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Executive Summary  
In this report we draw together the results of three recent studies of Danish conceptions of acceptance, 
toleration and intolerance. The main focus is on cultural and religious differences and how they have 
been approached in Danish society generally, and more specifically in the Danish primary educational 
system and in Danish political life. These differences relate mainly to immigration based minorities 
and in particular to Muslims, who in a Danish context long has served as the main ‘other’ in terms of 
culture, religion and politics.  
Chapter 1 analyses the cultural diversity challenges in Denmark and how they have been met with 
intolerance, tolerance, respect and recognition respectively. The chapter starts out by analysing the 
main traits of national identity and state formation, then moves on to Danish immigration history and 
the various ethnic and religious minorities resulting from immigration and from the changing of 
territorial borders, before it finally addresses how Denmark generally has handled cultural diversity 
challenges of the last 40 years. The main diversity challenges that Danish politicians consider 
important can be summed up in three core themes: 
 
1. Unemployment: It is often emphasized that the percentage of non-
Western immigrants on social security is out of proportion with the rest 
of the population. This is seen as a problem for the sustainability of the 
Danish welfare model. 
2. Parallel societies (ghettoisation): It is often noted that we need to avoid 
a situation where Muslims are living in their own secluded communities 
impervious to the rules and institutions of the rest of society and that we 
are heading towards such a situation if something is not done now. The 
fear is one of parallel societies hostile and indifferent to one another, of 
Sharia law being de facto implemented outside Danish law, and 
generally the erosion of society’s social cohesion. 
3. Radicalisation/extremism: There has been a growing concern with 
radicalisation within Muslim communities. In the discussion of the 
hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part 
been framed as overindulgence or indifference towards problematic 
beliefs and practices among minorities that in a worst-case scenario 
could lead to acts of terrorism. Concern for the democratic mind-set of 
Muslims is often expressed. However, both in order to counterbalance 
the symbolic exclusion of immigrant youth and thereby avoid 
radicalisation, and in order to counteract anti-Semitism in larger urban 
areas, the concept of toleration is being brought back onto the political 
agenda.  
In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural 
differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic 
Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark 
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and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of 
multiculturalism. The latter is seen as synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and 
political failure to demand and further the integration into society of all its members. In general, 
cultural and religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of 
integration, understood as one’s ability of live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and 
taxpaying individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions. 
In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been 
framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This 
criticism of tolerance as indifference or naivité relies on a historical preference for ‘free mindedness’ 
or ‘liberality’ over ‘tolerance’. In the Danish debate about liberality vs tolerance, tolerance is 
construed as form of moral failure: it implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right 
and wrong. Liberality, on the other hand, entails fighting for the values ‘you hold dearly’ while 
insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a 
strong commitment by all to equal citizen rights and to their protection by the state. Liberality, 
secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. Liberality is a ‘republican’ 
virtue that enables you to participate in blunt public exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you are able 
to reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements with your opponents at all levels of society. 
Chapter 2 focuses on how the Danish school system addresses challenges that arise from the 
presence of religious and cultural minorities with predominantly immigrant background. It looks at the 
extent to which differences are rejected, tolerated and recognised/respected in Danish public schools 
and the extent to which the structure of the Danish school system with its generous support to private 
schools allows for cultural and religious differences to persist. Chapter 2 hence contains two case 
studies. The first investigates how cultural and religious difference in public schools is discussed in the 
national political discourse and among school professionals and practitioners. The study takes its 
starting point in a political event in 2010 where a public school was heavily criticised for only inviting 
women to certain meetings on bullying because it was seen as an illegitimate accommodation of 
‘medieval’ cultural norms among immigrant parents. The second case regards the structure of the 
Danish school system, its institutional toleration of diversity. At the centre is the debate about whether 
it is legitimate that the Danish rules facilitating the creation of private schools with a large state 
subsidy are used to establish Muslim or Islamic private schools whose democratic credentials are 
uncertain. The debate resulted in legislative changes mandating civic education at private schools, 
regardless of their cultural and religious basis. To some these changes represent reduced (institutional) 
toleration on the side of the state and the political majority which is likely to reduce diversity in the 
Danish school sector. The chapter looks at the debate, the legislative changes and the perception of the 
new legislative requirements’ effects on schools.  
Chapter 3 analyses negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as they play out in two recent 
public debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial 
Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving 
the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of 
tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere.  
First, the chapter maps and compares the different toleration positions and arguments in the two 
debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. This analysis finds that while the debate 
surrounding Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was skewed towards toleration, the debate about Bilal Philips’ 
visit to Denmark was skewed towards intolerance. The reason for this difference in toleration 
boundary drawing is explained with reference to important differences in the sender-message-audience 
triad in the two selected cases. Despite these differences the analysis also shows that the same 
toleration positions and arguments of boundary drawing are found in the two debates. These recurrent 
positions include: ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’, ‘toleration-but-protest’, ‘toleration-because-
intervention-is-counterproductive’, ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, ‘intolerance-because-of-
liberal-perfectionism’. The analysis shows how the support of these different positions of toleration 
boundary drawing cut across the traditional political spectrum in Denmark. 
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Second, chapter 3 investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing 
exactly their version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking 
a stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. This analysis, building on media data as well as 
interviews with engaged actors, identifies three significant and recurrent strategies; 1) the strategy of 
pushing boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena, 2) the strategy of securitization, which 
pushes boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political and extra-ordinary, and 3) the strategy of 
reframing, adaptation or avoidance of boundary drawing. The central argument in this section is that 
the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determines 
the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope 
with pressures. 
As a last step, chapter 3 focuses on how toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect 
Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in political debates in the Danish context. It argues that 
although the controversies regarding the two meetings did not generate any concrete policy 
implication, which directly altered Muslim actors’ possibilities of using public meetings as a platform 
for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, it is argued, 
with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering. 
Toleration boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the 
recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration 
boundaries we are at the same time constructing in-groups and out-groups. In the analyzed debates 
Muslims in general are often designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the 
Muslim community, which may potentially serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as 
legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims. 
Chapter 4 draws together the studies of conceptions, debates and arguments on tolerance and 
intolerance in Denmark. The chapter is structured in five main parts. The first part brings together the 
major insights from the presented studies in order to provide an answer to the question of to what 
extent current conceptions of toleration and intolerance are challenging or reproducing the Danish 
tradition of ‘freemindedness’ or liberality. The second part concludes on the degree to which the case 
studies show examples of the argumentation going beyond toleration in Denmark towards ‘positive 
recognition’ or inclusion to the realm of ‘the normal’ of particular cultural and religious differences. 
The third part likewise draws some comparative conclusion on the conceptualization and limits of 
tolerance across issue fields (education and political life), in particular addressing the question of 
whether or not it makes a difference to perceptions of toleration if the issue at hand is one that 
demands practical solutions (concrete decision-making) or one that operates more at a symbolic level 
(more principled debates). The fourth part of the chapter discusses across the studies if Danish debates 
on limits of tolerance and policies of difference are excluding groups or making it difficult for them to 
participate in school or political life. Thus, it is discussed how toleration boundary-drawing impacts on 
not least Muslim minorities in these two spheres. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving some 
reflections as to what could be done vis-à-vis toleration of cultural and religious difference in the 
studies area in the future. The main focus is here on ensuring the security of rights of individuals as 
legal, political and moral equals. 
 
Keywords 
Tolerance, respect, recognition, accommodation, integration, intolerance, liberalism, secularism, free-
mindedness, civic turn, education, politics, political participation, Islam, Denmark 
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INTRODUCTION: TOLERATION IN DENMARK 
 
By Tore Vincents Olsen and Lasse Lindekilde 
 
In this report we draw together the results of three recent studies of Danish conceptions of acceptance, 
toleration and intolerance. The main focus is on cultural and religious differences and how they have 
been approached in Danish society generally, and more specifically in the Danish primary educational 
system and in Danish political life. These differences relate mainly to immigration based minorities 
and in particular to Muslims, who in a Danish context long has served as the main ‘other’ in terms of 
culture, religion and politics.  
‘Freemindedness’ or liberality has been seen as part of Danish national heritage and 
constitutes a central discursive dimension of public debates on toleration and limits to tolerance in 
Denmark. At the general level, this concept equals toleration in that it consists in defending the rights 
of those who have different beliefs and practices to utter them publicly and continue to practice them 
although they are seen as misconceived and outright wrong. It is usually summed up in the phrase 
‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor’ where Thor denotes the good and the upright in Nordic 
mythology and Loke the evil and the deceitful. However, free-mindedness or liberality does not mean 
that those with whom you disagree are to be left in peace. On the contrary, it means that you engage 
with them – and they with you – in a frank and open public confrontation about what is right and 
wrong. Indeed for some, free-mindedness is contrasted with ‘tolerance’, the latter is seen as 
indifference, moral relativism, and as such representing a failing ability to build moral judgment. To 
debate in the manner prescribed by free-mindedness requires ‘thick skin’. Thick skin is a presupposed 
‘civic virtue’. And eventually, it is presumed that despite your strong differences you will be able to 
live and reach common solutions together at all levels of society.  The virtue of thick skin was 
notoriously appealed to in the Danish Cartoon controversy when it was argued that Muslims in Danish 
democracy had to be able to stand ‘mock, scorn and ridicule’ (Lindekilde 2009). 
So historically toleration ought to have good preconditions in Denmark. In this report we trace 
through the study of societal discourses, debates on education and politics whether this notion of free-
mindedness still applies and more broadly, what the conceptions of acceptance, toleration and 
intolerance are. For against the heritage of free-mindedness and in this sense toleration, we have seen 
other developments in the last 10 to 15 years, which could be regarded as an reaction to too much 
toleration or naïve laissez faire towards cultural and religious differences which (are perceived to) 
threaten the Danish society, its values and cohesion.  Like many other European countries Denmark 
has witnessed a reaction to immigration and immigration based minorities. Not only have different 
forms of new nationalism and nationalist intolerance emerged, Denmark has also seen a ‘civic turn’ 
underlining the need to ensure commitment among the populace to key liberal democratic principles 
and values (e.g. democracy, human rights, gender equality, religious freedom) and induce all citizens 
in general, and immigrants in particular, to assume an active citizenship, again not just at the level at 
national political institutions, but in relation to all spheres of society, family, child care institutions, 
schools, voluntary associations, local democracy, public debate etc.  
In a certain sense, this combined national and civic turn could be seen as reducing the space of 
toleration in Denmark, although the modalities in which are not simple and clear-cut since, again, the 
value of ‘free-mindedness’ is among the values oftentimes confirmed by people defending key 
national and liberal values. Indeed Denmark does to some extent experience a form somewhat 
paradoxical ‘liberal intolerance’ based on fears regarding non-liberal differences and their impact on 
social cohesion, on the constitutive divide in liberal democratic order between public and private and 
on the notion that the only good and productive life is liberal life autonomously and self-reflectively 
lived, or, in short, that liberal societies ought to actively promote and encourage the creation liberal 
people and eventually that they are ‘for liberal people only’.  
Chapter 1gives a general introduction to Danish national identity and state formation, 
immigration history and the diversity issues connected to various minority groups as well as it sums up 
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historical and current conceptions of acceptance, toleration, and tolerance in Danish society as they are 
evidenced the Danish integration regime, policies and institutional arrangements.  
Chapter 2 studies how debates concerning toleration in education has unfolded in recent years. 
The chapter looks at both public schools and private schools. In particular public schools have by 
many been seen as the place where key national and liberal values should be transmitted to students 
and, to some extent, to their parents. The private schooling system, working on the basis of a generous 
state subsidy (voucher system), has for many been the incarnation of Danish free-mindedness, since it 
allows parents to choose schools for their children which teach in accordance with their (pedagogical, 
ideological, religious) worldviews. Nonetheless worries have been raised as to whether so-called 
‘Islamic’ private schools have been teaching students to respect the principles of human rights, 
democracy and gender equality to a sufficient degree and thereby preparing them for a life in Danish 
society. The chapter traces the various conceptions of toleration in the debates on cultural and 
religious differences in schools and relate them to the traditional conception of toleration in Denmark.  
Chapter 3 then turns to the conceptions of toleration and intolerance in Danish political life. 
The chapter analyses negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as they play out in two recent public 
debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial 
Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving 
the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of 
tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere. At 
the core of these debates are the norms and values displayed in political life by some Muslim actors, 
and questions of how much difference can and should be tolerated in political life without 
undermining cohesion and allowing intolerance to flourish. As such both debates offer a prism for 
studying the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors in the form of 
public meetings, conferences, etc. The chapter first maps and compares the different toleration 
positions and arguments in the two debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. Secondly, the 
chapter investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing exactly their 
version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking a (moral and 
principled) stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. Finally, the chapter focuses on how 
toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in 
political debates in the Danish context. Besides media coverage the last two sections of the chapter 
draws upon interviews with actors engaged in the two public debates. 
Chapter 4 draws together these studies and debates and analyses to what extent current 
conceptions of toleration and intolerance are challenging or reproducing the Danish tradition of ‘free-
mindedness’ or liberality. In doing so the chapter also draws some basic conclusions regarding the 
degree to which the case studies show examples of the argumentation going beyond toleration in 
Denmark towards ‘positive recognition’ or inclusion to the realm of ‘normal’ of particular cultural and 
religious differences. Likewise the chapter draws comparative conclusions on the conceptualization 
and limits of tolerance across issue fields (education and political life), in particular addressing the 
question of whether or not it makes a difference to perception of toleration if the issue at hand is one 
that demands practical solutions or one that operates more at a symbolic level. The chapter also 
discusses across the studies if Danish debates on limits of tolerance and policies of difference are 
excluding groups or making it difficult for them to participate in school or political life. Thus, it is 
discussed how toleration boundary-drawing impacts on not least Muslim minorities in these two 
spheres. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving some reflections as to what could be done vis-à-vis 
toleration of cultural and religious difference in the studies area in the future.  
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CHAPTER 1. TOLERANCE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY DISCOURSES IN 
DENMARK 
 
By Kristian Jensen, Johanne Helboe Nielsen, Morten Brænder, Per Mouritsen and Tore V. Olsen 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Danes perceive Denmark as situated on the fringes of Europe, and not only geographically. At face 
value, this perception is a peculiarity, since Denmark has always been surrounded by and interacting 
with key players in the struggle for European dominion. Today, Denmark’s closest neighbours in 
cultural, political and economic terms, Sweden and Germany, also constitute its main trading partners 
(Danmarks Statistik 2008).  
As Denmark’s role in the great European power struggles was gradually but inevitably reduced at 
the brink of the modern age, Danish national identity was more and more defined in accordance with 
its role as a minor European state. This transition is evident in Denmark’s two national anthems 
written within a time span of just 42 years – respectively in 1778 and 1820.
1
 The first anthem, “Kong 
Christian stod ved højen mast” (King Christian stood by the lofty mast), praises the “victorious” 17th-
century warrior King Christian IV as the embodiment of the lands he ruled. This anthem was written at 
a time when the king still ruled the most powerful navy in Europe and led a multinational “Composite 
State” (Helstaten), consisting of Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Norway, the islands of the North 
Atlantic and a number of overseas Colonies. The second anthem, “Der er et yndigt land” (a lovely land 
is ours) was written after the Napoleonic Wars and the loss of Norway. It is dedicated to the tranquility 
and fruitfulness of the Danish natural landscape, the purity of the national language and the people’s 
freedom. This anthem mainly serves as a warrant of the bonds of unbroken continuity between present 
and past, city and countryside, farmland, people and king. Here, powerfulness is only a memory of a 
long-lost past. 
A national awakening in the 19
th
 century fitted the political reality of the losses of Norway (in 
1814, to Sweden) and Schleswig-Holstein (in 1864, to Germany) as well as the ideal of romanticism. 
The separation from its former lands created a Danish state without noticeable differences in 
nationality and language. The Danish nation and the Danish state eventually became so closely knit 
together that it to this day is difficult to think of the nation without the state. 
In the early 20
th
 century Denmark gradually became a social democratic Scandinavian welfare state 
formed by the non-revolutionary Social Democratic Party. This social democratic struggle was also 
built upon a rearticulation of ‘the People’ (‘Folket’) as the emotional and essential core of the nation. 
Their struggle to reform the state was linked to a perception of the political elite as out of touch with 
the backbone of the nation: the working class (Hansen 2002: 60-61). 
After the Second World War welfare programs expanded significantly, and growth and equality 
were successfully united. Although this positive development came to a halt in the 1970’s, the 
fundamental social democratic vision of the welfare state had been largely accepted by even Liberals 
and Conservatives. Today all political parties (accept maybe one minor party: Liberal Alliance) 
operate on political platforms that essentially accept an extensive social safety net as the foundation of 
the Danish society. 
This widespread solidarity has come under pressure in recent decades as the share of immigrants 
and descendants has steadily risen. The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences 
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 The following analysis owes much to Uffe Østergaard’s interpretation of the development from Composite to Nation State: 
Østergaard (2002). 
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in Denmark today pertains to post-immigration minorities with backgrounds in non-western countries, 
most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. National minorities and more settled religious minorities 
are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal rights, symbolic 
respect and recognition. Immigration from non-western countries, on the other hand, are very 
controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability or willingness to integrate into the 
‘modern’ Danish society and democracy.  
In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural 
differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic 
and religious identities. This discourse of integration is explicitly set against notion of 
multiculturalism. The latter is seen as synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and 
political failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society.  
The strong focus on integration has changed the perception of Denmark as a country tolerant 
towards alternative lifestyles (first to legalize pornography and recognize gay marriages). The 
comparably liberal immigration laws of 1983 have been replaced through gradual reform since 1999 
with one of the toughest immigration regimes in Europe. Among other things this has resulted in a 
two-tier system of social membership in which immigrants from outside the EU and the Nordic 
countries receive a special ‘introduction benefit’ the first three years of their residence. Hereafter they 
pass to another scheme termed ‘start help’ which applies to all – except non-Danish EU citizens – who 
haven’t resided in Denmark in seven out of the last eight years. However, for Danish citizens it only 
applies if they have been residing outside of the EU. On these schemes individuals who are, for 
example, unemployed, sick, pregnant or on maternity leave receive welfare payments that are roughly 
half of what you would receive on the scheme for Danish citizens who have resided in the EU in seven 
out of the last eight years and for other EU-citizens. 
The developments above set the scene for studying the recent cultural, ethnic and religious 
diversity challenges in Denmark and the ways in which they have been addressed. Section 2 will 
expand on the current dimensions of Danish identity and the selective reading of historical events and 
figures related to this discursive construction. Section 3 will broadly describe Danish immigration 
history and the challenges that the most relevant minority groups of Danish society face today. Finally, 
before the concluding remarks, section 4 will expand on the dominant interpretation of tolerance in 
Denmark and on the values and arrangements of the Danish integration regime.  
In this chapter we use the following working definitions. National identity refers to the identity that 
Danes see themselves as sharing as members of the national community. National heritage concerns 
the historical bases of this identity. Multiculturalism relates both  to the fact that there are distinct 
socially salient groups in society that differ with regard to their cultural and religious backgrounds, 
and to the broadly conceived normative position which holds that these groups should be given 
positive symbolic recognition of their contribution to society and/or bestowed with a special status 
through specific polices and rights. Cultural, ethnic and religious diversity refers to the notion that 
there are non-trivial differences along cultural, ethnic and religious dimensions between different 
groups. Citizenship is both understood as legal nationality, and as a social and political ideal that 
implies that the citizen participates democratically in political institutions and the institutions of civil 
society. Integration means the equal participation of immigrants in all spheres of society and is in 
Denmark based on the notion of the adoption by immigrants of the practices and values of ‘active 
citizenship.’ It is hence not equal to a complete cultural assimilation and the demand that immigrants 
become like Danes on all cultural and identity dimensions. There are two forms of liberalism: 1) 
classical or laissez faire liberalism is based on the notion that the state should be neutral to different 
perceptions of the good life and provide the individual with the set of rights that give her the highest 
degree of freedom to pursue her own conception of the good life (if she so wishes), consonant with the 
equal freedom of all. 2) Perfectionist liberalism on the other hand stresses individual autonomy, i.e. 
the rational self-direction of one’s life, as the central aspect of a good life. In perfectionist liberalism, 
the state should promote individual autonomy. Republicanism emphasizes the ideal of citizenship as 
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democratic participation, because it is seen as part as a good life and/or because it is seen as essential 
for the maintenance of the institutions of liberal democracy. The doctrine of civic integrationism refers 
to the belief that integration of immigrants should be based on ‘active citizenship’ and includes 
elements of both republicanism and perfectionist liberalism. The concept of toleration  implies not 
forbidding beliefs and practices that one finds wrong, because the reasons for not forbidding them are 
found weightier that the reasons for objecting to them. In the chapter, the terms of tolerance and 
toleration are used interchangeably. In Denmark there is a particular conception of tolerance that is 
called ‘free mindedness’ or ‘liberality’. Liberality entails fighting for the values ‘you hold dearly’ 
while insisting on the same right for all others. Proponents of liberality contrast this notion of 
tolerance with an understanding where the term ‘tolerance’ is taken to mean indifference, relativism 
and the failure to form moral judgements. 
  
1.2. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE FORMATION 
 
1.2.1. State formation  
Through time Danish national identity has been influenced by the parallel and interwoven 
development of state formation and conceptions of the nation, each of which is connected to a series 
of key historical events. 
The Lutheran reformation (1536) whereby church land was expropriated and church influence on 
state policy was diminished, coincided with the often heavy-handed creation by the state of a 
(protestant) Christian people. This proto-nationalist people-building emphasised individual loyalty to 
the Christian king, knowledge of and ability to read scripture and the catechism, and to this end 
extended the use of national language in churches and schools. Only later, with the liberal 1849 
constitution, were freedoms of religion and religious worship in independent religious societies 
established, in conjunction with the creation of a state church, the so called ‘People’s Church’ 
[Folkekirken], with locally self-governing parishes under government administration. Despite 
declining membership a large majority of Danes remain members of this church today, although most 
do not practice. Culturally Folkekirken retains a privileged position today (Mouritsen, 2009: 7-8).  
The 1750s saw a large debate on how to define the nation and citizenship. Enlightenment ideas in 
the modernising monarchy produced – for a brief period of time – a form of cosmopolitanism where a 
person’s motherland was the territory where he chose to live in loyalty and allegiance to the king, 
whether one spoke Danish, Norwegian or German. This civic-patriotic conception of the nation and 
citizenship was soon challenged by a growing national bourgeoisie that was hostile towards granting 
citizenship and state employment to foreigners. Criticism grew after an episode in 1770s, where J. F. 
Struense, a German-born physician to mentally ill King Christian VII, had seized power to initiate 
reforms before he was outmanoeuvred. This perceived German coup d´état provoked the Law of 
Indigenous Rights of 1776, whereby only citizens born in the King’s dominions (but still also German 
speakers) could assume office.  
From the mid-19
th
 century Danish politics changed significantly when the last stage of nation 
building coincided with the country’s relatively early democratisation in a way that still shapes 
contemporary delineation of national membership. When the king resigned in 1848 and the first free 
constitution was signed in 1849, all major political forces favoured comprehensive constitutional 
rights and (male) democracy. However, an internal conflict erupted between national liberals on the 
one hand and cosmopolitans and left-liberals on the other, who disagreed on the identity, in terms of 
language and territory (but not religion), of the new democratic people. The main controversies 
centred on Schleswig, i.e. whether to separate it from Holstein or incorporate both under the new 
constitution. The national liberals, who came to dominate, emphasized Danish language as constitutive 
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for the nation, and furthermore wished to include certain German speaking territories, which would 
then have to be rendered Danish-speaking (Hansen, 2002: 56). This policy was of course resisted in 
the affected territories. Over the next 20 years, two wars were fought over the question of Schleswig-
Holstein, with the second in 1863-1864 ending in a miserable defeat where Lauenborg, Holstein and 
Schleswig – including the Danish speaking parts – were lost, rendering Denmark an almost pure 
‘ethnic’ and Danish-speaking nation. This blow produced an inward-looking, nationalist re-awakening 
inspired by romanticism and based on the rural society and peasant virtues. The loss of one-third of the 
country, including the most developed cities and regions, was counterbalanced by cultivating the 
Jutlandic moor, development of co-operative farm movements, and the establishment of popular folk 
high school education for peasant youth. .  
Danish nationalism, emerging as a literary phenomenon in the early 19
th
 century, evolved into 
political nationalism from the 1830s (Korsgaard 2004: 298), with N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872) 
playing a prominent part in both movements. As a priest, author of hymns and songs, and church and 
school reformer, he laid the groundwork for a Danish populist nationalism that mixes ‘cultural’ and 
‘civic’ elements within a Lutheran framework. Intensely concerned with the concept of the people and 
its spiritual roots, Grundtvig also introduced the idea of ‘liberality’ [frisind] as a particular kind of 
free-mindedness
2
 that differed, in his view, from ‘tolerance’ in accepting but not being indifferent to 
the difference of opinion (Huggler 2009). 
Today, the dominant conception of the nation and national identity reflects a selective reading of 
Danish national identity history. In it five semantic and narrative elements can be identified 
(Mouritsen 2009: 23-25; Mouritsen 2010: 8-9). First, even though traditional religiosity is declining, 
cultural Christianity remains significant. In the Danish context Christianity, Lutheran individualism, 
secularism, and peasant liberation and spiritual awakening become intertwined. Underlying is a 
narrative about the Danish peasants escaping from rural class society to a status of independent 
peasant-citizens through an ‘awakening’ stay at the Grundtvigian inspired folk high schools. The idea 
of a special Danish brand of Lutheranism, tied to this narrative, presupposes the separation of religion 
from politics and the practice of religion in a worldly fashion. Thereby it tends to place Islam in an 
unfavourable light.  
Second, Danish language has constituted an important element in national belonging. Today, 
immigrants are expected to master and use Danish at a level well beyond what is required to function 
in the labour market and ordinary communication.  
Third, Denmark is often described as a small and culturally homogeneous country with a 
characteristic social ideal of tight knit ‘cosiness’, in part owing to homogenising processes through 
state schools and through a national television station that had a monopoly until 1988. Present debates 
on cohesion in Denmark, the valuation of sameness, and mistrust of cultural pluralism per se draw on 
these themes.  
Fourth, smallness and homogeneity are connected to values of egalitarianism and a special way of 
understanding and organising democracy. The influence from Grundtvigianism created a tradition of 
anti-authoritarianism, social liberalism and appreciation of social levelling that have become linked to 
the comprehensive welfare state and its focus on social and cultural equality, as well as to the post-
World War II construction of a civic nationalism of conversational, consensual democracy (Koch 
1945). The notion that these values are really only genuine in Denmark (and other Scandinavian 
countries) often enter into debates on the civic (in)capacity of newcomers.  
Fifth, the pride in the welfare society evident in government discourse translates to a requirement 
of reciprocity and solidarity, concretely manifested as an obligation to work and pay taxes, which may 
                                                     
2
 Literally ‘frisind’ is a compound of two elements ‘fri’ (free) and ‘sind’ (mind), and is often also translated as 
‘openmindedness’ or ‘free-spiritedness’. We return to the cultural and political significance of this concept in the 
conclusion. 
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be seen as the key currency of symbolic recognition – i.e., the idea that membership depends on the 
ability to do one’s share. 
Today, cultural diversity is often associated with the existence of inferior cultures (un-western, un-
modern, un-civilised) in Danish society (Mouritsen 2009: 27). ‘Danish’ values of democracy, gender 
equality, and freedom of speech become presented, here, as universalistic concepts but with culturalist 
spins (Ibid: 19), producing a ‘particular universalism’, which is both seen as historically founded and 
bounded, and superior because it is liberal and modern. To a large extent, Muslims have become the 
defining ‘other’ of these peculiarly culturalised civic-liberal self-understandings. They are who the 
Danes are not (Mouritsen, 2006: 88).  
 
1.2.2. Citizenship in Denmark 
The term ’citizenship’ bears different meanings in a Danish context. The concept of indfødsret was the 
first coinage of a citizenship concept and literally means ‘the right to be native born’. It was 
legislatively constructed in 1772 to ensure that only citizens born in the King’s dominions could 
discharge honorary offices (Ersbøll 2010). The purpose was not to reserve positions for ethnic Danes 
and, hence, indfødsret was originally understood in terms of a ius soli interpretation.  The 
interpretation of the law, however, soon changed such that only children born of native-born parents 
acquired indfødsret at birth (Ibid.).  
The concept of statsborgerskab denotes legal nationality, and in terms of citizenship it signifies the 
citizen’s status as subject of a particular (national) state. Today indfødsret and statsborgerskab are 
used interchangeably as they denote the same status and rights.  
The concept of medborgerskab (medborger literally means ‘fellow citizen’) signifies a horizontal 
interpretation of what belonging to the same society entails – a form of compatriotism. It is not a legal 
concept but a normative concept pertaining to certain virtues the citizen ought to strive towards. In its 
contemporary use it is closely associated with the comprehensive Danish welfare state and the notion 
of Denmark as a social space inhabited by a population of active citizens who share the same public 
values. 
Due to the development from a multi-national to a national state whose borders followed, by and 
large, the ethnic boundaries of the population, it became increasingly less meaningful to differentiate 
between the above meanings of citizenship. From the early 20
th
 century onwards, the different terms 
were perceived as inseperable and both indfødsret and medborgerskab gradually fell out of use (Ibid.).   
However, citizenship as medborgerskab gradually re-entered the public discourse during the 1990s 
in the wake of the Muslim immigration and has been a central concept in the public discourse since the 
liberal-conservative government took office in 2001. The current distinction between 
statsborgerskab/indfødsret and medborgerskab denotes how access to legal citizenship is now 
perceived as a prize at the end of the road of successful integration. One has to be committed to the 
virtues of being a ‘fellow citizen’ (medborger) before one can gain recognition as a full-fledged 
member of the community. 
Danish citizenship is generally understood in terms of ius sanguinis. Accordingly, Danes today 
tend to perceive Denmark as a community rather than a society, as a Gemeinschaft rather than a 
Gesellschaft. For more than 200 years after 1776 immigrant descendants were entitled to Danish 
citizenship either automatically or since 1950 through declaration (though from 1976 conditioned on 
residence and from 1999 also on conduct). This general entitlement was repealed in 2004 with 
immigrant descendants now being required to apply for Danish citizenship by naturalization (Ibid: 26).  
Since 2001 there has been a tightening on all fronts concerning permanent residence and 
naturalization.  Both objective criteria such as years of residence (for naturalization: from seven to 
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nine years) and self-support (for naturalization: no more than 6 months on public benefits in the last 5 
years plus no debt to the state) as well as what can be defined as a subjective criterion of belonging has 
been tightened.  The last aspect is probably the most central. Initiatives like the signing of an 
Integration Contract and a Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship, a harsh language 
proficiency test (excluding many from ever gaining citizenship) and a citizenship test examining 
knowledge of “Danish culture, history and social conditions” signals a turn towards a more subjective 
element of belonging where being Danish is not only a matter of submitting to Danish legislation or 
even to Danish norms, but of identifying with those norms. 
 
1.2.3. Denmark and Europe 
The opposition between being Nordic and being European was emphasized in the debate in the 19
th
 
century among romanticists and adherents of enlightenment ideology. The (liberal) left centering on 
Edvard Brandes and Viggo Hørup were condescendingly called “the Europeans” due to the fact that 
their emphasis on liberal values was less bound to a national or Nordic discourse.  Being Nordic meant 
defining one’s identity in terms of being Danish or Scandinavian, while being European meant 
defining one’s identity in more abstract terms, as committed to more general ideas of the liberty and 
equality of man. As a result of this contrast, a significant discourse was established towards the end of 
the 19
th
 century according to which a true Danish sentiment could only be nurtured by a genuine anti-
European feeling. 
The consequence of the tight conceptual coupling of nation and state in the 19
th
 century has been 
that encroachments on political sovereignty have been perceived as threats to the nation. Since the 
early 1990’s Denmark’s relationship to the EU has been marked with skepticism expressed in the 
consistent high level of no-support in referenda from 1992 and onwards. This inability to distinguish 
between nation and state has locked the debate in such a way that the pro-Europeans primarily have 
focused on the economic prospects and argued that the EU does not exceed normal inter-state 
cooperation while the euro-skepticists have claimed that the EU is a new superstate that threatens 
national independence (Hansen 2002). 
When the Maastricht Treaty was turned down in 1992, the solution was a compromise that would 
keep Denmark within the European Community and at the same time ensure that the process leading 
towards the “United States of Europe” (allegedly the main concern of the electorate) could be brought 
to a halt (Krunke, 2005: 341-42). Denmark ratified the treaty but was allowed to opt out of the 
integration process on four issues: Union Citizenship, the Common Defence and Security Policy, the 
Economic and Monetary Union and the new initiatives in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. 
The last of the four opt-outs was from the very beginning framed as a means of securing national 
sovereignty regarding questions of immigration and integration. However, the European Court of 
Justice’s decision in the Metock case (2008), which allowed third-country nationals to obtain family 
reunification with their EU-citizen spouses whenever the latter had used their right to free movement 
under EU law, raised fears that the strict Danish immigration rules would be undermined. The Danish 
Government reacted strongly, with the Minister of Integration declaring it her goal to change the 
European legislation after the ruling. This testifies to the ongoing opposition to let the EU encroach on 
areas of importance to the national self-understanding. 
 
1.3. CULTURAL DIVERSITY CHALLENGES 
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1.3.1. Immigration history of Denmark 
Before the immigration wave of Turkish and Yugoslav foreign labour in the late 1960s (a result of the 
demand for workers for Danish industrial production) the question of cultural homogeneity in 
Denmark was, with a few notable exceptions, hardly ever raised. Denmark has been – and probably 
still is - one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world. Danes have always been 
reluctant to perceive the nation and Danish history in relation to and as a result of immigration, which 
reflects itself in the fierce opposition the last 20 years to label Danish society as multicultural. Today 
9.8 percent of Denmark’s 5.5 million residents are immigrants and descendants of immigrants, and 6.6 
percent of the population are from non-Western countries (Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and 
Integration 2010: 17). 
Following the Reformation, Denmark was a Lutheran Protestant country where the principle of 
‘cuius region eius religio’ was strictly pursued for decades: in the multicultural ‘Composite State’ 
there was strict church discipline, and Catholics, Calvinists and Jews were not allowed to settle here. 
However, due to economic needs a more tolerant view on religious differences began to show during 
the 17
th
 century. The first tendencies emerged in the Schleswig-Holstein duchy where the cities of 
Glückstadt and Altona were opened to immigration, including religious minorities, in order to benefit 
from the diligence of these groups and take up commercial competition with Hamburg. After the wars 
against Sweden in the mid-17
th
 century, non-Lutherans were also allowed to settle in Copenhagen, 
Fredericia and Nakskov in order to help restore these damaged cities. An extensive tolerance was now 
instituted by the King in these cities which allowed Jews, Calvinists and Catholics to practice their 
religions freely. The Danish Law of 1683 removed several of the strict regulations concerning non-
Lutheran immigration from the time of the Reformation and allowed all but monks and Jesuits access 
to the kingdom. As a result, Jews settled in many provincial cities (Østergaard 2007: 264-65). The law 
also proscribed Lutheran priests from inciting hatred against other faiths. Nonetheless, it was still the 
King’s duty to protect his subjects against heresy and strictly forbidden to speak against the Lutheran 
church. Full religious freedom was not instituted until the ratification of the constitution in 1849. 
In the 18
th
 century the ideas of the Enlightenment slowly began to affect theological thinking and 
the relationship between the state and religious minorities. This led to greater tolerance among the 
different Christian confessions but the extension of tolerance to Jews was more difficult. When 
Bishops and other people of authority spoke of or decided on religious matters (e.g. the building of a 
synagogue) they often referred to the possible resentment of the general public. It was a common sight 
for Jews to be harassed in the streets (Ibid: 145). However, toward the end of the century the ideas of 
the Enlightenment also began to benefit the Jews. Within 30 years (1784-1814) the government started 
to ignore the views of the clergy when deciding on religious matters relating to minorities.  The guilds 
were opened in 1788 and in 1814 Jews were given equal access to all occupations, their educational 
opportunities (including university) were greatly enhanced, they got the right to buy land and they 
were added to the military enrollment (Ibid.). At the same time, however, the special rights Jews had 
within the areas of family and religion were reduced. To an increasing degree, equality was conceived 
as the elimination of special rights and the attribution of the same rights and duties to all. This 
ultimately led to the assimilation of many Jews. 
This Enlightenment view of the government was not accepted by all. In ‘the literary Jew feud’ of 
1813 several works hostile to Jews were published. The hostility intensified in connection with the 
1813 state bankruptcy for which the Jews were blamed. In 1819 during the two days of ‘the corporal 
feud,’ Jews were physically attacked by an angry mob in Copenhagen. Because of police passivity the 
government had to have the military stop the attacks.  
At the end of the 19
th
 century, approximately 3500 Jews lived in Denmark. In 1904-1917, 
following the violent pogroms in Russia this number doubled. The newly arrived Russian-Polish Jews 
were poor, had other customs, language, names and were often more orthodox believers than the semi-
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assimilated Danish Jews.  This led the latter to fear that the newcomers might provoke anti-Semitism 
among the majority population. 
In the last part of the 19
th
 century, the industrial revolution took place in Denmark and increased 
the demand for foreign labor. By 1885 8.1 percent of the population in Copenhagen was foreign born 
(Ibid: 284). The majority of foreign workers came from Sweden and took on the hardest and worst-
paid jobs. The Danish workers’ movement criticized the flow of Swedish labor for pressing wages and 
functioning as strikebreakers. Prompted by financial concerns, the government started sending home 
those foreigners who couldn’t support themselves. In 1891 the Poor Law (“Fattigdomsloven”) 
established that only Danish citizens were entitled to support from the state.  At the same time, 
however, access to Danish citizenship was made easier, especially for Swedes and Norwegians. In 
combination with mixed marriages, a similar language and culture, this led to quick assimilation.  
There was also a small flow of workers from Germany. Despite minor conflicts, the Germans were 
generally welcomed by the Danish Unions who placed great value on their international contacts. The 
demand for labor created by the cultivation of sugar beets that began in the 1870s and 1880s was met 
by Polish seasonal workers. In 1914 14,000 Polish workers came. However, the First World War led 
to a drastic decline, and after 1929 the flow of workers practically stopped. 3-4000 Polish men and 
women settled in Denmark. They stood out with their different language and religion (Catholicism). 
Harassment was not uncommon. The Catholic Church in Denmark supported the Poles and helped 
them adjust. It strived to assimilate them in order to avoid a Polish minority church and because it 
feared that the poor and alien Poles would diminish the Church’s reputation in Denmark. The Church 
generally succeeded in this endeavor as the following generations largely melted in with the Danish 
population (Ibid: 304). 
After the Second World War less than 1000 of the approximately 30,000 non-German refugees 
from the war stayed in Denmark and did not noticeably stand out (Ibid: 332). Up until 1983 
approximately 10,000 refugees arrived from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uganda, Chile and 
Vietnam. They were perceived as unproblematic and largely welcomed with kindness and 
understanding. 
The period after the Second World War was one of economic prosperity, with industrial expansion 
in Denmark in the 1950s and 1960s increasing the demand for labor. The first groups of guest workers 
came in 1967. Liberal immigration rules made it possible for them to come without work or residence 
permits. A spontaneous immigration of mostly Turks and Yugoslavs – and later on Pakistanis – took 
place after Sweden and West Germany tightened their rules. Immigration was first regulated with 
quotas for work permits in 1973. However after the oil crisis hit the country later the same year, all 
further labour immigration was suspended. Despite this the number of immigrants continued to rise as 
the foreign workers sought family reunification. Later on, their children often married people from 
their homeland.  
In 1973, 12,000 guest workers resided in Denmark; family reunifications brought that number to 
35,000 by 1978 (Ibid: 362). The realization that many guest workers planned to stay prompted the 
Social Democratic government in 1980 to make integration the explicit principle behind its immigrant 
policies: the goal was to make immigrants self-supporting and to strike a reasonable balance between 
assimilation to Danish language and culture and the preservation of the identity-carrying elements of 
the immigrant communities.  
From 1984 the attention shifted to the flow of refugees coming from the Middle East and Sri 
Lanka, with 2,827 asylum seekers arriving in September 1986. This number drastically dropped to 137 
in the following month after the law was tightened (Togeby 2002: 37). In 1992 it was decided to give 
Yugoslavian war refugees (approximately 9,000, mostly Bosnians) temporary residence in expectation 
of a rapid return to their home country. In 1995 when this turned out not to be possible, their residence 
was normalized. The good will of their surroundings contributed to a relatively smooth inclusion into 
society. In the mid-90’s a large group of Somalis sought refuge in Denmark. They were met with an 
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often intrusive attention from the public and much more attention than had ever been directed at 
comparable groups of Iraqi and Afghan refugees who had arrived throughout a longer time period. 
Since the mid-1990s Denmark has seen a long period of politicization of integration and refugee 
issues particularly focusing on Muslims. At first the issues mainly revolved around welfare-state 
dependency, family reunification and the concentration of immigrants in ghettos. After 9/11 the focus 
was also directed at the (un-)democratic mind-set of Muslims, their loyalty to the Danish state and the 
lack of gender equality in many households. From the mid-90s the centre-left government came under 
increasing pressure to address immigration. This resulted in a number of revisions to the immigration 
and integration rules. It culminated in 1998 in a major revision that restricted the possibilities for 
permanent residence and family reunification and introduced a reduced ‘introduction benefit’ for 
immigrants. The latter entailed a break with the tradition of giving all residents the same rights. This 
introduction benefit was, however, raised again in 2000 after being met with political opposition and 
stories of refugees caught in poor living conditions. The discourse also toughened and deep cultural 
differences were targeted as a problem for the coherence of the national state – especially with 
appointment of the social democratic hawk Karen Jespersen as Minister of the Interior in 2000. It was 
often emphasized that Denmark should not become a multicultural country.  Multiculturalism took on 
a negative connotation referring to parallel societies. 
 
TABLE 1.1 Immigrants and descendants in Denmark, 1 January 2010. 
  
 
Immigrants 
 
Descendants 
 
Total 
Percentage of all 
foreigners in 
Denmark 
Turkey 32,255 26,961 59,216 10.9% 
Germany 28,234 2,678 30,912 5.7% 
Iraq 21,306 7,958 29,264 5.4% 
Poland 25,443 2,958 28,401 5.2% 
Lebanon 12,012 11,763 23,775 4.4% 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17,911 4,310 22,221 4.1% 
Other African countries 17,054 4,586 21,640 4.0% 
Pakistan 11,169 9,223 20,392 3.8% 
Yugoslavia 11,021 5,938 16,959 3.1% 
Somalia 10,127 6,704 16,831 3.1% 
Norway 14,663 1,404 16,067 3.0% 
Other Asian countries 11,907 3,509 15,416 2.8% 
Iran 12,098 3,111 15,209 2.8% 
Sweden 13,233 1,921 15,154 2.8% 
Vietnam 8,919 4,959 13,878 2.6% 
Great Britain 11,832 1,221 13,053 2.4% 
Afghanistan 9,966 2,664 12,630 2.3% 
Sri Lanka 6,715 4,088 10,803 2.0% 
Latin America 9,352 870 10,222 1.9% 
Morocco 5,140 4,691 9,831 1.8% 
China 8,506 1,182 9,688 1.8% 
North America 8,773 908 9,681 1.8% 
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Thailand 8,849 562 9,411 1.7% 
Phillipines 8,377 930 9,307 1.7% 
Iceland 7,876 1,090 8,966 1.7% 
Other Countries 81,684 12,126 93,810 17.3% 
All Countries 414,422 128,316 542,738 100.00% 
Source: reproduced from Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration 2010: 29. 
 
As this politicization of Muslims progressed, the right-wing Danish People’s Party (DPP) also became 
increasingly influential. In 2001 the new liberal-conservative government became dependent on the 
DPP for their parliamentarian majority, and the following years saw further restrictions and an even 
tougher political discourse. The new government made a wide range of changes aimed at reducing the 
number of immigrants, refugees and family reunifications, and at making it harder to get access to 
permanent residence and citizenship. Most recently, the government has proposed making family 
reunification dependent on the work experience, educational level and mastery of specific languages 
of both parties seeking reunification. But perhaps most notably, a host of initiatives have been 
undertaken to change the mind-set of immigrants – particularly Muslims – with the aim of 
modernizing their outlook on society (cf. section 3.2.4).  
In brief, until the inflow of guest workers in the late 1960s immigration to Denmark was limited 
and often resulted in assimilation. Increasing cultural pluralism from the 1960s on, however, 
eventually led to politicization of the issues surrounding integration from the mid-1990s and resulted 
in more and more restrictive rules and a tough political discourse aimed primarily at Muslims. The 
table above sums up the composition of immigrants and their descendants in Denmark as of January 
1
st
 2010.  
The next section outlines the challenges that the main minority and immigrants groups have faced 
in and posed to Denmark. As an introduction table 2 below broadly describes the different minority 
and immigrants groups in Denmark and how they differ along six dimensions.  
 
TABLE 1.2 Main minority groups in Denmark and their dimensions of difference 
Dimensions of difference Racial Ethnic Religious Cultural Linguistic 
Native minorities      
Greenlanders X X  X X 
Germans     X 
Jews  X X X  
Catholics   X   
Immigrants (non-Muslims)      
Scandinavians (Norwegians, Swedes, 
Icelanders) 
    (X)* 
Germans     X 
Poles   X X X 
Iranians (Christian) X X  X X 
Asians (Sri Lankans, Vietnamese, Filipino, 
Thai) 
X X X X X 
Roma X X X X X 
Immigrants (Muslims)      
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Iranians (Muslim) X X X X X 
Turks X X X X X 
Arabs (Iraqis, Lebanese, Moroccans) X X X X X 
ex-Yugoslavs (Serbs, Bosnians) X X X X X 
Asians (Pakistanis, Afghans) X X X X X 
Somalis X X X X X 
* In general Norwegian, Swedish and Danish are very similar. Icelandic however is not understandable for Danes. 
 
The next section will focus on the Greenlandic minority, the German minority, the Roma minority, the 
Jewish minority and the Muslim minority as these groups have commanded the most public attention. 
The Muslim minority consists of many different nationalities (Turks, Iraqis, Lebanese, Bosnians, 
Pakistani, Afghani, Somali etc.) but the tendency in the media and politics is to treat the Muslim group 
as a whole instead of differentiating between the different nationalities. The Muslim minority have by 
far received the most public attention. It is also clear from table 2 that the Muslim minority (regardless 
of nationality) is the group that differs most along the six dimensions. 
 
1.3.2. Toleration of differences  
1.3.2.1. The Greenlandic minority in Denmark 
Greenland, part of the Danish Kingdom since the 18
th
 century, was a colony until 1953, when the 
(theoretically) equal status between Danes and Greenlanders was formally declared. Following 
growing Inuit political and national awareness in the 1970s that emphasized a distinct Greenlandic 
culture in contrast with Danish culture, Home Rule was established in 1979 (Togeby 2002: 120). In 
2009 Greenland’s status was further enhanced with a declaration of the area’s political autonomy, also 
entailing the recognition of Greenlanders as a people under international law and of Greenlandic as the 
principal language in Greenland.  
Characteristics of Greenlanders living in Denmark and their demands and relation to Danish 
society closely reflect the political connection between Denmark and Greenland. In the 1950s 
Greenlandic pupils were sent to Denmark for higher education as part of a sustained modernization 
policy. Later younger children (12-14 years old) also came.. The idea to create a Danish-minded elite 
which could take on a leading role in Greenland upon returning was a complete failure (Ice News 
2009). “The Experiment”, a Danish drama film premiered this year, recounts the fate of these children. 
A debate arose in its wake and Greenland’s Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist demanded an official 
apology which so far has been refused (Findalen & Hermann 2009; Nielsen & Korsgaard 2010). Apart 
from this recent example issues of Greenlanders in Denmark rarely appear in debates and on the 
political agenda, and Greenlanders seldom participate themselves (Togeby 2002: 157).  
In the 1970s and 80s Greenlanders in Denmark were primarily young students, as well as a 
relatively small group of women married to Danish men (Ibid: 45). As education opportunities 
broadened in Greenland, the number of Greenlandic students in Denmark has decreased.
3
 In 2001 
family relations were the main reason for Greenlanders’ settling in Denmark, and 75 percent of 
Greenlandic residents in Denmark had lived in the country for more than 10 years (Togeby 2002: 33-
35).  
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 In 2001 13% of women and 19% of men of Greenlandic background state educational reasons for living in Denmark.  
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Whether born in Denmark or Greenland, Greenlanders have Danish citizenship and hence the same 
political, civil and social rights as Danes, but receive no special treatment on the basis of the European 
Framework Convention. That is, Greenlanders in Denmark are not recognized as a national minority, 
which has been criticized by the Council of Europe (2000; 2004). Further, as Danish citizens they are 
not entitled to subsidies targeted at immigrants (Ministry for Social Affairs 2003: 6). 
Compared to ethnic Danes, Greenlanders in Denmark have lower levels of education and 
employment (Togeby 2002: 38). Approximately 40 percent depend on transfer incomes, compared to 
20-25 percent of Danes.  Greenlanders also have less political capital and participate less in electoral 
channels of democracy, whereas their participation in everyday civil society is equal to that of Danes 
(Ibid: 151). Compared to immigrants, they tend to be more integrated on several dimensions (in terms 
of having Danish friends, being married to Danes, residential segregation, stated preference for living 
in Denmark, reported dual identity/no identity problems (Ibid: 33-35, 121, 129, 153)). Many maintain 
an affiliation to Greenland through networks such as the Greenlandic Houses, located in the main 
cities, in which club meetings, lectures, exhibitions, personal guidance, consultancy, etc., take place; 
as such, these constitute regional meeting places for Greenlanders in Denmark (Ibid: 48-49).  
Despite common attachment to Greenland, Greenlanders living in Denmark hardly constitute a 
single group. Togeby (2002) distinguishes between five groups, which differ in their national 
belonging. One of these, the marginalized, had a Greenlandic childhood and have lived in Denmark 
several years but are not self-supporting or married to a Dane.
4
 In 2002 the government initiated a 
number of policies to rectify the social problems of this group, many of whom are homeless, abuse 
alcohol, and feel isolation from society (Ministry for Social Affairs 2003). Even though the group of 
marginalised only make up a small percentage (5-10 percent) of all Greenlanders in Denmark, they are 
the most visible in the streets, have gained most public attention and hence constitute the stereotype 
(Ministry for Social Affairs 2003: 7; Togeby 2002: 45, 154). The grievance most often mentioned 
among Greenlanders in Denmark concerns discrimination, racism and general prejudices (Togeby 
2002: 112-126). However, compared to Turks, Greenlanders report few incidents of discrimination. 
Still, the refusal of some Danes to accept Greenlanders as full or natural members of the national 
community remains an obstacle to Greenlanders’ becoming fully integrated equal citizens (Ibid: 152). 
 
1.3.2.2. The German national minority in Southern Jutland  
The only recognized national minority in Denmark are the Germans in Southern Jutland who are 
Danish citizens but identify with German culture. A corresponding Danish minority exists south of the 
Danish-German border. No German-Danish minorities existed before the war in 1864, which moved 
the border northwards, creating a Danish minority in the Prussian realm. Before that time, the duchies 
of Schleswig and Holstein were separately administrated in the multinational Danish ‘composite state’ 
(Kühle 2003: 125). 
The Versailles treaty after World War I required two plebiscites in Northern Schleswig to establish 
boundaries of national belonging (Ibid: 127, 169). In the northern zone 75 percent favoured 
reunification with Denmark. A German majority emerged in the Tønder, Aabenraa and Sønderborg 
areas and in the southern zone 80 percent voted for German nationality . The line between the voting 
zones was ratified as the new border in 1920. Since then the border has not changed despite some 
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 The other four groups: 1) the Danish are children from mixed marriages which have spent the most of their childhood in 
Denmark, 2) the integrated have a Greenlandic childhood but have lived in Denmark several years and is now self-
supporting and married to a Dane, 3) the partial integrated have same characteristics as the former but is dependent on 
social security benefits, 4) the newcomers have only lived in Denmark for few years and are influenced by the attitude in 
Greenland defining Greenlandic in contrast to Danish. 
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revision claims from the German minority, especially after the Nazi takeover in Germany, as well as 
some Danish claims after World War II (Klatt 2006: 11).  
The two minority groups have been recognized in both Denmark and Germany, which have agreed 
on practical solutions to problems concerning family separations and broken trading and cultural 
relations, though the Danish government refused to make a bilateral agreement with Germany 
concerning the two minorities despite pressure from Germany and the German minority (Kühle 2003: 
129-130). Hence, national policies for minority protection were passed to facilitate a significant 
degree of cultural autonomy for the minorities.  
In 1920 a number of Danish policies were implemented enabling the German minority to establish 
private German schools or German speaking sections in Danish schools, with both receiving Danish 
state subsidies. German vicar positions were established in Haderslev, Sønderborg, Tønder and 
Aabenraa and in 1923 Nordschleswigsche Gemeinde was founded as an independent church in the 
rural districts closely connected to the Nordelbische Kirche in Schleswig-Holstein. It was also made 
possible to communicate in German with public institutions, and a relaxation of legislation made it 
possible for the minority to establish a political party, Schleswig Party, running for election in 1920.  
 In the years leading to World War II tensions between the German minority and Denmark 
grew, with more than half of the former supporting the Nazis, many volunteering for the German army 
and leaders expressing desire for changed borderlines (Ibid: 130-131). After the war, the Danish state 
and legal system clamped down on the German minority by closing all of the 89 German schools and 
imprisoning many Germans, affecting almost all German-minority families.  
This made the German minority, supported by the regional Länder governments of Schleswig and 
Holstein, eager to obtain publicly guaranteed minority rights. The Bund Deutcher Nordschleswiger 
(BDN) association, the new organizational centre of the German minority, declared unconditional 
loyalty to the Danish King and state and pledged to accept the present border, but in return sought 
recognition as a national minority entitled to safeguard its political and cultural interests (Ibid: 131-
133).  
When Danes in Germany were given minority rights in 1949, the German minority initiated 
negotiations with the Danish government aiming to obtain a corresponding official declaration. The 
Danish government made it clear that the German minority already possessed the civic rights 
announced in Germany through existing practice, and that the minority could freely negotiate on equal 
terms with authorities. Hence, no governmental declaration or establishment of a liaison committee 
was achieved, but a promise of equality of rights was expressed in the minutes from the meeting 
(Copenhagen Note).  
Following the West German NATO membership application the Danish-German minority issue 
emerged on the international agenda, resulting in dual government declarations: the 1955 
Copenhagen-Bonn Declaration. It contained recognition of school examinations, the long desired 
written declaration of German-minority rights in agreement with Danish-minority rights, 
acknowledgement of the need for spiritual and material support of the minorities, and finally a free-
choice basis of affiliation with German nationality and German culture that the government would not 
be allowed to verify, herby maintaining the principle of ‘disposition’ [sindelagsprincippet]: those who 
wish to be part of the minority are part of it (“Minderheit ist, wer will”/ ”til et mindretal høre, hvem 
der regner sig til dertil”) (Ibid: 99-100, 135-136; Klatt 2006: 74-76). 
 The German delegation did not achieve a bilateral liaison committee, and the consequences of the 
prosecutions after World War II for the German minority had not been part of the negotiations. 
However, the reciprocal declaration had great political and sociological impact and is often described 
as the turning point from national tensions to increasing mutual recognition and co-operation (Kühle 
2003: 136).  
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Since 1953 a German minority-Danish government dialogue has been facilitated through a regular 
elected representative in the parliament in the periods 1920-43; 1953-1964; 1973-79 and, following 
failure to have candidates elected, through the Contact Committee established in 1965
5
 (Ibid.: 137). 
Inclusion of the German minority is also facilitated through significant local and regional political 
participation. In this regard, the merging of Danish counties in 2007 creating bigger administrative 
entities was opposed by the German minority, who feared losing their significant local political 
leverage in some city councils (Ibid: 149). The close attention to the regional minority by the Danish 
queen and royalty has also contributed, at a more symbolic level, to reconciliation.  
German-minority issues do not take up much attention in the Danish media or public anymore. To 
a large extent the German minority is recognised as a well integrated group, and the co-operation 
between it and Danish authorities is almost without friction. The Danish-German way of handling the 
border and minority issues has in an international context been emphasized as role model for other 
areas. Today in Denmark there are 17 German-language schools, including one continuation school 
[efterskole], usually one year following basic schooling] and one gymnasium financially supported by 
the Danish state; several German-language day care centres and after-school centres; and German 
libraries financed by the German and Danish states (Kühle 2003: 133) 
However, dislike of Germans still occasionally surfaces (Ibid: 143). Two events have recently 
gained attention. First, the creation of a Euro-region between the county of Southern Jutland and the 
German part of Schleswig in 1997 ignited an emotional debate with anti-German hostility, threats of 
violence and incidents of vandalism (Ibid: 143-144). This transnational regional co-operation remains 
strongly supported by the German minority represented, presently, with a seat in the Southern Jutland 
Regional Council .  
Second, the Danish ratification of the European Treaty of Regional or Minority Languages in 2000 
initiated intense debate concerning the use of German language in Danish public institutions (Ibid: 
145-148). The debate was quickly played down by the Danish government, supported by the Danish 
minority in Germany. German language is now recognized as a minority language in Southern Jutland, 
meaning among other things that a greater effort is made to ensure German-speaking staff in 
residential homes for elderly people who cannot speak Danish well – an issue advocated for by the 
German minority. 
 
1.3.2.4. Roma 
For nearly 200 years, from 1554 to 1736, the Roma were outlawed in Denmark; if caught by the 
authorities they were either deported or put into forced labor. By the mid-1700s reports on the Roma 
had gradually disappeared, and for the next 100 years very little was heard of them (Østergaard 2007: 
200). Not until the latter half of the 19
th
 century did the Roma (immigrating from Hungary and 
Romania) re-appear in noticeable numbers. A new law, stating that it was illegal to take up residence 
in Denmark if one sought work by travelling, was put into force to form a legal basis for deporting the 
traveling Roma; this law remained in force until 1952.  
Today the Roma residents in Denmark have settled more permanently. In 2006 there were between 
5.000 to 10.000 Roma in Denmark (Ibid: 204). Most are ‘guest workers’ from Yugoslavia who arrived 
in the late 1960s, and their descendants. A smaller number came as refugees from the wars in 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo.  
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A large part of the Roma is concentrated in the city Elsinore. The municipality has gained a certain 
media attention with their special initiatives aimed at relieving the group’s social problems, especially 
concerning low rates of school attendance among Roma children. From 1982 to 2004 the municipality 
maintained special all-Roma school classes for children deemed problematic. After the policy had 
been criticized internationally as racial segregation, however, the Ministry of Teaching declared that 
the school classes violated the primary school law. Another practice eventually found illegal started in 
2000 and consisted in an economic incentive structure set up to make parents bring their children to 
school. If the children did not turn up in school, it was seen as a failure by the unemployed parents to 
participate in a mandatory ‘activation program’ and money was deducted from their social transfer 
payments. 
A recent expulsion from Denmark of 23 Roma with citizenship in other EU countries, justified on 
the grounds of their threat to public order, created some debate on the discrimination and prejudices 
experienced by the Roma in Denmark. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) in Budapest is 
currently preparing a court case against the Danish state, claiming that the expulsion violates EU law 
(EU citizens’ right to free movement) and is discriminatory. 
The stereotype of the Roma as stealing, cheating, lying, poor, uneducated, lazy and unwilling to 
integrate is well alive in Denmark and felt by the Roma, inducing many to hide their background 
(Schmidt 2003). This stigmatization may have influenced the lack of organizational representation to 
carry forth group demands to public institutions. 
 
1.3.2.3. Jews 
Following a spread of anti-Semitic sentiment in Poland in 1969 more than 3000 Poles migrated to 
Denmark, contributing significantly to the number of Jews in Denmark. The Jewish minority today 
consists of somewhere between 5000 and 7000 members, less than one per thousand of the total 
population. The Danish Jews are especially of interest due to the status which the rescue of the Danish 
Jews during World War II still carries in Danish, Israeli and American national mythologies about the 
events during the Second World War. 
Copenhagen is the religious center for Danish Jews. There are several synagogues in Copenhagen, 
and Jews also have their own nursery, school, after-school center, elder care home and cemetery. 
These institutions have never been the subject of critical public discussion in a way that resembles 
anti-Semitism.  
The general impression is that anti-Semitism is practically unknown in Denmark except for 
conflicts between some Muslim immigrants and Danish Jews. Most noticeably the media reported on 
20 documented incidents where Jews were harassed by Muslims during the three weeks of the Gaza 
War in 2008/09. However, the former head rabbi of the Jewish Community
6
 in Denmark, Bent 
Melchior, was quick to emphasize that he did not see the incidents as reflecting general anti-Semitism 
and that their significance was blown out of proportion (as opposed to the DPP, who called for a 
national action plan to fight anti-Semitism). He did not want the fight against anti-Semitism 
instrumentalized in what he perceived to be a much more systematic and organized Islamophobia and 
fear of Muslims (Melchior 2009). 
Unconcern about the level of anti-Semitism is in part contradicted by a recent study that 
demonstrates a significantly higher level of apprehension towards Jews among Turks, Pakistanis, 
Somalis, Palestinians and Ex-Yugoslavians than among ethnic Danes. Between 60 and 70 percent of 
the former five groups confirmed that ‘you can’t be too careful around Jews’ compared to 18 percent 
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of ethnic Danes (Nannestad 2009). This points to a tacit, rather than explicit, anti-Semitism. Cultural 
sociologist and former president of the Jewish Community Jacques Blum does indeed find a 
combination of straightforward harassment of Jews by Muslims (mostly unreported), as well as an 
undercurrent of anti-Semitism reflected in the negative connotation of the word ‘Jew’ in the Danish 
language (Jørgensen 2007). The latter has prompted Danish Jews to label themselves as Jewish or as 
having a Jewish background. 
 
1.3.2.4. Muslims 
Since the 1990s a tendency has been identified across Europe to label immigrants in religious terms 
rather than in light of their ethno-cultural background or social roles in society (Allievi2006: 37). This 
tendency, whereby Muslims in particular are seldom categorized as Turks, Iranians or Somalis (or as 
students or workers) also exists in Denmark, where debates over integration and toleration of 
differences invariably centre on Muslims and where religion is often associated with potential conflict 
(Mouritsen 2006: 75-76).  
Whereas controversy over integration is discussed as related to issues of culture, culture is almost 
always linked to religious beliefs and associated value conflicts. Since the end of the 1990s 
immigration and integration policies have been important issues among the electorate and a main 
theme in election campaigns (Mikkelsen 2008: 185), although there are now indications that it may be 
losing saliency after continual tightening of immigration, citizenship and integration policies and 
requirements that has been implemented over the last decade.  
Public discussions tend to take place in an ‘us-them’ framework which, on the one hand, is 
concerned about the social and residential segregation of an out-group of Muslims in vulnerable 
suburb districts (these officially termed ‘ghettos’ have recently been the target of competing action 
plan proposals from the Government and the Opposition (Social Democrats & Socialistic Peoples 
Party, 2010; Government, 2010). On the other hand, the ‘us-them’ polarity is reinforced as Islam is 
increasingly constructed in opposition to Danish values of democracy and equality (Mouritsen 2009: 
19; Lindekilde 2009: 4).  
In Denmark, as noted, the constitution gives a privileged position to the Lutheran Folkekirke as the 
state church, while also guaranteeing freedom of religion to other religious communities; these can be 
officially recognized by the state, but without getting all the same privileges. Today 23 Islamic 
communities are legally recognised (Ministry of Justice 2010a). Approved religious communities may 
be granted authorization to officiate marriages, subject to individual evaluation of congregations 
(Ministry of Justice 2010b). In contrast to the state church, other religious communities finance their 
activities, buildings and cemeteries themselves. 
A mosque built in accordance with traditional Islamic rules does not yet exist. Financial difficulties 
and obstacles to obtaining planning permits have long delayed the process despite strong desires 
among Muslims, who have set up advocacy groups in favour of a mosque. Groups opposing the 
building of mosques in Denmark have also been established, and the political salience of the issue 
remains high. Particularly controversial is the question of whether to allow calls to prayer from 
mosque minarets, which is currently prohibited. In 2009 the Ahlul Bait association was granted 
permission to build the Imam Ali Mosque in Copenhagen. The building will have a traditional look 
with a dome and minarets, the latter only having symbolic function. The cost of the project is 
estimated to be 40-50 million DKK, of which less than half was collected by June 2010, through 
private donations from Denmark and abroad
7
 . Building a Mosque in Aarhus has also been discussed. 
At the time of writing, these plans have collapsed due to internal disagreements among Muslim 
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groups, lack of finances  and disagreements about location. For now, Muslims in Denmark use 
previously existing buildings not built for the purpose as places of worship.  
The first Muslim cemetery not attached to a Christian cemetery was established in 2006 near the 
city of Brøndby outside Copenhagen
8
 . Until then Muslims were either buried in their country of origin 
or in special areas of cemeteries reserved for Muslims. The negotiations and preparation preceding the 
opening of the Muslim cemetery date from the early 1990s, when different Muslim associations joined 
together to advance their claim. The process made slow progress due, among other things, to 
disagreement over the prohibitive price (21.5 million DKK/approx. 3 million EUR) initially asked by 
the local council that owned the desired land. After the Danish Muslim Association had managed to 
raise 3 million DKK, the Social Democratic government in early 2001 pledged to compensate the 
remaining difference within a price set by an impartial appraisal commission. The new government 
that took office later in 2001, supported by the Danish People’s Party, withdrew the promise (Hjort 
2002: 11). The price was later set at 3.2 million and the Danish Islamic Funeral Fund (a fusion of 23 
associations) bought the site, which they now administer with private funds. Negotiations to establish 
Muslim cemeteries in Herning (Jutland) and Roskilde (Zealand) are now taking place, meeting 
Muslims’ wishes to be able to bury family members nearer to their homes (Ritzau 2008; Jørgensen 
2008).  
An official education for imams (corresponding to the official Lutheran priest educations) does 
not exist, but the possibility has been discussed for a number of years (Kristeligt Dagblad 2005; 
Pedersen 2007; Borking 2010). It has been argued that a Danish education would stem the influx of 
radical imams without any background in Denmark. Currently, imams from abroad who are affiliated 
with an approved religious society in Denmark can obtain a residence permit (Law of Foreigners §9f 
subsection 1). 
The Danish version of the head scarf debate began as a controversy about whether cashiers in 
supermarket had a right to wear headscarves on the job, or whether it was a legitimate interest of the 
employer to ensure that no customer was ‘inconvenienced’ by the headscarves, and that they were 
therefore ultimately allowed to fire employees who insisted on wearing headscarves. The controversy 
was settled with the right of the employer to dictate a job uniform. In most cases practical solutions 
have been found, with a large majority of employers accepting the headscarf (Bræmer 2008).  
Debates over headscarves in schools have not been as protracted or politicised as in France or 
Germany, in part because of a relatively decentralised system of school administration, which has 
facilitated local solutions. Debates over headscarves have, however, spread to other areas, from 
politicians wearing headscarves at the speaking podium in Parliament to whether or not judges may 
wear headscarves (the latter a purely hypothetical debate that prompted an amendment of the Law of 
Justice Administration (Retsplejeloven) in 2008 (Klarskov 2008)). 
In the latter case the Danish court agency (Domstolsstyrelsen) had announced that Muslim female 
judges could in fact wear headscarves in court, but the government disregarded the statement and 
banned the wearing of any kind of religious or political symbols in court (Law of Justice 
Administration: §56 subsection 1; Boddum 2008). The headscarf is in general involved in the larger 
debate about integration and Islam’s compatibility with the fundamental values of Danish society, 
especially gender equality (Mouritsen 2009: 20).  
Owing to existing Danish legislation on private schools, Muslims are allowed to run Muslim 
schools on the condition that the curricula meet basic Danish standards. No official statistics on the 
number of Muslim schools exist. However in 2004-5, 21 independent schools were categorised by the 
Ministry as having predominantly bi-lingual students (Haarder 2006). This number may be compared 
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to the total number of independent schools, which is about 500, and the number of regular public 
schools, which is about 1600.  
Various controversies concerning education have emerged in public debate, including native-
language instruction (abolished in 2001); questions of separate changing rooms and shower facilities 
for Muslims in connection with sports activities; the uneven distribution of immigrant children in 
schools; bussing of pupils (practiced in Aarhus and discussed in Copenhagen); and, most recently, 
parents’ meeting only for mothers.  
A more general change of the Danish official school ideology may also be identified, in line with a 
growing focus on national identity, diversity and integration in society. The preamble of the Danish 
Law for primary and secondary school (Folkeskoleloven) was changed in 1993 (and adjusted in 2006) 
to emphasise that pupils must become ‘familiar’ with Danish culture (and history from 2006) while 
giving them an ‘understanding’ of other countries and cultures (Jensen 2010).  
Certain subjects referred to as ‘identity carrying subjects’, such as history and Christian studies 
(kristendomskundskab), were strengthened. In particular, a discussion has taken place between 
politicians and teachers as to whether ‘religious studies’, as a broader information subject, could be 
taught instead of ‘Christian studies’ as a cultural and identity-oriented subject (even if the latter does 
not include the preaching of Christianity). The government made it clear that Christian Studies is a 
compulsory subject. How these changes may affect the pupils, however, depends largely on their 
implementation by teachers (Mouritsen & Olsen, forthcoming).  
In the intense public debates on integration problems, Danish media have tended to confront non-
Western ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, to get their reactions regarding the issue at hand. 
Hence, immigrants are often presented in the role of a self-defending reactor to a political agenda that 
has been defined by others (Lindekilde 2009: 26-27). This media focus may partly explain why ethnic 
minorities in Denmark raise more claims regarding issues of integration, as compared to claims 
regarding issues of immigration, asylum, citizenship and homeland affairs. However, better 
opportunities for immigrants, when compared with those in most other countries, to participate in the 
framing of local integration policy, e.g. through integration councils, could be an explanation for this 
tendency too (Ibid: 22-23): the Danish local electoral system has been found to be relatively 
favourable to (concentrated) immigrant groups in the larger cities. Before the Muhammad caricatures 
in 2005, Danish Muslims had not mobilized and engaged in continued claims-making or been 
prominent actors in national debates, but this is now changing (Ibid: 26).  
Often in debates of Muslims vis-à-vis the Danish society all Muslims have been portrayed as a 
monolithic group. However, in some cases internal splits among Muslims have become evident, even 
in public media. This has been the case, for instance, with the issue of whether sunni Muslims could 
identify with the Mosque project in Copenhagen, which was led by a shia community. Particularly in 
public debates surrounding the Muhammad caricature controversy, different Muslim groups became 
visible expressing quite different views, emphasising different problems, and making different claims 
to the state. The question of which groups, representing which Muslim communities, the state should 
consult or negotiate with remains controversial.  
One way of distinguishing between Muslim groups is to describe Muslim claimants as exponents 
of different ways of practicing Islam in a Danish context (Lindekilde 2008: 78-79). A major task, here, 
is to combine their identity as Europeans/Danes and their Islamic beliefs, which may be done in 
different ways by stressing various normative interpretations of Islam and different guidelines for 
adjusting to Danish society. Three basic types of this diverse ‘diasporic’ Islamic religiosity have been 
distinguished by Werner Schiffauer – see the table below (Schiffauer 2007). The different dispositions 
should be viewed as positions on a continuum. 
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Cultural Muslims are the most assimilated group and believe that Islam can be practised in the same 
secularised way that Danes typically practice Christianity. Thus religious symbols are not to be 
displayed in the public sphere. The organisation Democratic Muslims are the clearest exponent of this 
group. It was established during the Muhammad caricatures controversy, attempting to mobilise the 
‘silent majority’ of Danish Muslims (Lindekilde 2008: 79).  
The Neo-orthodox Muslims maintain their Islamic traditions but in a way that is adjusted to the 
Danish context. Sometimes demands for certain privileges are made by groups belonging to this 
category. An organisational exponent of this group is The Community of Islamic Faith (Islamisk 
Trossamfund), who was very active in the public debate in the beginning of the caricature controversy. 
They demanded an official apology for the publication and initiated the sending of the ‘imam 
delegation’ to Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, thereby aiming to achieve external support for their claims 
(ibid: 86; for a detailed analysis of Muslim organisations and claimants during the Muhammad 
caricatures controversies in Denmark see Lindekilde 2008).  
The Ultra-orthodox Muslims consider the other two groups as not being real Muslims or as 
‘selling out’ on Islamic values. These segments often come together in loose networks instead of 
organisations and often choose to live isolated from society. They reject democracy by being passive 
and often they support violent groups in their lands of origin which are condemned by the West, e.g. 
Hamas and al-Shabaab. Danish authorities are worried about the development of these groups because 
radicalised Muslims, including individuals actually convicted of terrorism, have come from here. 
Muslim organisations cutting across national origin but with Islamic religiosity at their cores have 
gained ground in recent years, especially among the second and third generations of Muslim 
immigrants (Mikkelsen 2008: 144-145). Emphasising a pan-Muslim identity is favoured by many 
TABLE 1.3 Types of Islamic Religiosity 
 
Source: reproduced from Lindekilde 2008, applied from Schiffauer 2007: 80-90 
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youth who seek integration in the host society without entirely losing their background (Lindekilde 
2009: 36). For this group religiosity is becoming an increasingly important part of their identity, and 
they spend more and more time and energy, compared with their parents, familiarizing themselves 
with Islam. At the same time they clearly seek recognition from Danish society, signalling that 
simultaneously being a second-generation immigrant, a Dane and a Muslim is perfectly possible. 
 
1.4. DEFINITIONS OF TOLERATION AND RESPECT IN DENMARK 
 
Historically, tolerance has in a widely received interpretation been dismissed as a form of indifference 
and relativism with regard to the beliefs and actions of others. As such it connotes the idea that all 
beliefs, values, and practices are of equal value and therefore also of no value. Tolerance, in this sense, 
means the inability to make judgements, or to differentiate properly between right and wrong, good 
and bad, true and false (Bredsdorff & Kjældgaard 2008: ch. 15). While this idea is based on a biased 
(or misunderstood) reading of Enlightenment philosophy, many have wished to employ an alternative 
term, a favourite being frisind, meaning ‘liberality’ or ‘free mindedness’.  
This term, originating from the influential populist leader, author and priest N.F.S. Grundtvig, 
originally refers to the idea that the state should stay out of matters of religion and let the exponents of 
different views of religion use all verbal powers at their disposal to promote their own views and 
criticise those of others. By contrast, ‘tolerance’ would here be indifference towards, and refraining 
from judgment on that which one considers wrong, and thereby losing an essential moral faculty as a 
human being.  
Yet with the state as the guarantor of equal civic freedoms – securing, as Danes have put it since 
Grundtvig, freedom to Loke as well as to Thor
9
 – liberality means that one is able to speak truth 
against a lie without holding back in dull indifference or adopting social conformism in order to ensure 
social and political peace (ibid.). One is able to fight for all that one holds dearly (‘kæmp for alt hvad 
du har kært’),
10
 while insisting on the same rights for others. The notorious Danish cartoon crisis 
referred to this understanding of liberality: by those who argued for the right to criticise and ridicule 
the beliefs of others, as well as by those who were concerned that all the relevant parties did not in fact 
have equal civic standing in Danish society (Ibid.; Meer & Mouritsen 2009). 
The preference for liberality over tolerance is particularly conspicuous among right-of-centre 
politicians in Denmark today. A competing conception of tolerance developed in connection with a 
split up of the Liberal party in 1905 (in Danish the party is called Venstre, literally ‘Left’). Ongoing 
debates in Parliament led to an institutionalisation of the split-up and the creation of two separate 
liberal parties, one mainly consisting of farmers and members of the liberal professions (Venstre), and 
another made up by small peasants and intellectuals (Radikale Venstre, literally ‘Radical Left’).11 The 
political views of both groups were by and large inspired by the thoughts of Grundtvig, but the latter 
also found inspiration in the thoughts of brothers Georg and Edvard Brandes and the editor Viggo 
Hørup, representing a new, radical, form of liberalism. Due to this ideological difference not only two 
distinct liberal parties but two distinct liberal ideologies developed, and these two different 
                                                     
9 In Nordic mythology Thor of course denotes uprightness and truth, whereas Loke stands for falsehood and deviousness. 
10 The passage is from a hymn, ’Altid frejdig, når du går’, by Christian Richardt, written in 1867, which has become 
associated with resistance and struggle, in particular reistance to the German occupation during World War II. 
11
 The bone of contention leading to the division of the liberals was the question of the defences of Copenhagen. By 
circumventing the Commons Prime Minister Estrup of the governing Right Party (Højre) had financed the extension of 
the outdated defences of the capital city, which had, due to the massive urbanisation of the 19th century, far outgrown the 
boundaries of the old city. He was able to do so with the political support from the right-wing liberals. The left-wing 
liberals on the contrary considered spending money on military expenses as a waste, especially in light of the defeat of 
1864, which had demonstrated the Danish military’s inefficiency in front of a determined enemy.  
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interpretations of liberalism caused the reception of tolerance to follow two separate courses 
throughout the 20th century. In very general terms: in contrast to the right-wing liberals who, by and 
large, stuck to Grundtvig’s distinction between tolerance and liberality, left-wing liberals accentuated 
the importance of a universal concept of tolerance. 
Recent times have seen a change in the subjects and objects of toleration in Danish discourse. 
While it never acquired an unequivocally positive meaning, the main concern with tolerance has 
shifted: from the intolerance of the majority against immigrants in the 1970s and the 1980s, to a 
concern, in the 1990s and the 2000s, that too many immigrants (potentially tolerant themselves) being 
reluctant to integrate would have a corrosive effect on the otherwise well-established, traditional 
tolerance of the majority. There has never been any celebration of multiculturalism in Denmark, 
beyond seeing cultural diversity as giving interesting spice of life (foods, folklore, etc).  
From the 1990s onwards, multiculturalism has represented ‘parallel societies’, disintegration, and a 
moral, social and political failure to demand and promote the full inclusion of all groups into society: 
into its labour market, education, civil society organisations and, eventually, politics. This inclusion is 
seen to be endangered by too much tolerance or overindulgence towards groups who abuse the rights 
and privileges they enjoy in Denmark and who may not eventually reciprocate the tolerance of the 
majority (or who may themselves in the future become an intolerant majority). 
The form of inclusion available for immigrants is based on a comprehensive concept of equal 
citizenship that pertains to all fields of life, including family and private life. The only form of 
recognition given to immigrants is that of becoming a full and equal citizen; a form of recognition 
nonetheless withheld for a considerable number of years, until immigrants have proved their 
determination and ability to become full members of society through economic self-sufficiency, 
Danish language literacy and knowledge of Danish history, culture and fundamental political values. 
Some symbolic (and legal) recognition is also given to working immigrants who bring special 
professional skills to the country and contribute to its economic growth. However, their positive 
contribution is seen as almost purely economic, not cultural (skills, not identity) (Mouritsen & Olsen 
2011). 
  
1.4.1. Acceptance and integration in Denmark  
1.4.1.1. The values of the Danish integration regime 
The inclusion of post-immigration minorities in Denmark is based on the values of equal and active 
citizenship. The fundamental idea is that this status is accessible to all who want it, and that it is not 
prima facie a particularly Danish, ‘national’ form of citizenship. As a normative and identity- or 
practice-oriented ideal (‘good’ citizenship) it is relatively comprehensive (Mouritsen & Olsen 2011; 
Mouritsen 2011) and is conceived to have a progressive and emancipatory potential for the suppressed 
and dominated in different ways, i.e., in relation to traditional authority and patriarchal norms, gender 
equality and child education, and even sexual practices. Capacity to practice critical self-reflection in 
private lives as well as politics and democracy is crucial. 
Right of the political centre, these values are often seen as anchored in a broader Danish cultural-
Christian tradition influenced in particular by the Grundtvigean movement which emphasises popular 
consent, anti-authoritarianism and liberality. Groups on the left, while generally subscribing to the 
same comprehensive understanding of these values, are more reluctant to agree to this particular 
cultural heritage argument (Mouritsen 2006). Liberality is thus broadly considered a central virtue 
when dealing with others in a democratic system such as the Danish, i.e. where democratic decision 
making is often understood (and celebrated) as a ‘form of life’ characterised by informality, 
deliberation, equal voice and consensuality.  
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Democracy and democratic debate do not here connote politeness and civility, let alone 
‘recognition’, so much as blunt and open exchanges are combined with having ‘thick skin’. In this 
view, one has to be able to handle rudeness and even ridicule as a part of democracy. There is no real 
place for offence or for being offended, neither hence for catering to cultural and/or religious 
sensibilities, which again diminishes the space for criticism of stereotyping, pejorative expressions, 
etc. This all entails that Danish tolerance in a paradoxical way is not seeing society and exchanges 
between groups in society as being based on ‘co-existence’ or a modus vivendi. Tolerance is wrong, or 
even a vice to the extent that it implies permissiveness or ‘letting people be’. Rather, tolerance is, as it 
were, a republican virtue that structures the critical exchanges of citizens in what is essentially a 
cooperating democracy. 
 
1.4.1.2. Policies and institutional arrangements 
Danish efforts to reduce discrimination and create equal treatment for all to a large extent have been 
driven by the need to transform international obligations into national law (Justesten 2003, Nielsen 
2010). However, the early 1990s saw the creation of a Board for Ethnic Equality (BEE) with the 
purpose of ‘fighting difference of treatment in all its aspects as well as supporting that all ethnic 
groups in society, irrespective of differences in their conditions, are given the opportunity to exercise 
their activities on an equal footing.’ (Law on the BEE 1993). The BEE was to work through 
campaigns and counselling of public and private organisations, individuals and policy makers. 
Consonant with the dominant perception in the 1980s of subjects and objects of toleration, the BEE 
was supported across the political spectrum. Behind the BEE, which was based on a Social 
Democratic proposal, was a general concern with racism and pressure from immigrant organisations 
who had fought for recognition as ethnic minorities rather than as immigrants and who pointed to 
discrimination as a main cause of minority exclusion (Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling 2002: 7-12).  
The BEE defined ethnic equality as ‘more than just formal rights. Ethnic equality entails equality 
before the law, equal access to the institutions of society and equal right to realize one’s distinctive 
character (særpræg) within the limits of the law’ (Ibid: 15).  One idea behind ‘ethnic equality’ rather 
than just ‘ethnic equal treatment’ (a discussed alternative) was that ethnic equality meant more than 
formal equal treatment and might imply certain types of positive action, as well as a recognition that 
the different needs of different groups might have to be met in different ways. It is not clear that ethnic 
equality as a concept entailed either an appreciation of cultural differences as a positive contribution to 
society per se, or the recognition of minority identities as valuable.  
The BEE could not process individual complaints about discrimination. Danish legislation against 
discrimination and racism was based on criminal law until 1996 where a new law on discrimination in 
the labour market opened up possibilities for civil law suits. This law was supplemented in 2003/4 by 
the implementation of two EU directives on anti-discrimination which extended civil law prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity beyond the labour market. This extension also 
introduced administrative complaint procedures, which were strengthened in 2009 with the creation of 
a new Equality Board which will process complaints on all relevant grounds. 
Nonetheless, public campaigns against discrimination and racism suffered a blow with the change 
of government in 2001, which closed the BEE and ‘restructured’ the Danish Centre of Human Rights 
into a new Danish Institute for Human Rights. The present governing coalition of Liberals, 
Conservatives and Danish People’s Party had found the two former institutions too vocal in the 
general immigration and integration debate. The new government prioritised restrictions in 
immigration policies and access to citizenship and pursued a tough integration policy already initiated 
in the late 1990s by its Social Democratic predecessor. 
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Integration policies, over the last decade, have aimed to render the immigrant able to participate 
‘on an equal footing’ in Danish society, to a large degree placing the responsibility for this to happen 
on the individual immigrant/minority member, rather than the receiving society. The aim was  
 
to contribute to the newly arrived foreigner’s possibility for participating on 
an equal footing with other citizens in the political, economic, work-related, 
social, religious, and cultural life of society;…to her quickly becoming self-
supporting; …to contribute to giving the individual foreigner an 
understanding of the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society 
(The 1999 Integration Law, par.1). 
 
This integration policy has been deepened and extended in consecutive stages, moving from an initial 
emphasis on labour market functionality and language into a wider realm – particularly after 9/11 – of 
civic competences and liberal values, cultural and historical orientation, and loyalty. It has pushed 
sensitivity towards cultural identities and notions of a society based on pluralism, mutual respect and 
tolerance of diversity into the background (Hvenegaard-Lassen 2002: 251; Mouritsen & Olsen 2011).  
However, government policy has not been without focus on tolerance and equal respect. In 2003, 
the government developed an action plan, ‘For the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Diversity and 
The Fight Against Racism’ (based on the 2001 Durban Declaration). This plan again refers to the old 
Nordic ‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor’ as a principle of equal treatment that implies that ‘we 
are not identical and we should not be made uniform’ and stipulates that ‘difference is the precondition 
for all democratic dialogue’ (p. 1). But consonant with the new perception of subjects and objects of 
toleration, the plan eagerly underlines that ‘tolerance should go in all directions’, and points to 
problems of intolerance between groups of ethnic minorities as well as ‘intolerant attitudes among 
ethnic minorities towards the majority population’ (p. 14). The remedy is again the creation (through 
integration policy) of a set of shared values: 
 
The freedom to be different can only thrive if there is a widespread commitment in 
society to the shared fundamental democratic values of freedom, equal worth 
(ligeværdighed), responsibility, duties and active participation. (p. 15) 
 
The plan was mainly premised on state support for initiatives formed by other actors, primarily from 
civil society. In 2010 it was replaced by a new action plan on ‘Ethnic Equal Treatment and Respect for 
the Individual’. The new plan is based on the same ideas of spreading the fundamental principles of 
democracy. It does, however, reflect an increased concern with intolerance both against minorities and 
within minorities (anti-Semitism in particular) and underlines the need to map and counteract 
discrimination in different areas of life such as work, spare time activities and education. As 
something relatively new, it refers to diversity management in workplaces and conceives of diversity 
as an asset for companies and for the economy more generally. Also in a few places it even mentions 
that ‘nobody should be discriminated, degraded or threatened because of, for example, their ethnic 
origin, sex, belief, sexual orientation or because they have voiced their opinions’ (5), presumably 
pointing in two directions simultaneously: against the degrading of minorities on the one hand and the 
threats against cartoonists, opinion makers and politicians on the other.  
The shift in emphasis that this plan entails can reasonably be explained by a desire to attract highly 
skilled workers to the booming (until 2008) Danish economy on the one hand, and on the other a 
concern with domestic cases of planned (but not executed) terror actions (and the Cartoon Affair). As 
to the latter, the plan is indeed directly tied to a strong government concern with radicalisation of 
minority youth and is part of the realization of the 2009 government action plan on ‘Prevention of 
Extremism and Radicalisation among Young People’. In this plan the fight against intolerance and 
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discrimination is regarded as an important part of avoiding extremism and generally connects this goal 
with increased efforts to instil democratic values in all new members of society, in particular through 
education and civil society participation. Hence tolerance and equal respect are back on the agenda, 
this time not only in order to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but especially with a view to 
enhance the security of the majority. 
 
1.4.1.3. Acceptance and accommodation as a social practice 
Danes exhibit a relatively high level of comfort with the idea of having neighbours who have a 
different ethnic background or another religion than themselves, compared to the European average.
12
 
Danes are also more likely than the EU average to have friends and acquaintances that have another 
ethnic background (62 percent) and religion (66 percent) than themselves. Younger people mix more 
with people of different backgrounds than do older people, and the more education you have, the more 
you mix with people of other ethnic backgrounds (Eurobarometer 317/2009, factsheet on Denmark, p. 
1).  
Paradoxically, Danes at the same time perceive their country to be quite discriminatory in relation 
to people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds. 77 percent and 55 percent find discrimination 
on the basis of these respective grounds widespread (Ibid.). Between 63 and 68 percent also suspect 
that skin colour, ethnic background and the expression of a religious belief make a negative difference 
for job candidates when employers choose between people of equal skills and qualifications (Ibid: 2).  
This indicates that while people themselves in general are appreciative, indifferent, or perhaps 
tolerant towards ethnic and religious differences in their daily lives, they perceive others to be rather 
intolerant of such differences. Eurobarometer surveys generally show a high level of comfort, among 
Danes, with the idea of having people with different ethnic background elected for the highest political 
office in the country while the comfort level with regard to people with a different religious 
background is at the European average (Eurobarometer 317: 69, table QE6.5).  
Studies of political tolerance carried out in Denmark (but thought to apply generally) demonstrate, 
however, that tolerance is conditional on the perception of whether the groups in question respect 
democratic norms and hence live up to a norm of reciprocity (Petersen et al. 2010). Low tolerance, on 
the other hand, is found with regard to groups who have been previously associated with an ‘extremist 
stance in terms of violent and non-democratic behaviour’ (Ibid: 10, 13). The partial exception here is 
the group of ‘ordinary Muslims’ (as opposed to ‘Islamic fundamentalists’) who are not tolerated 
among those who dislike them the most, despite the fact that they have not been directly connected 
with extremist stances. This is likely to be explained by the ‘perception that the social practices of 
even ordinary Muslims are in conflict with liberal ideals’ (Ibid: 14). 
The findings of the above studies suggest that Danes personally have a somewhat high tolerance 
level in their daily practices when it comes to people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds 
than their own, and that there is a relatively high level of contact between people of different cultural 
and religious backgrounds, especially among the young and the well-educated. Indeed, Danes may be 
indifferent towards or appreciative of such cultural and religious differences. However, their 
perception is paradoxically that the tolerance of other fellow citizens is low. Moreover, political 
tolerance is largely conditional on the perception of others’ respecting fundamental democratic values 
and subscribing to a norm of reciprocity: no toleration for the intolerant. 
 
                                                     
12
 Ethnic background: 8.6 vs. EU27 average 8.1 (score between 1 and 10); Religion 8.9 vs. EU27 average 8.5 
(Eurobarometer 296/2008:Tables QA6.4 and QA6.5.) 
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1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Over the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural 
differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic 
and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of 
multiculturalism. The latter is synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political 
failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society. In general, cultural and 
religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, 
understood as the ability to live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying 
individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.  
The idea that we need to be mutually reassured at the symbolic level that we all belong to the same 
community (in that we affirm the same fundamental democratic values) is now a central part of a self-
conscious discourse on the necessity of ensuring the ‘cohesion’ of Danish society in order to sustain 
the support for the Danish welfare community and its social and moral achievements. While these 
achievements include equality and self-reflective moral and political autonomy for the individual 
citizen, the idea of social integration through values is closer to the idea of a Gemeinschaft built on 
mechanic solidarity (Durkheim), than to that of a Gesellschaft premised on abstract norms of 
interaction, individualism and division of labour (organic solidarity).  
This ‘civic integrationism,’ with its comprehensive notion of citizenship, draws on central elements 
in national identity history that place a value on the society’s smallness, popular participation, 
consensus and the ability and duty to communicate in the same language across social and political 
cleavages. For the right-of-centre, it is rooted in a broader national and Christian culture. The centre-
left also subscribe to the citizen ideal, but tends to reject the right wing’s somewhat nationalist 
interpretation of its basis. It is generally believed that status as an equal citizen with identical rights 
and duties provides sufficient support for the realisation of cultural and religious identities and that it 
is accessible to all with the right motivation. Danish citizenship as a social and legal status is not 
biased towards a specific nationality, culture or religion. Nonetheless immigrants are thoroughly 
vetted through integration and language tests to qualify for citizenship: the formal legal status is a 
prize and the end of a long trial period that is supposed to ensure and demonstrate the commitment by 
the new-comer to the fundamental democratic values of Danish society.  
The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to 
post-immigration minorities who arrived from non-western countries in the last 40 to 50 years, most of 
whom are (identified as) Muslims. National and older religious minorities of Greenlanders, Germans, 
Poles and Jews are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal 
rights, symbolic respect and recognition. Immigrants from non-western countries, on the other hand, 
are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability to integrate into the 
‘modern’ and ‘liberal’ Danish society and democracy.  
The turn towards integration has pushed the question of toleration aside. In the discussion of the 
hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence 
or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as 
indifference or naivité, relies on a historical preference in some parts of society for ‘liberality’ over 
‘tolerance’. Tolerance is seen as form of moral failure: it implies giving up the forming of judgements 
over what is right and wrong. Liberality, on the other hand, entails fighting for the values one holds 
dear while insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance 
is, first, a strong commitment to equal citizen rights by all and their protection by the state. Liberality, 
secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. While this leaves some space 
for legal tolerance, understood as the right to think and act in ways that are considered wrong, it leaves 
little space for social tolerance, understood as abstention from criticism of, among other things, 
cultural and religious sensibilities. Liberality is a ‘republican’ virtue that enables you to participate in 
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blunt public exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you can reach negotiated, consensual democratic 
agreements with your opponents at all levels of society.  
In the last 4-5 years, concern with radicalisation and extremism may have led policy makers to re-
consider whether the swing towards civic integrationism, also fuelled by post 9/11 fears of radical 
Islamism, has been too one-sided. Slightly more emphasis is given to concepts like tolerance and equal 
respect in order to prevent minorities from being alienated and turning against society: these concepts 
are thus back on the agenda, not only to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but also improve 
the safety of the majority. 
In conclusion, the main diversity challenges that politicians consider important relate almost 
exclusively to non-Western immigrants. As described above, the concerns driving them can be 
summed up in three themes: 
 
1. Unemployment: It is often emphasized that the percentage of non-Western 
immigrants on social security is out of proportion with the rest of the population. 
This is seen as a problem for the sustainability of the Danish welfare model. 
2. Parallel societies (ghettoisation): It is often noted that we need to avoid a 
situation where Muslims are living in their own secluded communities impervious 
to the rules and institutions of the rest of society and that we are heading towards 
such a situation if something is not done now. The fear is one of parallel societies 
hostile and indifferent to one another, of Sharia law being de facto implemented 
outside Danish law, and generally of the erosion of society’s social cohesion. 
3. Radicalisation/extremism: There has been a growing concern with radicalisation 
within Muslim communities. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism 
and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or 
indifference to problematic beliefs and practices of minorities that in a worst-case 
scenario could lead to acts of terrorism. Concern for the democratic mind-set of 
Muslims is often expressed. However, both in order to counterbalance the 
symbolic exclusion of immigrant youth and thereby avoid radicalisation and in 
order to counteract anti-Semitism in larger urban areas the concept of toleration is 
being brought back onto the political agenda.  
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CHAPTER 2. (IN)TOLERANCE AND ACCOMMEDATION OF DIFFERENCE IN 
DANISH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS  
 
By Tore Vincents Olsen and Sofie Marie Ahlgren 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Denmark has 10 years of mandatory education from age 6 to 15. Denmark offers free education in 
public schools and parents can choose to send their children to state subsidized private schools, so-
called free primary schools. The state subsidy makes them affordable to most parents. Home schooling 
is also allowed, but very rare.  
Private Schools: Free Primary Schools 
Private schooling is based on a constitutional clause from 1849 which reflected discontent with state 
schools (Balle 2006). First, starting from 1787 the bourgeois class had established private schools to 
educate their children to enter into the (modern) trades of the estate, including international commerce, 
and to bestow them with bourgeois virtues (Balle 2006: 4). Secondly, the school movement led by 
N.F.S. Grundtvig and K. Kold saw the state school as repressive and reactionary (‘the school of 
death’, Grundtvig). It pleaded for ‘the school of life’ which should raise the children of especially 
independent peasants/farmers to a life in freedom, (national) enlightenment and self-determination 
(individually and collectively) by teaching history, languages, poetry, singing and storytelling. The 
schools were established in the first half of the 19
th
 century and defied the formal strictures of tests and 
exams (Balle 2006: 5).  
The constitutional protection of home and private schooling can be construed as democratic minority 
protection. In terms of educational policy it places a strong emphasis on the rights of parents (and not 
the state) to have their children educated according to their preferred ideological outlook (Balle 2006: 
6). The freedom of free primary schools peaked in 1979 when the state subsidy was at about 85 
percent and the schools’ only formal obligation was to fulfil the general aims of education as 
stipulated in the law on the public primary school. This allowed minorities to make use of their 
minority rights, determining the content and form of education for their children. The schools hence 
incarnated Danish liberality or tolerance. 
However, in the last 13 years more conditions for the reception of state funds have been 
placed on free primary schools and they are increasingly seen as a part of a common 
educational system. This reflects the increased number of students attending these schools 
(now 13 percent of all students) as well as concerns about their academic quality and about 
religious and cultural diversity. The schools are monitored more closely by the state. They 
have to teach in Danish and their staff and board all have to be proficient in Danish. 
Moreover, in 2002 and 2005 civic education became obligatory for the schools: 
According to their purpose and in all of their work [the schools] shall prepare the students to live in a 
society like the Danish one with freedom and democracy and develop and strengthen the students’ 
knowledge of and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including equality between the 
sexes (Law on Free Schools, article 1.2). 
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Students in private schools must receive liberal civic education and not taught political, 
religious and cultural doctrines that are socially and politically divisive. The state (the 
political majority) will no longer fund schools that do not teach democratic virtues. Moreover, 
both government and opposition are currently considering how to induce predominantly 
‘white’ private schools to take greater responsibility for the ‘integration task’ by recruiting 
more students with ‘weak family backgrounds’.  
Public Schools: The People’s School 
The public primary school, literally ‘The People’s School,’ must familiarise the students with ‘Danish 
culture and history’ and give them an understanding of ‘other countries and cultures’. It should create 
national awareness if not identity but not necessarily appreciation of other cultures. Moreover, the 
school should induce the students to ‘learn more’ and ‘educate themselves’, promote the ‘well-
rounded development of the individual student’ and provide the framework for the students to develop 
‘cognition and imagination (…) confidence in their own potential and a basis for taking a stand and 
acting’ (Law on the People’s School, art. 1.1. and 1.2). The Danish public school hence rests on a 
rather strong (liberal) perfectionism when it comes to the development of individuality and personal 
autonomy. Also civic education is emphasised:  
The People’s school shall prepare the students to participation, mutual responsibility, rights and duties in a 
society with freedom and democracy. The work of the school shall therefore be characterized by 
intellectual freedom, equality and democracy (Law on the People’s School, art. 1.3) 
The general aim of the public school was revised in 2006. Arguably, the revision represented in part a 
change towards the development of a more opportunistic personality type who should be able to 
compete in a (global) labour market and increase the wealth of the nation (Pedersen 2011). In the new 
‘competition state’ (as opposed to the welfare state) the school is once again instrumentalized for 
national (economic) purposes and is no more the sanctuary for the general education, Bildung, of the 
individual’s character that it had been from 1958 to 2006 (Pedersen 2011). As for democracy and civic 
education, the emphasis has arguably shifted from a perception of the school as a site for the practice 
and constitution of (school) democracy to a place where students are taught how to act in a democracy 
which is pre-constituted or ‘already given’ (Pedersen 2011).  
The municipalities are responsible for running the public schools in Denmark. Since 2005 parents are 
allowed to send their children to schools outside their school districts. Bilingual children with deficient 
Danish language skills can for ‘pedagogical reasons’ be sent to schools outside their school district. In 
Aarhus (Denmark’s second largest city) bilingual students are forcefully redistributed via bussing. In 
Copenhagen city, a number of places are especially reserved in predominantly ‘white’ public schools 
for bilingual students who wish to attend a school outside their own district. In both cases, the 
intention is to ensure an more equal distribution of bilingual children and diminish the segregation of 
schools into ‘black’ and ‘white’ schools.13  
There are national descriptions of the subjects taught in the public school, but no nationally set 
curricula. However, central control with what is being taught in schools arguably has increased over 
                                                     
13
  The Copenhagen Model is currently under revision, because it, perhaps unsurprisingly, is bilingual students with the least 
need for school relocation who use its opportunities. Copenhagen now wants to conduct ‘firm supervision’ of parents of 
students who really need relocation to a more Danish dominated school environment to aquire sufficent Danish language 
proficiency.  
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the last decade with the development of ‘canons’ of literature, history and democracy and with the 
introduction, in light of disappointing PISA results, of ‘common national goals’ and national tests as 
well as mandatory individual student evaluations and development plans for all students in all ages in 
all taught subjects (Nielsen et al. 2011). The responsibility for the curricula and teaching methods lies 
with the school director, supervised by the locally elected school board, but in practice often with the 
individual teacher.  
Parents are (also legally) required to be ‘actively involved’ in the schooling of their own children 
(including doing homework with them) and in the daily functioning of the classes and the school. This 
is seen as peculiar to the Danish educational system and the Ministry of Education has issued 
brochures in several languages listing parents’ rights and responsibilities.14 The school board (one per 
school) is elected among the school’s students (2 reps), parents (5 to 7 reps) and staff (2 reps).  
Schools, directors, teachers, parents and school boards thus have considerable autonomy in deciding 
how the school should be run in order to fulfil its tasks. As a ‘school community’ they are able to 
make flexible interpretations of the content and form of education. This includes decisions about how 
to accommodate cultural and religious diversity, which are (may be) based on local experiences and 
experiments.  
Number and Composition of Schools 
In 2009 there were 2,306 primary schools in Denmark: 1,529 public primary schools, 513 free primary 
schools and 264 so-called continuation schools (private, publicly subsidised schools for school 
primary school graduates 9
th
 to 10
th
 grade) (Ministry of Education 2010a: 50). The number of public 
schools has decreased slightly, while the number of free primary schools has increased in recent years. 
This also reflects a ‘migration’ of students from public schools to private. The number of students in 
public schools has dropped 3 percent from 2005 to 2008 while the number of students in free primary 
schools has risen 6 percent (Ministry of Education 2010a: 50). There are in total 719,000 students in 
the Danish school system (2008 numbers); 581,000 (81 percent) in public schools, and 95,000 in free 
primary schools (i.e. 13 percent, the rest are in continuation schools and different special schools).
15
 
Public schools have about 376 students on average while free primary schools have about 189 students 
on average (Ministry of Education 2010a: 53).  
About 10 percent of the students are of non-Danish ethnic origin, and about 90 percent of these are of 
non-western origin.  
                                                     
14
  The Integration Ministry has issued a Handbook for School-Home Cooperation to strengthen the inclusion of New-Dane 
parents (i.e. parents with immigration background) into the daily life and work of the primary school, URL: 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5DA0130F-8591-4CBA-A2E6-
CC7A329C13CC/0/1020101_Detgodeskolehjemsamarbejde_samlet.pdf 
15
 Source: http://statweb.uni-c.dk/Databanken/uvmDataWeb/ShowReport.aspx?report=EGS-bestand-skoletype 
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Table 2.1: Students by country of origin, 10 largest immigrant groups (2009/10) 
 Public schools Free primary schools Total Percent 
Turkey 9,691 1,207 10,898 15.3 
Iraq 5,810 862 6,672 9.4 
Lebanon 5,538 1,009 6,547 9.2 
Somalia 3,975 642 4,617 6.5 
Pakistan 2,817 400 3,217 4.5 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2,892 118 3,010 4.2 
Afghanistan 2,898 86 2,984 4.2 
Vietnam 2,186 426 2,612 3.7 
Yugoslavia 2,292 113 2,405 3.4 
Sri Lanka 1,856 486 2,342 3.3 
Other countries 20,450 5,443 25,893 36.4 
Total non-Danish 60,405 10,792 71,197 100.0 
Denmark 516,485 85,062 601,547  
Total* 576,890 95,854 672,744  
Source: http://statweb.uni-c.dk/Databanken/uvmDataWeb/ShowReport.aspx?report=EGS-bestand-land-herkomst 
* The number does not include students at ‘continuation schools’, cf. above. 
 
In some municipalities the concentration of immigrant children is much higher than the 10 percent 
average (see table 2). Except for Aarhus and Odense, the municipalities with a high percentage of 
immigrant children are in the Greater Copenhagen area. 
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Table 2.2: Municipalities with high percentage of immigrant children (2009/10) 
 Danish Immigrant Total Percentage 
Ishøj 1,678 1,018 2,708 37.6 
Brøndby 2,470 1,247 3,720 33.5 
Copenhagen 31,181 14,008 45,342 30.9 
Albertslund 2,582 1,081 3,676 29.4 
Høje-Taastrup 4,705 1,690 6,403 26.4 
Aarhus 27,803 6,739 34,557 19.5 
Herlev 2,425 582 3,008 19.3 
Odense 18,099 4,066 22,168 18.3 
Vallensbæk 1,707 342 2,056 16.6 
Rødovre 3,425 666 4,096 16.3 
Hvidovre 5,061 939 6,005 15.6 
Frederiksberg 7,091 1,220 8,373 14.6 
Glostrup 1,886 300 2,188 13.7 
Source: http://statweb.uni-c.dk/Databanken/uvmDataWeb/ShowReport.aspx?report=EGS-bestand-kommune-
herkomst 
As table 3 reveals, 8 percent of the public schools have no immigrant children. For the free primary 
schools the percentage is 16 percent. 75 percent of the public schools have less than 10 percent 
immigrant students, while this applies to 82 percent of the free primary schools. 42 (3 percent) public 
schools and 30 (6 percent) free primary schools have more than 50 percent students with immigrant 
background.  
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Table 2.3: Distribution of immigrant children in different school types 
 Number of schools 
Percentage of 
children with 
immigrant 
background 
Public 
schools 
Free primary 
schools 
Continuation 
schools 
Special 
schools 
Day treatment 
programs 
None 134 80 65 43 101 
0.1-9.9 1,070 332 190 73 35 
10-24.9 239 44 3 49 34 
25-34.9 65 8 2 6 12 
35-49.9 41 9 0 5 3 
50-74.9 27 5 0 3 2 
75-99.9 15 25 0 0 1 
100 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1,591 503 260 179 188 
Source: reproduced from Hornbek 2009: 12. 
http://www.uvm.dk/~/media/Files/Stat/Folkeskolen/PDF09/090914%20herkomst.ashx 
About 83 percent of all students continue education after the first 10 years of mandatory education. 
However, more girls than boys pursue further education. Moreover Danish children pursue further 
education to a greater extent than immigrant children. 17 percent of the ethnic Danish boys compared 
to 22 percent of the immigrant boys do not continue education. 17 percent of the ethnic Danish girls 
compared to 23 percent of the immigrant girls do not pursue further education.
16
 
The Educational Quality, Segregation, and School Choice Anxiety 
Disappointing rankings in the OECD PISA surveys have been an important driver of Danish school 
policy in the last decade both generally and in relation to bilingual children. The last decade has seen 
some improvement, but despite a strong focus on raising the competences of immigrant students, 43 
percent of first generation and 32 percent of second generation immigrant students have not acquired 
the skills deemed necessary for further education (compared to 13 percent of ethnic Danes) (Egelund 
et al. 2011). On average immigrant students are almost 2 years behind Danish students. Statistically, 
the one third of the educational deficit of immigrant students compared to ethnic Danes can be 
explained by their socio-economic and cultural status (i.e. OECD’s ESCS17 measure, not ‘ethnicity’) 
(Egelund et al. 2011: 10-11). Other explanatory factors are language spoken at home (Danish or not), 
whether parents read to their children and whether the immigrant children attend schools where 
                                                     
16
 http://www.uvm.dk/~/media/Files/Stat/Folkeskolen/PDF09/090914%20herkomst.ashx 
17
  Definition of ESCS: ‘The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) index of economic, social and 
cultural status was created on the basis of the following variables: the International Socio-Economic Index of 
Occupational Status (ISEI); the highest level of education of the student’s parents converted into years of schooling; the 
PISA index of family wealth; the PISA index of home educational resources; and the PISA index of possessions related 
to ‘classical’ culture in the family home.’ Education at a Glance, OECD, Paris, 2002, Glossary. URL: 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5401 
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immigrant children make up the majority. The latter may be explained by special dynamics at schools 
with a high percentage of immigrants which makes the teaching challenge different and more difficult 
(Egelund et al. 2011: 10). Also, the teachers’ (and the parents’) low expectations to students at schools 
with high immigrant concentration may contribute to low achievements as may lack of respect among 
students for teachers since it obstructs teaching generally (Egelund et al. 10-11).
18
  
Better educated Danish parents and immigrant parents who speak Danish at home tend to avoid public 
schools with more than 30 percent immigrant children (Rangvid 2010).
19
 While Danish parents choose 
a public or private school with fewer immigrant children, immigrant parents pursue a two-pronged 
strategy. Either they send their children to schools with fewer immigrant children or they send them to 
pure immigrant private schools.
20
 The rejected school generally has lower academic achievements than 
the one chosen. All in all this means that school choice increases both ethnic segregation and 
segregation between students with poorly and well educated parents and between more and less 
language proficient immigrants (Rangvid 2010: 327). In general figures indicate a large degree of 
socio-economic segregation of students (both Danish and immigrant) between different schools (cf. 
Egelund et al. 2011: 10).  
The teaching quality of public schools has been under fire in recent years (in light of the PISA results). 
A general discourse on the difficulty and necessity of finding the right school for your children has 
emerged and is likely to push towards further segregation. Continued segregation is problematic since 
a low concentration of students with ‘weak family background’21 (at least below 30 percent) in schools 
significantly elevates the academic achievements of ‘weak students’ and increases their tendency to 
pursue further education (Olsen 2009: ch. 3). This creates a collective action problem: It is 
individually rational to pursue a strategy with segregation effects, while it is collectively irrational 
because it lowers the academic achievements of some (in particular those with ‘weak family 
backgrounds’) without necessarily raising those of others.  
To sum up, initiatives to handle cultural and religious diversity in the Danish school system should be 
seen in light not only of cultural and religious differences, their accommodation and potential 
integration, but also in connection with concerns about the segregation of the student population into 
high and low academic achievers. While there is – as in many countries – a strong concern about 
academic achievement generally, there is a particularly strong concern with the academic 
achievements of students with immigrant background, not only for their own sake, but also because of 
the cost they might incur on the welfare state.  
                                                     
18
  In a qualitative study of the differences between the successful Finnish school system and the less successful Danish 
system, Andersen (2011) points to norms of respect for the teachers and of ‘always doing your best’ as central to the 
Finnish success.  
19
  Rangvid’s study is based on data from Copenhagen only.  
20
  In Rangvid’s model the explanation would be that this strategy is chosen because the option to choose a public or private 
school with fewer immigrant students is not available. The private immigrant schools are hence seen as a better option – a 
second or third best – than staying in the local public school. This is supported by a survey revealing that immigrant 
parents’ applications to schools with lower immigrant concentration have been turned away at a higher rate than the 
applications of ethnic Danish parents (Rangvid 2010: 330).  
21
  A ‘weak family background’ obtains when a student displays at least two of the following three characteristics: 1) neither 
parent has any education beyond upper secondary education or vocational training; 2) at least one of the parents’ main 
income is based on social welfare payments; 3) the student does not live with both parents. 
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Policy Initiatives 
In a short overview, there are a number of initiatives in education that relate to cultural and religious 
diversity either entirely or partly. One consists of strong focus on Danish language acquisition for 
immigrant children, since language is seen as a presupposition for learning. This has entailed language 
screening at the age of three and mandatory language stimulation for children who do not attend 
preschool care. The kindergarten class (grade 0) has been made mandatory for all (as of 2009) and 
there is also a mandatory language screening here.
22
 Efforts have been made to raise the expertise 
among teachers and extra resources have been invested in teaching Danish as a second language. As 
mentioned, the municipalities of Aarhus and Copenhagen try to redistribute immigrant students with 
low language skills on a mandatory or a voluntary basis. These are in a certain sense desegregation 
measures. In late 2010, the government introduced the idea of redrawing school districts in order to 
avoid segregation into white and black schools and it wants to increase state monitoring of immigrant 
free primary schools to make sure they meet academic standards including Danish classes (Danish 
Government 2010a: 23). It would also allow schools with many immigrant students to extend the 
school day to further their academic development (ibid.). Finally, as mentioned, it is being discussed 
how white free primary schools may contribute to ‘integrating’ students with immigrant background 
(Danish Government 2010b).  
A second initiative has been to more closely monitor the free primary schools, in particular those with 
a high percentage of immigrant students. One concern is their academic standards; another whether 
immigrant Islamic schools teach fundamentalist and divisive anti-democratic doctrines as evidenced in 
the introduction of mandatory civic education in these schools. State monitoring of Islamic schools is 
now also connected with government anti-radicalization programs. Similarly, staff at public schools is 
required to report on students with radical outlooks.  
A third set of initiatives directly addresses the question of cultural and religious diversity in school 
life. The Ministries of Education and Integration have developed handbooks and tools for dealing with 
such differences and resolving conflicts among pupils and between teachers and pupils (e.g. Ministry 
of Education 2008; 2003). As mentioned a separate effort has been directed towards establishing the 
right connection between school and immigrant parents and turning the latter into active participants in 
school life according to the Danish ideal of parent involvement. 
A fourth concern has been the increased focus on civic education for all children in the school and on 
establishing a stronger national and cultural awareness/knowledge if not identity among students in 
Danish schools. From different sources, teaching material has been developed that can be used in civic 
education. Civic education is not a separate subject but is thought to be part of other subjects, mainly 
social sciences, but also history, Danish, and Christianity studies. As mentioned there has been a move 
away from the idea that democracy is taught through practice at the schools towards seeing it as 
cultural knowledge that students should acquire in school to be able to participate in a pre-constituted 
democracy (Pedersen 2011; Jensen 2010). This is crafted especially with immigrant youth in mind 
(Jensen 2010). Furthermore the transmission of Danish national identity has been given a stronger 
emphasis by the centre-right government (Jensen 2010). 
                                                     
22
 In Denmark Kindergarten is for the 3 (sometimes 2½) to 6 years old. Kindergartens are separate institutions. Kindergarten 
class is for 6 years old and is placed as the entry level at public and private schools alike and is also sometimes called 
grade 0. You are allowed to enroll your children already as 5 years old in the kindergarten class if they are deemed to be 
sufficiently mature. But normally children are enrolled when they are 6 or turn 6 within the first semester of the 
kindergarten class. 
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Finally, addressing problems of bullying it has been made mandatory for each school (board) to 
formulate an anti-bullying strategy based on a value set for good behaviour. It should create student 
welfare and a good learning environment of ‘respectful relations between the school students and 
between students and school staff’ (Ministry of Education 2010b: article 1.2). Transgressions of norms 
of good behaviour in and outside the school can be sanctioned.  
2.2. Toleration, Recognition And Integration 
Many issues regarding non-toleration, toleration and recognition have emerged in the context of the 
above developments. The strong focus on integration has worked against the acceptance of differences 
either negatively (toleration) or positively (recognition). There is a general concern that the school 
system transmits civic values and in the public schools also a common (national) identity and 
development of individuality and autonomy. It is feared that some free primary schools teach divisive 
ideological (religious) doctrines. Generally there is a concern with segregation along not only ethnic 
but also social and academic lines, due to the legislation on free primary schools and free choice 
between public schools.  
In this study of toleration issues in the Danish school sector, we focus on two particular cases which 
cover most, but not all of these issues. With regard to the transmission of key values through the 
school system, we have focused on the permissibility of individual schools to accommodate culturally 
and religiously founded demands of students and parents with minority background. The case 
concerns self-representation and interaction in the public school system and the relation between 
principled boundaries of tolerance and pragmatic accommodation so that the school provides 
education for all students on a daily basis (in collaboration with their parents). 
The other case regards the institutional structure of the educational system and in general the creation 
of free primary schools by religious minorities, in particular Muslims. The Danish rules on free 
primary schools can be construed as a right for minority parents to choose the kind of (ideological and 
religious) education they want for their children. As such it epitomizes Danish (institutional) 
toleration. However, increased state control and monitoring of free primary schools can be seen as 
restriction of the space of tolerance. 
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2.3. Case 1: The Accommodation of Ethno-Religious Diversity within the Public School  
A controversial issue in the Danish public debate has been the extent to which the public schools 
should accommodate demands for special treatment and exemptions for immigrant students and 
parents based on their cultural and religious sensibilities.  
As accounted for in the introduction, public schools have relative autonomy to decide the content and 
form of education and the individual school boards can make decisions on how to run the schools. 
This autonomy can be used to accommodate cultural and religious differences. However, the need for 
schools to transmit key liberal democratic values and a common (national) identity has been strongly 
emphasised and accommodations have been controversial when they are perceived to conflict with 
core values.  
Accommodations in the form of exemptions have been discussed in relation to Christianity studies in 
the public schools, gym classes including swimming as well as music and arts classes. Special 
treatment has been discussed in connection with the selection of teaching material, creation of prayer 
rooms, shower curtains facilitating privacy, dietary requirements, special days off in connection with 
Ramadan and the resort to religious authorities, imams, in keeping discipline in schools. This type of 
cases predominantly concerns identities and practices in schools and to what extent they should be 
prohibited, discouraged, tolerated, or recognized as valuable and accommodated. 
The present case study concerns a recent event in February 2010 that represents discussions of this 
kind. A debate erupted about whether it was legitimate for the public Holberg School in Copenhagen 
to hold parent meetings only for women on the grounds that some immigrant women did not turn up to 
meetings open to both sexes and the school had difficulty creating contact with those parents. To some 
this was a pragmatic measure to create the kind of parent involvement that is needed in order to get the 
daily life of the school to function. To others, it was a fundamental breach with the key norm of 
gender equality and a submission to Muslim intolerance and ‘medieval patriarchal norms’, etc. The 
fact that certain groups of parents cannot work within the framework of mixed-gender parents’ 
meetings should not be taken into account because it would undermine clear norms of gender equality, 
interpreted to mean no separation between men and women at common meetings with the school as 
well as identical responsibility of both sexes for the education of their children. 
The initial complaint that started the event came from a father who felt unjustly excluded from the 
women-only meetings on bullying among students. The complaint was reported by a national 
newspaper. High-ranking national politicians intervened. Some demanded that the politically elected 
head of the Copenhagen School administration should correct the headmaster of the Holberg School 
and have him change the decision regarding the meetings. The Danish People’s Party developed a 
national plan for schools to counteract initiatives of this kind. One suggestion was that children should 
only be allowed to speak Danish in Danish schools (no Arabic and Turkish!). The Liberal Minister of 
Education said that he found the initiative to hold women-only meetings ‘horrible’, but still defended 
the autonomy of the school’s board and headmaster to make such decisions. Some politicians, also 
from the Liberal Party, demanded a national investigation on how widespread these (illegitimate) 
accommodations of cultural and religious differences were. They were turned down by the Liberal 
Minister of Integration, who preferred to spend her money on integration instead – as she put it. The 
leader of the left-wing Socialist People’s Party got in trouble with sections of his own party, especially 
those in Copenhagen, for his initial hard line opposition to the women-only meetings, and had to 
retract his ‘condemnation’ of the meetings. Some of the high-ranking politicians were invited to and 
visited the Holberg School. Curiously it turned out that the meetings were part of a state-subsidized, 
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local ‘integration project’ with funding sanctioned by the same national parties who were criticizing 
it.
23
 The women-only meetings were held and continued as planned. There was no immediate action at 
any political level (national or local) to change this type of accommodation.  
There are two interesting aspects in this case with regard to toleration in education: the (lacking) effect 
of principled national discourses on every day practices at individual schools and the underlying 
approach to making accommodations in the daily life of schools. There is a prevailing (pragmatic) 
interest in getting the school life to work, especially ensuring that the students receive the relevant 
education and that schools create good communicative relations with immigrant parents. Sometimes 
the ‘big questions’ about fundamental values and identities are bracketed in order to reach an 
understanding about the very concrete concerns of different parties involved in the individual student’s 
schooling. This may also involve not only toleration but the employment of norms of interaction that 
imply respect for immigrant parents as competent and equal participants in communication with the 
school and in the ‘school community’ in general.  
Nonetheless, there are limits to the kinds of accommodation that can be made. Some have pointed to 
the (unintended) negative consequences of accommodating, for instance, religious demands. 
Accommodating religious practice within school hours can, for example, lead to peer pressure on 
students ‘nominally’ belonging to a specific religious group to conform to religious norms that they 
reject or are disinterested in.  
The case study is mainly based on three sources: (1) media coverage of the Holberg School debate; (2) 
interviews with people connected to the event at the national, municipal and local levels, representing 
different points of view and interests. Interviewees who are differently placed with regard to the case 
(see list in annex 1) are prioritized; (3) examples of policy guidelines and tools developed at different 
levels (national and local) for dealing with cultural and religious diversity in school life, including 
communication with immigrant parents.  
2.3.1. The Media Debate 
The concern about integration is almost all-pervasive in Denmark and this was also reflected in the 
debate about the Holberg School. Both supporters and opponents of the women-only meetings used 
‘integration’ as an underlying premise in their argumentation. Opponents saw them as undermining 
central Danish values in school practices and as a form of ‘performative’ contradiction by a central 
Danish (value, cultural) institution. They would undermine the ability to transmit key values to 
children and, not least, to their parents. The parents ought to adapt to the modern Danish values and 
leave old-fashioned patriarchal cultural and religious norms behind. Among the strong opponents of 
the women-only meetings, there was no talk of recognition or toleration. 
Supporters claimed that such pragmatic measures would establish contact to parents – and in general 
to groups – that could not be established through other means. By including groups through pragmatic 
measures communication would be established and communication would lead to ‘integration’. It is 
evident in the interviews, that this perspective is dominant in the professional world. It also clear from 
the guidelines or ‘inspiration catalogues’ / handbooks published by the Ministry of Education. While 
the introductions/forewords by the minister may emphasise the centrality of ‘Danish values’ the body 
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 The funding came from a special pool of money, Satspuljemidlerne, distributed to social projects with regular intervals and 
decided upon by most Danish political parties in common. 
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of the publication is based on the notion of intercultural dialogue and places great emphasis on 
recognising all students and parents as equal and important irrespective of their cultural and religious 
background. It is also underlined that the cultural backgrounds of such students should be seen as a 
‘resource’ in teaching and school life. However, there is no talk of recognising people’s particular 
identities as valuable as such – and great efforts are made not to reduce the explanation of behaviour 
and conflicts to culture (/religion). Similarly, while there is focus on the fact that people legitimately 
may hold different values and the publications advise on conflict resolution, there is no admission of 
fundamental and permanent value conflicts. There is in this sense little focus on ‘tolerance’ as a 
possible means of dealing with cultural and religious conflict. More about this below. 
The opponents of the women-only meetings claimed that such meetings were unacceptable. There 
were various lines of criticism and reactions. A key concern was the undermining of modern Danish 
gender equality norms: 
It is a completely ridiculous decision. We shall not sacrifice gender equality and the rights of 
fathers to participate in the school life of their children out of consideration for some entrenched 
religious convictions. (Villy Søvndal, Leader of the Socialist People’s Party, quoted in Berlingske 
Tidende 04.02.2010) 
According to Villy Søvndal, the school should not promote and legitimize reactionary gender roles 
based on the notion that the education and well-being of children were only the responsibility of 
women. This line was generally supported by the members of the Social Democratic Party (at the 
national level), members of the governing Liberal and Conservative Parties and of course the Danish 
People’s Party: 
It is deeply grotesque that a Danish people’s school holds such a medieval conviction that men 
and women cannot be in the same room in the year 2010 (Pia Adelsten, DPP Spokesperson on 
gender equality, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 04.02.2010) 
Pia Adelsten (DPP) summarized the main expectation behind this view 
In Denmark men and women are equal and we will not change our society to the demands and 
norms of immigrants. The immigrants should adapt to Denmark and not the other way round. It is 
completely unreasonable that a single father or a father who wants to, cannot participate in a 
parents’ meeting at the school of his child. It is sex discrimination and gender equality has to 
apply both ways (Pia Adelsten, in Berlingske Tidende 05.02.2010). 
It is obvious that for most of the opponents, this is the limit of toleration: 
If more school directors – in misunderstood tolerance – contribute in this manner to undermining 
the necessary integration process, which the Prime Minister several times has defined as the 
government’s focus area, the Minister [of Education] must join the debate clearly demarcate the 
boundary of toleration (Editorial, Berlingske Tidende 05.02.2010).  
One concern is that accommodation of particular demands of immigrants is a slippery slope that may 
end in an irreversible state of affairs: 
Every time people insist on special accommodations of Muslim fellow citizens, and every time 
these special accommodations are extended also obligate others besides Muslims, another slice of 
the salami is cut off – another slice of the Danish basis of democratic culture (Editorial Jyllands-
Posten, 05.02.2010).  
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There is a risk that it becomes much more comprehensive and once something like this is 
established it is difficult to change (Karen Jespersen, Liberal Party, quoted in Jyllands-Posten 
05.02.2010). 
This is paired with the claim that it is really only the most extreme segments of Muslim minorities that 
make such demands and that accommodations really are accommodations of the extremist and not of 
the ordinary Muslims (N. Khader, Conservative Party, quoted in Jyllands-Posten 05.02.2010).  
The reaction was in favour of having the school director stop the meetings. Another action was to have 
the extent of such accommodations mapped with a view to regulation. The DPP went furthest. It was 
not content with a general debate about values leaving school autonomy intact, and therefore 
suggested prohibiting sex-separated classes and parents’ meetings in Danish schools (Berlingske 
Tidende, 05.02.2010) as well as a ban on languages other than Danish in schools (Information, 
06.02.2010). 
The middle ground was covered by Liberal ministers, predominantly the Minister of Education. He 
argued for toleration based on local school autonomy and reluctance to have the Danish state regulate 
in detail how individual schools should be run. The minister is reported as saying that he had never 
heard anything as ‘horrible’ in his fifteen years as Minister of Education and he encouraged the school 
director at the Holberg School to get a hold of the immigrant fathers, give them a scolding and tell 
them that ‘this is Denmark and here you can go to a meeting even if there are people of the opposite 
sex present.’ However, he added:  
It is definitely not something that we have to decide for all of Denmark. We have to strengthen 
the management responsibility [of the individual schools], not weaken it. I am neither minister for 
headscarves, shower curtains, liver pate sandwiches [traditional Danish lunch dish containing 
pork], invitations to parents’ meetings nor questions about what you are allowed to say in the 
school yard (Politiken, 05.02.2010). 
The Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party sided with the government. They also did not 
want to ban or regulate this type of accommodations in individual schools.  
Supporters of the women-only meetings generally took a pragmatic stance and argued that if these 
meetings would facilitate communication that otherwise would not take place, then they were in order. 
A second premise is that the overall principle is to make sure that the school communicates with and 
includes all groups. In fact, it transpired that the meetings were not really parents’ meetings in the 
strict sense, but rather special theme meetings organized in the context of a general integration project 
financed by the government and authorized by the same parties which were condemning it in public.
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The supporters’ argument was that this was a pragmatic measure and was justified on the basis of the 
aim of the meetings 
If that is what it takes to ensure that the students have a safe and good day in school without 
bullying, then I respect the decision. (Anders Bondo Christensen, Chairman, Teachers’ Union, 
quoted in Berlingske Tidende 04.02.2010) 
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  In fact, members of the SPP, SD and the Liberal Party retracted some of their initial criticism when it became public that 
the meetings were part of an integration project for women and that they were not parents meetings in the strict sense. 
They claimed they had been misinformed. 
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This kind of medieval view on women has to be fought, but that is not the purpose of this coffee 
meeting. Nor is it the responsibility of the school. The school must focus on the children; on their 
well being and education. (Mette-Line Thorup, commentary, Information, 05.02.2010) 
A good suggestion: Relax, let the individual school directors decide. If they can help the children 
by holding meetings only for mothers, only for siblings or only for fathers, then let them do it as 
long as the regular school-parent cooperation is observed and respected. The meeting at the 
Holberg School was not actually part of the value struggle. (Editorial in Politiken, 05.02.2010)  
As the last two quotes reveal there is a conscious distinction between the principled political value 
debate or ‘culture/value struggle’ – a household term in Danish politics in the last 10 years – and 
pragmatic measures. Not all things could possibly be the responsibility of schools and their efforts to 
create contact with groups of parents.  
Also the chairman of the board of the Holberg School lamented that the politicians had lost contact 
with reality: 
You simply have to relate to how the real world is. The politicians completely miss the point and 
escalate the whole thing into a very populist debate (Britt Vorgod Pedersen, quoted in 
Information, 05.02.2010)  
While the critics of the meetings were afraid that the Holberg School was going to set a bad example 
for other schools, the supporters, many of whom belonged to the professional community, argued for 
allowing schools to experiment with different solutions adjusted to their individual conditions and 
experiences.  
The experiences of the Muslim Schools underline yet again that there are differences between 
schools and that it is up to the teachers and directors at the schools to establish a meeting culture 
which takes into account the interest and well-being of the children in the best possible manner. 
(Bondo Christensen, Teachers Union, Kristeligt Dagblad, 05.02.2010) 
Testing different ideas is positive. The most important thing is that one does what is best for the 
children (…) The schools in Denmark are very different and it is therefore important that the 
schools are able to manage problems individually. (Benedikte Ask Skotte, national parents’ 
association, School and Society, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 06.02.2010). 
I propose that one experiments with what works and what does not. (A. Balle, School Directors 
Association, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 06.02.2010). 
One university expert pointed out that schools had to work with the parents as they actually were and 
not how they ought to be: 
One can hope that that is what the Holberg School does: that it takes its starting point in how the 
parents actually are and listens to their perception of the problems. It can benefit the school 
because it gets new information. It can also benefit the parents because they are taken seriously. 
And it can benefit the students because the school and the parents in this manner together can 
solve some problems instead of being mutually disappointed in each other (H. Knudsen, Dept. of 
Education, Aarhus University, quoted in Kristeligt Dagblad 05.02.2010). 
The pragmatic defence of the meetings reveals an implicit concept of tolerance. As with the liberal 
minister of education, there is no positive acceptance of the alleged difference – different 
interpretation of gender equality (or patriarchal norms). However, contrary to the minister it is here 
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argued that this difference has to be tolerated in order to achieve an overriding goal: the well-being 
and education of the children. The medieval norms should be changed, but parents’ meetings about 
bullying are not the time or the place. To the minister, tolerance is towards school practice out of 
respect for school autonomy and in a rejection of the notion of a detailed central state regulation of 
school life. In defence of pragmatic solutions there also a second conception of toleration which is less 
pragmatic and more principled. This is evidenced in the last quote: the parents have to be taken 
seriously as persons and parents even if they endorse wrong perceptions of gender roles. The parents 
are not only conceived as objects of toleration, but also as subjects of toleration: they are seen as moral 
and ‘political’ equals. 
The endorsement of local experiments can be seen in the same vein; as a way for power wielders – 
school, board and staff –to best develop working relationships with immigrant parents as objects of 
manipulation; or, in a more democratic interpretation, local solutions consider the interests of all 
involved to ensure the well-being and education of the children.  
In the debate, few directly addressed the need for recognition. A participant in one of the meetings (on 
bullying) pointed to the negative view of immigrant groups produced in the debate and how this 
misrecognition may have negative consequences beyond their immediate target group (immigrant 
fathers allegedly subscribing to medieval patriarchal norms):  
One thing is that some of the elected politicians haven’t bothered to study the purpose and idea 
behind the meeting, another is how they talk about Muslims, while they with their words of 
condemnation dig the chasm between ‘them’ and ‘us’ deeper, deeper and deeper. It is thought 
provoking and perhaps not so strange that the children in the schools have difficulty treating each 
other with dignity and respect. There are in any case clear threads back to the exclusion 
mechanisms which are drawn all the way down from the highest level (Ditte Dalum 
Christoffersen, in Politiken 06.02.2010).  
Another critique of the politicians’ reactions pointed to the potentially negative consequences of the 
initial harsh criticism of the school’s initiative to seek new solutions in cultural and religious diversity 
questions: Who would bother or even dare to take new initiatives if one risked being attacked in this 
manner (letter to the editor, Jyllands-Posten 09.02.2010).  
Behind the defence of the pragmatic approach to accommodating cultural and religious diversity is 
another partly competing, partly supplementary perception of what leads to integration, the overriding 
concern in Danish politics. This approach may be termed ‘integration through inclusion’ as opposed to 
‘integration through values’ (i.e. through the transmission and acquisition of central (Danish) values). 
Integration through inclusion is based on the idea that it is better to make accommodation which pulls 
various groups, predominantly women, out of their isolation and establish contact, than to insist on a 
very definite and uniform understanding of what central Danish values entail (e.g., that all meetings 
should be gender mixed): 
The inherent beauty of the mothers’ meeting at the Holberg School was that in addition to 
resolving the problem of bullying at the school, it would get the mothers out of isolation and give 
them an opportunity to get in contact with and integrate with society (Anita Bay Bundegaard, 
editor, in Politiken 06.02.2010). 
One of the very popular words of the day is parallel society. We are really getting a parallel 
society if the Muslim girls are kept at home because they cannot participate in activities together 
with boys. Now the girls are together with Danish girls and girls with another ethnic background 
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(Maria Bondo Gravesen, responsible for Girls Clubs in the library Vollsmose, Odense, quoted in 
Information 06.02.2010). 
The code words here are pragmatic integration solutions. It does not make the medieval darkness 
descend over Denmark that 25 women meet and drink tea. (A. Vang, Mayor for Education in 
Copenhagen, quoted in Information 09.02.2010). 
As mentioned, integration through inclusion seems to be the favoured approach by most members of 
the professional community (i.e. municipal school administrations, teachers’ and school directors’ 
associations as well as parent representatives). Obviously, the details of this approach did not emerge 
in the media debate, but material from the professional community, including the highest levels of the 
Ministries of Integration and Education, give more evidence for this approach as do many of the 
interviews.  
However, the approach lives side by side with the integration through values approach and in 
particular with the requirement contained in the legal framework that the public school imbue the 
students with certain values and virtues. The next section will look at publications issued by the 
Ministries of Integration and Education in which the approach is spelled out and in which tensions 
with other concerns can be seen.  
2.3.2. Integration Through Inclusion: Dialogue and Respect  
As mentioned, curricula in the Danish schools are determined locally. However the state governs the 
school sector by setting goals and targets for all school subjects. Moreover the ministry (ministries) 
issues optional guidelines and handbooks on topics such as cultural differences in schools. While the 
final editing is in the hands of the ministries, production of the material is usually outsourced to 
professionals and based on research projects and experiments in schools in Denmark. 
These publications evidence a tension between integration through values and integration through 
inclusion. A good example is a 2003 publication from the Ministry of Education Inspiring Better 
Integration in the People’s School (see also Ministry of Education 2008). The Minister of Education 
writes in the foreword that ‘the school should ensure that the values upon which the school is based is 
known and respected by staff as well as students and parents’ and mentions the three values 
‘intellectual freedom, equality and democracy’ (Ministry of Education 2003: 8 cf. above) and have 
other statements to the same effect. The rest of the publication is nonetheless mainly dedicated to the 
idea of integration through inclusion and the discourse on ‘values’ recedes to the background. The 
publication hence underlines the need to create understanding of the purposes of the schools and the 
expectations on both sides of the cooperation between schools and parents. For example, it is 
important that ‘the school is interested in the [the parents’] ideas and expectations and views the 
parents as important co-players, who have to be included in the cooperation as early as possible’ 
(Ministry of Education 2003: 15). It is underlined that there may be different ideas about schools and 
schooling among immigrant parents and that it should be taken into account in the communication that 
there are different expectations in Danish schools about certain norms, for example the perception of 
authority, the need for discussion and argumentation in class as well the informal dress of students and 
teachers (ibid.: 21). It is emphasised that all misunderstandings and conflicts are not necessarily based 
on culture and identity, but may have personal or social reasons (ibid.: 15). The publication discusses 
how certain accommodations on the basis of inclusion of immigrant students and parents can be made 
in connection with for example cooking classes (selection of meat, possibility of taking the produced 
food home and eating it after sunset), gym classes (showering dressed), sex education (separate classes 
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for boys and girls), school excursions (separate sleeping arrangements, food selection, no alcohol) and 
in connection with religious holidays, exempting students from school and planning key school events.  
Integration through inclusion is also prevalent in a recent publication from the Ministry of Integration 
on School-Parent cooperation with ‘New-Danish Parents’ (Ministry of Integration 2010). It is initially 
underlined that it is important to convey the purpose of the school-parent cooperation and the school’s 
demands to the parents. However, the actual dialogue between teachers and parents (i.e. the actual 
participants in the cooperation) emphasises mutual respect. Teachers and parents have common 
interest in the academic success of the child: 
The purpose of school-parent cooperation is to unite the school’s and the parents’ view on the 
child and achieve a common understanding of the child as a student. (ibid.: 11) 
The dialogue thus has one overriding purpose: the education and well-being of the child. The 
publication then underlines the importance of mutual respect and how ‘the appreciative dialogue’25 can 
ensure such respect: 
Parents and teachers have different roles and see the child from their respective perspectives. 
Mutual respect is a critical condition for good cooperation. The parents want to be respected for 
the values they give to their child and for their effort to raise the child in such a way that he/she 
will be able to take care of him/herself as an adult. The parents are emotionally tied to their child 
and view the child from experiences and contexts which include much more than just the child’s 
school-life. The teachers want to be respected for their competence as teachers. The teacher is the 
professional, who sees the child as a student and as part of a bigger group of students. (ibid.: 11)  
The appreciative dialogue is based on the notion of focusing on future directed actions and 
possibilities rather than on identities and problems. It is seen as a dialogue in which mutual 
recognition of others as equals is established and where differences in views are recognized (ibid.: 11). 
The dialogue is intended to establish relations and transforming them and the field available for action. 
In terms of practical advice it is underlined that it should be made clear that parents are able to 
contradict the teacher and express disagreements. The focus should be on dialogue and concrete issues 
and not (just) on the transmission of information from teacher to parent. Similarly, and strikingly, it is 
underlined that ‘speaking inclusively’ excludes expressions such as ‘This is how we do it in Denmark’ 
(ibid.: 18). 
Another publication lays out the principles and steps of the appreciative dialogue (Navigent 2008) 
based on the idea that the truth must emerge as a result of negotiations between different perspectives, 
none of which can be said to be correct or true beforehand (ibid: 9-10). The parents must be accepted 
and recognised with a view to developing mutual respect: 
When you understand and accept the parents, it is also possible to recognise and appreciate them. 
Even if they have a different world view than you and have other convictions, you can talk about 
it with them and create the possibility of changing some things – simply because they feel 
recognised. (ibid.: 13) 
Recognition leads to ‘mutual respect’ (see figure 1) and this entails recognising and respecting the 
differences among parents and teachers. For the teacher this is important to remember because the risk 
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 A adaptation of the concept of ’appreciative inquiry’. 
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is that ‘integration takes place as cultural adaptation where some people are incorporated [assimilated] 
into your culture and the dialogue takes place on your premises’ (ibid.: 13). 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the steps of appreciative dialogue 
      Love 
     Respect  
    Recognise   
   Accept    
  Understand     
 Meet      
See       
       
Note: It is emphasised that the last step, ‘love,’ is only relevant in the relation between child and parent, not in 
the professional relation between teacher and child/parent (Navigent 2008: 12). 
Now, the underlying theory, and principles and practical measures of the appreciative dialogue are 
some distance from the idea of integration through values. There is no scolding of fathers with 
antiquated patriarchal norms and telling them that ‘in Denmark we do so and so.’ Similarly, there is no 
idea that there are some key values that are necessarily privileged at the outset (however, see below). 
On the other hand, it is not clear that it is based on positive recognition of the values and identities of 
other people. Rather it is the respect and recognition of others as people who hold other values and 
convictions. And again there is a warning against reducing people to their cultural and religious 
background because it can ‘impede the dialogue’ (ibid.: 23).  
In this sense ‘integration through inclusion’ contains an implicit notion of tolerance, which 
entails more than objection, namely a form of curiosity and openness, but still less than a 
necessary embracement and ‘positive recognition’. Openness and curiosity even apply when 
the limit of toleration is reached:  
Acceptance is impossible in those rare cases when utterances of the parents are in conflict with the law or 
our society’s fundamental values of democracy, gender equality, freedom of religion etc. Here it is 
necessary for you as a teacher to hold your ground. But do it in an appreciative manner. Ask what it is the 
parents wish for, what they hope for and dream about, and go on from there instead of problematizing their 
statements. (ibid.: 12)  
So there are limits to toleration and tension between equalizing all perspectives and key values does 
arise. Dialogue-based integration through inclusion has its limits. On the one hand, it is geared towards 
reaching common solutions and discussing disagreements, e.g. about the school’s role in influencing 
the children in the area of ‘values and life attitudes’ (Ministry of Integration 2010: 41). It seeks 
solutions that ‘fit the school and parent group in question’ (ibid.: 41). On the other hand, the solutions 
must be ‘in agreement with the school’s view on learning and its value basis’ (ibid.: 41), including for 
example the notion that students are required to ‘take responsibility for their own learning’, ‘that the 
school is based on student democracy and co-determination’ and that the ‘students are expected to 
express their views’ (ibid.: 10), i.e. ideas closely related to the Danish People’s School’s emphasis on 
personal autonomy and development and reflexive democratic virtues.  
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In the publications the dialogue-based integration through inclusion and related practical measures are 
generally presented as things that have been proven to work because it creates communication and 
because it motivates immigrant students and parents for participation where they are taken seriously as 
equal and competent communication partners with legitimate interests, views and values. The same 
impression comes from interviews with members of the professional community. It is underlined that 
the political discourse on key values and drawing on the idea of ‘integration through values’ at best is 
irrelevant and at worst harmful, either because it produces risk adversity in the school sector with 
regard to new experiments and accommodations or because it pollutes the efforts to establish contact 
and communication between school, parents and students. The latter because the identities created in 
the national discourse on values, including the prevalent ‘them’ and ‘us’ distinction, become 
interpretative schemes through which parties interpret each other and each others’ statements, making 
communication even more difficult. Interviewees from the professional community reveal that the big 
questions about ‘values’ are often bracketed in view of the need to find concrete solutions to concrete 
challenges of making the school life of individual students work. The effort is in other words to 
distance themselves somewhat from the principled political discourse on values and prioritise the goal 
at hand: the well-being and education of the student.  
2.3.3. Conclusion 
An underlying premise of the accommodation of cultural and religious differences in Danish public 
schools is integration. Danish national politics and public discourse is dominated by a conception of 
integration through values, according to which the public schools should transmit key national and 
liberal democratic values to students and their parents in a uniform and uncompromising manner. This 
leaves little space for the recognition or even toleration of difference. The counter discourse of 
‘integration through inclusion’ is also in part based on the goal of integration. Pragmatic arguments for 
toleration and accommodation are however also closely related to securing the well-being and 
education of the individual student. They are followed by more principled arguments pertaining to the 
concept of appreciative dialogue about respecting minority parents as equal and competent speaking 
partners who are entitled to make their own choices about values and child rearing. The driving idea 
about integration through inclusion is that integration follows from the kind of accommodation that 
creates contact and interaction between different groups in society. The underlying concept of 
acceptance is a respect based conception of toleration emphasising the need to respect others as moral 
and political equals with the right to make their own choices. However, it does not go beyond this 
notion of respect. It is paired with a principled openness and curiosity towards that to which one 
objects/rejects, but does not rest on any requirement of positive recognition.  
At the same time, the concept of toleration and respect contained in ‘appreciative dialogue’ – the more 
principled part of ‘integration through inclusion’ – is some distance from the traditional Danish notion 
of liberality which includes a blunt and confrontational discursive ethos according to which one ‘fights 
for everything one holds dear’ while recognizing the same right for all.  
It seems clear from the material issued from e.g. the ministries and from the interviews with people 
working with or in the public school professional community that the partly pragmatic and partly 
principled approach underlying the overall discourse of ‘integration through inclusion’ is deemed 
successful, whilst the stubborn insistence on a uniform transmission of values, including the inherent 
‘them and us’ distinctions, is at best irrelevant and at worst harmful to school level efforts to create 
facilitating conditions for immigrant minority students in public schools.  
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2.4. Case 2: Free Schools – The Epitome of Danish Educational Tolerance? 
The Danish tradition of free primary schools is often seen as an expression of (institutional) tolerance 
in the Danish educational system. The free schools are seen as privileging the rights of parents to 
choose education for their children in accordance with their own ideology and pedagogical convictions 
over the right of the state and the democratic majority. As such it can be construed as a democratic 
minority right which furthermore is made effective through a large state subsidy (a voucher system) 
which makes it affordable for most parents to send their children to these private schools.  
In the 1990s a number of schools were established for Turkish, Arabic and Urdu-speaking children. In 
1998 the free school legislation was tightened so that only free schools teaching in Danish would be 
eligible for state subsidies. German minority schools and some international schools were exempted. 
A post-9/11 debate on Muslim free schools and concerns that their teaching may not teach in support 
of democracy and human rights led to a change in the legislation in 2002 so that the free primary 
schools are required to teach democracy and human rights. In 2005 the regulation was tightened yet 
again emphasising that the schools should ‘develop and strengthen the students’ knowledge of and 
respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including equality between the sexes’ (cf. above). 
The basis for monitoring the schools’ ability to live up to these requirements and to academic 
standards equal to those of the public schools was improved. Recently, monitoring of free primary 
schools was included in the Government’s 2009 anti-radicalization plan (Danish Government 2009: 
18). 
Another criticism against the use and establishment of free primary schools is that they facilitate 
‘white flight’ from the public schools based on ‘intolerance’ against weak and bilingual (i.e. 
immigrant) students and that this leads to segregation and increased intolerance between groups 
because social and cultural groups do not mix. As mentioned, it is currently discussed how free 
schools may be economically induced to take more responsibility for the ‘integration task’. 
Together the two criticisms and the ensuing policy development can be seen as a restriction on the 
minority right and the space of tolerance partly to ensure tolerance in the future. In this sense, what 
some see as the epitome of Danish (institutional) tolerance (or liberality) others see as its opposite. It 
should be added however, that tolerance and integration are not the only concerns. The academic 
effects of segregation also play a role for some of the critics. 
The case study concerns the ‘structure of the education system’ and it is about the boundaries between 
what is unacceptable and what is tolerable. To some degree it also concern issues of interaction – or 
rather lack thereof – between different groups in the overall Danish school system with regard to 
development of tolerance and respect/recognition.  
The case study is based on newspaper coverage in the last 10 years and policy documents pertaining to 
the 2002 and 2005 revisions of the law of free primary schools. The main actors in the debate are 
national politicians, school sector professionals, commentators and members of the general public. 
The study is also based on interviews with people from the free primary school sector, politicians and 
employees in the Ministries of Education and Integration. 
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2.4.1. The Free School Debate in The Danish Press 
The attitudes to the free schools and their role in Danish society can be divided into different types of 
tolerance and intolerance. A nationalist intolerance argues that the establishment of Islamic free 
schools undermines fundamental Danish values and traditions. In addition, new forms of principled 
liberal intolerance  come in three modalities relating respectively to the liberal divide between public 
and private; the perfectionist requirement to become ‘liberal people’; and the protection of cultural 
cohesion and homogeneity i.e. a societal intolerance of ‘too much diversity’ including concerns about 
segregation.  
The arguments in defence of the Islamic free schools and their right to teach in Denmark are based on 
the Danish free school tradition, on notions of tolerance and the democratic rights of minorities as well 
as on pragmatic arguments about maintaining peace through a modus vivendi. In general the debate is 
about tolerance and the limits of tolerance. However in a single case (and perhaps somewhat 
rhetorically), it is argued that the fact that the Muslim minority has acquired the Danish ‘free school 
tradition’ should be celebrated and recognised as valuable.  
National Intolerance: Islamic Schools Destroy the Danish Free School Tradition 
To people in the DPP and others, the establishment of Islamic free schools is an abuse of a Danish 
tradition that requires the rules to be changed. It undermines Danish values. Members of the DPP have 
argued that while they are for the free school tradition, it should be against the law on free schools to 
teach the Quran: ‘it is completely out of place that children growing up in Denmark are given state 
subsidies to be taught in any other religion than Christianity’ (Chr. H. Hansen, DPP, Jyllands-Posten, 
12.11.2001). Another commentator argued along similar lines: 
There is no warrant in the Danish constitution for giving other cultures equal status to the Danish 
culture and turning us into a country of immigration. In addition, it costs us money to give these 
people human rights which we ourselves do not need, and which will destroy our culture. (A. M. 
Engel, commentator, JP, 05.06.2001)  
The view that Islamic free schools lie outside the Danish tradition is perhaps most evident in a 
relatively recent comment from DPP party leader Pia Kjærsgaard:  
The utilization/abuse of the Danish free school tradition by the Muslim private schools makes it 
necessary to tighten the rules concerning free schools and the rules concerning the duty to 
monitor [the free schools], and it destroys a good Danish tradition for being able to establish free 
schools and teach in accordance with the value set of the parents. (Berlingske Tidende, 12.10.09) 
The statement implies that it must be ensured that the parents’ values are within the realm of the 
acceptable before they can establish their own schools. Or at least that is should be ensured via the 
legislation that the schools teach within the limits of what is acceptable. The view is that Islamic free 
schools must be viewed with a general suspicion and monitored. They are furthermore to be regretted 
because they are undermining a good Danish tradition which would function well in their absence.  
Liberal Intolerance  
The nationalist intolerance of Islamic free schools as a threat to Danish values and tradition of 
tolerance or liberality (see Danish WP1) shades into a more liberal concern with the fact that the 
teachings of Islamic schools may go against fundamental liberal and democratic norms. Paired with a 
form of Christian intolerance against Islam in Europe, one commentator, a retired priest, hence saw 
far-reaching consequences of the establishment of Islamic free schools. They 
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are emerging all over Europe and lay the basis for an Islamism which will become a serious 
political factor in the future, a political factor that does not know of religious freedom (John W. 
Hørbo, Jyllands-Posten, 15.10.2002 )  
At a less apocalyptic level, the concern is that the Islamic free schools do not teach the values of 
democracy and human rights or in accordance with them:  
The whole point of the free school is that there is space for thinking and believing in a way that is 
different ... but conversely this should not mean that this becomes a sanctuary for a belief and a 
way of thinking that is characterised by intolerance and opposition to the surrounding society. (K. 
Sejr, Social Liberals, JP 15.11 2001) 
Commentator Lone Nørgaard perhaps took this point the furthest:  
As far as my (failing) tolerance is concerned, I am no longer prepared to be tolerant towards 
values that I deeply and utterly oppose: the repression of women, discrimination, and the reading 
of the Quran that elevates the Quran to the highest authority … if tolerance means that I have to 
observe from the side line while Danish society step by step is transformed in a direction that I do 
not want, well, then I do not mind giving up that version of tolerance. (BT, 12.07.2003)  
This is a version of not being tolerant of groups with illiberal values: a case for the intolerance against 
the intolerant. Nørgaard also used a second modality of liberal intolerance. The point is that allowing 
parents to send their children to Islamic free schools is really to let down the children and their interest 
in achieving a good life: ‘The freedom and rights of parents should not take priority if the price is that 
the children are left in the lurch.’ (L Nørgaard, JP, 12.05.2003) 
The unambiguous opinion is that Islamic free schools produce ‘losers’ unable to function in society. It 
is reminiscent of liberal perfectionism and its ‘intolerance’ of non-autonomous living. Free schools are 
to give their students the education they need to live autonomous lives. By not giving children this 
type of education they harm their interests (rights).  
This argument is connected to the third modality of liberal intolerance, according to which the Islamic 
free schools produce too much diversity to the detriment of the sociological preconditions for 
maintaining a liberal society. Islamic free schools undermine liberal integration. They represent an 
unhealthy segregation of society. 
Free Schools Lead to Segregation Generally 
As mentioned, this point is taken further by some commentators who apply it to the free primary 
schools generally (not only Islamic or religious schools). The targets for criticism are not only 
immigrant Muslim parents, but all parents who choose to send their children to free primary schools 
for no other reason than to avoid the allegedly low quality of public schools with many ‘weak’ 
students, in particular those with immigrant background:  
It was never the intention with the free school law that resourceful families would send their 
children to private schools at the taxpayers’ expense to avoid the weakest pupils. (Ritt 
Bjerregaard, Social Democrats, JP, 16.04.2005) 
The use of the free primary schools can be seen as a form of escape option that is based on intolerance 
of the weaker students. This is really a break with the free school tradition which is about ideological 
and pedagogical experimentation and about democratic protection of minorities:  
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The original idea behind the free school tradition was to develop a diversity of teaching which 
reflected the right of minorities which was part of the idea of democracy ... we risk that the 
alternative school sector is replaced by a protest school sector ... that it becomes an attractive 
alternative that enables people to avoid those children nobody really wants play with. (C. 
Antorini, Social Democrats, Berlingske Tidende 19.05.2005) 
The problem is that these private schools are subsidized by the public but do not accept a social 
responsibility: ‘it is a reverse Robin Hood, the state’s money is redistributed from the poorest in the 
country to the richest’ (JJ. Steen & K. Barsøe, CEVEA, JP, 03.06.2010). As mentioned, some of the 
concerns here regard the ability to ensure quality teaching in the public schools to increase the 
academic results of the weakest learners who are affected by the ‘flight’ of strong learners from the 
public schools. A second point is that segregation is not only based on intolerance, but that it fosters 
intolerance because different groups do not mix:  
I think it is easier to have a community with people you know. And for me, the People’s School is 
the core. It is a central building block in our welfare society. Because this is where we meet each 
other and get the [sense of] community. If we don’t meet each other because the top and the 
bottom are taken out, then we have a problem. (interview, A. Vang, Mayor for Education. 
Copenhagen). 
In sum, some find that the free school tradition is being abused to create free schools which teach 
intolerant doctrines which go against central Danish values and/or the values of liberal democracy and 
create intolerant (and uneducated) children. That is seen as a threat to integration and the ability to 
maintain a liberal society. Moreover, the resulting segregation has been under attack for undermining 
the academic results of the weaker learners and for fostering intolerance among social groups. The 
demands have ranged from banning Islamic free schools over increasing the demands for civic value 
education and state monitoring to creating new economic incentives to make free primary schools take 
more social responsibility and contribute to integration. Regulation and increased monitoring have 
been the main policy reactions, which has arguably reduced the space of toleration. However, other 
people have defended the freedom of the free primary schools in the name of tolerance and the Danish 
tradition of liberality.  
In Defence of the Free School Tradition  
A relatively unusual defence of the Danish free schools and the ability to establish religious schools 
within this legal framework is based on the pragmatic idea that it allows different religious and value 
sets to exist side by side. This is unusual in a country where the integration concern has been so 
predominant. One commentator hence defended Islamic free schools on the following grounds:  
The path school director Abdul Wahid Pedersen has chosen with his [Islamic] free school is the 
only way to prevent that two great cultures collide in insoluble conflicts. The Muslim culture will 
not adjust to the Christian. And the Christian will not adjust to the Muslim. (V. Madsen, deputy 
school director, JP, 1008.2001) 
This argument is reminiscent of a classic pragmatic argument for tolerance. It creates peace through 
modus vivendi. Remaining arguments in defence of the free school tradition is first that it is a 
venerable Danish tradition of toleration or ‘free mindedness’ (liberality, see Danish WP1). This is 
construed as a democratic minority right, which again is connected to the idea that the choices of 
others should be respected as the choices of moral and political equals. It is part of the conception of 
liberty that state regulation of and intervention in the free schools should be opposed. B. Haarder, 
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Minister of Education at the time, expressed this first argument, which he shares with his colleague 
and later Liberal Integration Minister B. Rønn Hornbech:  
Precisely the free schools are a special Danish value since nothing like them can be found 
anywhere. The fact that we not only give equality to the minority, but give them extra support is 
unique for Denmark. The free school legislation means that one has the right to send one’s 
children to a school that fits one’s ideas of what a good school is. (Information, 06.07.2009) 
The point is that this is something special pertaining to Denmark. This is not necessarily based on 
universal values, but rather a part of Danish national history and culture. Others take the same route 
and underline the paramount values of democratic minority protection: 
Liberality [free-mindedness] has always been a capital point in questions of schools and 
churches ... A democracy must be evaluated based on how it treats its minorities ... we have ended 
up in judgmentalism – the foulest enemy of liberality. (Asger Baunsbak Jensen, priest and writer, 
JP, 20.07.2009) 
T. Balle, former headmaster of the Free Teachers College (educating teachers for free primary 
schools), also points out that there is something more at stake than just forbidding Muslim schools, 
namely the rights of parents and the democratic protection of minorities: The free schools ‘are a key 
cornerstone in what you could call the special Danish values’ (T. Balle, Information, 14.12.2007).  
Muslim commentators who defend Islamic free schools also used a combination of liberal arguments 
and arguments based on the Danish tradition.  
Denmark boasts about its unshakable values, including freedom and tolerance. It is tragic that it 
does not take more than a couple of Muslim immigrants to shake them and turn them into empty 
rhetoric. (O. Shah, JP, 18.05.2003)  
To Shah it is evident that the Islamic free schools cannot be disconnected from the surrounding society 
and have to teach their students about it and how to function in it, however,  
to demand that they have to preach all those values (or the lack thereof) which characterize 
society in all its aspects, is a dictatorship of opinion and contrary to the values that Denmark 
claim for herself. (O. Shah. JP, 18.05.2003) 
Shah offers a different explanation of the creation of Islamic free schools and their popularity. They 
are not the product of Muslim disdain for Danish society or intolerance of the Danish majority, but 
rather of the lack of tolerance and consideration for Muslims by the Danish public and public school: 
Like other parents, Muslim parents simply wish to have their children seen and treated as students 
who have to be taught, rather than as some sorry creatures who (in the best case) have to be saved 
from repression or who (in the worst case) are seen as cultural enemies to be fought ... if the 
Copenhagen public school reflected realities, and tolerance and consideration were not seen as 
submission to fundamentalism, then many of the children who today end up in the free schools 
would most likely stay [in the public school]. (O. Shah Information, 10.01.2006)  
Another Muslim commentator, Safia Aude, also claimed Muslim parents had all good reasons for 
sending their children to Islamic free schools including the fact that the grades are higher there than in 
the public schools (JP, 15.05.2003). In a relatively recent comment Z. B. Hussain asks why nobody 
can see the positive in the fact that Danish Muslims have learned from the Danish tradition of 
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organizing in voluntary associations and created their own nurseries and free schools (Information 
31.07.2010).  
These views link back to the discussion about cultural and religious accommodation in public schools 
and the different concepts and effects of integration through values and integration through inclusion 
respectively. It is also evident that the conception of who is tolerant/intolerant and who is breaking 
with Danish traditions is reversed. The Islamic free schools do not represent intolerance. Rather the 
criticism of them represents intolerance and shallow commitment to key liberal principles. And 
finally, it is pointed out that critics are not even able to recognise the value of something they usually 
value, just because the people involved are Muslims.  
People directly connected with Islamic free schools tried to remove criticism by pointing out that they 
were indeed committed to integration (J. Hansen, Ahi International School, Berlingske Tidende, 
02.10.2001). One school director described how the school had moved in a more secular direction by 
introducing sex education, natural science and religions other than Islam. He also described a school 
excursion to a Christian (Grundtvigian!) Church:
26
 
It was a very positive experience to see and hear the engagement of the children. The priest said 
that it was exciting to have us visit and that we were welcome another time, if we wanted to. (D. 
Anik, Sealand’s Private School (Islamic), Information 21.11.2001) 
The strategy here is to show that the Islamic schools are oriented towards and engaged with the 
surrounding society in a positive and open-minded manner to deflate the picture of them as sanctuaries 
for fundamentalism or for cultural and religious isolation and intolerance.  
2.4.2. Policy Changes  
There is widespread political support for the Danish free school tradition and it is unlikely that it will 
be changed fundamentally. However, in recent years defenders of free school autonomy have lost to 
the extent that free autonomy has become increasingly conditioned and circumscribed. There has been 
an increased emphasis on the need for free schools to ensure academic quality equal to the public 
school (and through this regulate the subjects taught in the schools) including the demand that schools 
operate and teach in Danish. Similarly the free schools are now explicitly required to transmit the 
values of freedom and democracy to students.  
In 1998 it was stipulated that free primary schools should teach in Danish in order to receive public 
subsidies, and the monitoring of the quality of education was increased. In 2002 and 2005 two major 
changes followed. In 2002 it was introduced in the law that ‘the schools shall prepare the students to 
live in a society with freedom and democracy’. The legislative bill was motivated by reference to 
integration of bilingual children. It furthermore stated that  
It has hitherto been an underlying presupposition for the freedom to establish and run free 
primary schools with state subsidy that the schools respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Of late, doubt has emerged as to whether the freedom is utilized to run free primary 
schools on value bases which are so fundamentalist that they disable the students to function in a 
society like the Danish one with freedom and democracy. (2001/2 LSF 163) 
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Originally, the new clause contained a reference to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), but this was taken out in the legislative process due to concerns about readability. The clause 
(and its motivation) set the outer boundaries of toleration (for schools receiving state subsidies). The 
bill continues: 
It is not the intention … to mandate that the free primary schools express specific views on 
ethical, religious or political questions, etc. On the contrary, the schools shall prepare the students 
to function as citizens in Denmark, including acknowledging and respecting that there can be 
different views on such questions, which is a presupposition of democracy. (2001/2 LSF 163) 
It furthermore states that the schools are to give the students understanding of the underlying 
principles of the ECHR and that the clause entails a prohibition of teaching based on the notion that 
the ECHR is not respected, for example through religious and racist discrimination or the violation of 
freedom of speech and association. It unclear whether the clause demands that the schools transmit a 
democratic ethos to their students or only that they are provided with knowledge about the basic 
principles of human rights and democracy in order to function in Danish society.  
Only two parties did not accept the 2002 revision. The DPP thought it was too slack and the Red-
Green Alliance (far left-wing party) rejected it on other grounds. In the 2005 revision the democracy 
and freedom clause is expanded:  
According to their purpose and in all their work [the schools] shall prepare the students to live in 
a society like the Danish one with freedom and democracy, and develop and strengthen the 
students’ knowledge of and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including 
equality between the sexes. (Law on Free Schools, article 1.2) 
The 2005 revision is seen as a specification and expansion of the 2002 clause to include not only 
teaching per se but all activities connected with the school. The expansion is made to ensure  
that fundamentalist or extremist actions, which are justified on religious grounds, etc., but which 
contradict human rights and fundamental freedoms, including gender equality, cannot take place 
at or from a free primary school. (legislative bill 2004/2 LF 105, emphasis added) 
The government underlines that this clause is consonant with the ECHR because the ECHR only 
protects ‘associations, statements/utterances and gatherings, etc., which respect democracy and the 
equality between the sexes’ (legislative bill 2004/2 LF 105). This arguably restricts the freedom of 
schools and students to express opinions which diverge from endorsement of democracy and gender 
equality and come close to demanding a democratic and sex-egalitarian ethos in free schools. It hence 
seems to construe the space of toleration even more narrowly than the 2002 revision.  
The 2005 revision also requires that teachers and board members are proficient in Danish and that the 
schools set goals for their own subjects or adopt those formulated for the public school, publish them 
and evaluate them continuously. The latter would increase the focus on academic standards and 
facilitate external monitoring of the schools.  
The 2005 revision was opposed by the Social Liberals, The Socialist People’s Party and the Red-
Green Alliance on the grounds that it took the freedom out of the free school tradition. They saw it as 
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undermining the rights of educational choice and as revealing distrust in the ability of parents and 
schools to use their freedom responsibly. As such it represented centralism and paternalism.
27
  
The most recent initiatives for free schools are a) monitoring of their activity as part of a 2009 
government action plan on anti-radicalisation; and b) increased discussion about how to induce ‘white’ 
free schools to take on more responsibility for ‘the integration task’. 
2.4.3. Policy Effects 
State monitoring of free schools has led to the closing of a few schools. Before the 2002 legislative 
change three Muslim free schools were closed (i.e. their state subsidy was taken away). Two because 
of failing academic standards and one because it was suspected that it was not an independent unit (as 
required by the free school legislation), but a school run by the Lebanese organisation A.I.C.P. After 
the 2002 legislative change one Muslim school has been closed (in 2011) due to concerns that it did 
not live up to the requirements in the freedom and democracy clause.
28
 The same applied to one 
Christian school belonging to the Pentecostal movement. Two other Muslims schools and one 
Scientology school have been closed due to failing academic standards. In terms of school closings, 
the monitoring effects have not been very strong.  
If the Ministry of Education (in cooperation with the Ministry of Integration) finds shortcomings at a 
school, it can put it under ‘special monitoring’ – a sort of probation period. Schools are selected for 
monitoring because a) they lack clearly stated goals and policies for civic education; b) a general 
concern that students are part of isolated groups and social environments which exclude others 
because of religion, skin colour or political views (e.g. ‘ghetto schools’); and c) information (e.g. 
through the press) that creates concern in the ministry that a school’s civic education is failing. This 
implies that it rather easy to fall into the categories of schools put under monitoring. Recently, 25 free 
primary schools were selected for monitoring in connection with the Government’s 2009 anti-
radicalisation plan to establish whether new changes in the law on free primary schools are required 
(Danish Government 2009: 18).  
The ministry has a flexible approach to evaluation. It can use a 140-indicator model as guide relating 
to whether the school has clearly formulated goals, the goals and intentions of its teaching, the 
concrete teaching (content and learning processes), the results, and the overall culture of the school 
(Ministry of Education 2009b). One of the intentions behind model is that there ‘are many ways in 
which one can prepare the students to live in a society’ with freedom and democracy and ‘that there 
can be a lot of [different] signs that [the schools] live up to the requirement’ (Interview A. Andersen, 
Ministry of Education).
29
 The evaluation is hence based on a ‘general assessment’, not on a strict list 
of criteria that must be fulfilled (ibid). Furthermore, the ministry’s general experience is that problems 
in relation to the freedom and democracy clause are predominantly due to the fact that schools have 
not provided the students with sufficient knowledge about society and its fundamental principles, not 
that the schools transmit controversial convictions and attitudes (ibid). Although the ministry does not 
see itself as conducting ‘loyalty tests’, it does not exclude that controversial convictions and attitudes 
could make schools fall short of the freedom and democracy requirement (ibid).  
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Interviews with people from the free school sector (The Free School Teachers’ Union and the Free 
School Association)
30
 reveal the perception that the monitoring of free schools represents a lack of 
trust in Islamic free schools. The latter have felt discriminated against, also in connection with 
‘random’ selection of 25 schools for monitoring in continuation of the 2009 anti-radicalisation plan 
(cf. above). The two interviewees generally think that the increased monitoring is unnecessary and is 
an example of symbolic politics. Lastly, it is suggested that although the legislation continues to allow 
for large degrees of freedom, some schools are inclined to copy the subjects and the teaching methods 
from the public school in order not to have to defend themselves in connection with state monitoring. 
Documenting that they live up to standards in alternative ways is too costly and too risky for 
individual schools.  
Two school directors of monitored schools generally express great uncertainty about how to 
demonstrate that the school and its teaching is really democratic and non-extremist. They describe 
how their school and staff make great efforts to come across as democratic (Kjærgaard & Larsen 2010: 
68-75). They also express great concern about the method and feel that it is random whether or not a 
school is found to be failing in regard to civic education (ibid.). They furthermore see it as (part of) a 
general suspicion of (or construction of suspicion) Islam, Islamic free schools and Muslims 
(Generalverdact). They point to the ensuing feeling of discrimination and exclusion, especially among 
the students: 
It makes them feel ‘but we are not a part of this society anyway, they don’t regard us as equals 
after all’ (School Director 1, interviewed anonymously in Kjærgaard & Larsen 2010: 73).  
I think this has gotten a real negative ring to it because by now radicalization and extremism are 
simply connected with Islam. I think they have used the words – really grabbed them and used 
them so that one cannot use radical or extreme without people thinking: Islam, terrorist or 
whatever. ... And I think it is sad that we have to sit here and defend ourselves like this. (ibid.)  
It is an attempt to articulate an agenda, saying that there are some really dangerous, there are 
some young people, who are latent terrorists. (School Director 2, interviewed anonymously in 
Kjærgaard & Larsen 2010: 75) 
The closing of schools and the effect of the perception of being under general suspicion suggest that 
the policies have a knock-on effect in the free school world. Most likely schools are and will become 
more alert to the possibility of being closed if they do not come across as sufficiently democratic. 
Another effect is that they reduce their diversity in order not to have to defend their own alternative 
standards (i.e. definition of subjects and teaching methods) and hence become more similar to the 
public school. In addition, monitoring may have exactly the opposite effect of what this version of 
‘integration through values’ approach aims to achieve, namely alienation of Muslim students from 
society. The interviewees do not convey a feeling of freedom and an experience of secure rights and 
tolerance from the Danish state. It is hence questionable that the policies can be regarded as 
unequivocal successes.  
2.4.5. Conclusion 
The case concerns the structure of the educational system and whether or not it is necessary to define 
the parameters of private school autonomy more precisely in order to defend key national liberal 
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democratic values, further integration and ensure the rights of children to education that makes them 
competent individuals and citizens. The proponents of a more precise definition of free school 
autonomy – which arguably leads to its reduction – have used both arguments from the national 
tradition and arguments which can be described as liberal intolerance. They have wanted to reduce the 
space of toleration by defining its limits more precisely. The recent legislative changes seem to 
mandate that students are equipped with democratic ethos and not just knowledge sufficient to live in a 
society with freedom and democracy, although state monitoring usually is more concerned with the 
knowledge that schools provide than with their ethos. The discourse of integration through values may 
also be said to be underpinning these efforts.  
Opponents of the reduction of the space of toleration through the more precise delimitation of free 
school autonomy have argued that this goes against the Danish tradition of liberality and have 
furthermore based their criticism on liberal arguments about the rights of minorities to make their own 
choices as well as the need to trust that they as moral and political equals will make responsible 
choices for themselves and their children. Again, the emphasis is more on toleration and respect than 
on clear positive recognition of particular minority identities and values.  
In terms of implementation it is likely that the increased state monitoring and the risk of being closed 
down have increased schools’ attention to academic standards and to civic education. However, people 
at the receiving end of these policies generally feel that they are not trusted and their rights are not 
entirely secure. The system may pressure free schools to become more similar to the public school in 
order to reduce the risks and costs of pursuing a diverse vision of their school and its religious and 
ideological basis. Moreover, the experienced lack of trust may ultimately have counter-productive 
effects on the feeling of belonging to Danish society and democracy.  
2.5. General Conclusions from the Two Case Studies 
This section draws some general conclusions from the two case studies. It discusses differences and 
similarities between the two cases and asks whether the cases represent continuity or change within 
Danish school traditions before it addresses the various Danish forms of acceptance and non-
acceptance that the cases represent. Finally, the section points to some of the lessons that can be 
learned from the two cases.  
Similarities and Differences between the Two Cases 
In both cases the focus on integration is very central. There has been a lot of emphasis on transforming 
parents and students into democratic citizens with the right values. This is integration through values. 
There is in both cases strong emphasis on democratic citizenship as an ideal that has to be taught and 
practiced in schools among parents, students and school representatives. While the free primary 
schools are not under the same formal obligation to develop students into autonomous persons in the 
private and professional realm, they are under some obligation to create democratic virtues which in 
fact come very close to this (in particular if one takes a close look at how it is operationalized in the 
state’s 140 indicator model). This is reminiscent of liberal perfectionism, or even better a strong 
republicanism, i.e. the civic integrationism which is very dominant in Denmark and which extends to 
the private life and the family. Becoming an ‘active citizen’ is regarded as a category which is and 
should be accessible to all. It represents the framework of the good life, including a reflexive 
relationship to one’s own life style and life choices encompassing family relations. There is here no 
conscious distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism (even though the latter two are 
difficult to distinguish in practical terms, cf. Gutman 1995).  
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The two cases are to some connected the other way around. The lack of tolerance and respect (but not 
necessarily positive recognition) resulting in an alleged lack of accommodation in the public school 
system partially explains why immigrant students feel forced to leave it and attend Islamic free 
schools. This relates to the general discussion whether it is better to make exemptions to religious 
fundamentalists to keep them within realm of the public school (e.g. Brighouse 2008: 259-62). The 
alternative of having them leave and create their own private schools may on balance be worse 
because of the disintegrative effects etc. However, this is a balancing act that Danish politicians have 
not entered into. They have decided to make sure that also private schools are required to teach civic 
education.  
Another similarity is that both public school autonomy and private school autonomy is defended, 
while increasingly circumscribed by central state regulation (goals, civic education). Two other 
competing steering rationales blend into the discussion about school autonomy and the rights of 
parents to choose school for their children. One relates to the concern about the academic effects (on 
weak learners) of segregation, and segregation’s effect on the feeling of community and the 
acquisition of tolerance of others. The other relates to New Public Management ideas in the 
governance of the school sector: the schools compete for students and parents as customers (the 
money follows the student). The schools’ ability to deliver educational service is measured on 
centrally set goals. This is a question of creating a market rather than a question of ideologies, culture 
and religion. It is not clear that the market necessarily protects or leads to diversity: the same reduced 
number of models may be pursued with more or less success and resources.  
In both the public school case and the Islamic free school case we see instances of nationalist and 
liberal intolerance although the distinction is easier to track in the Islamic free schools case (see 
below). 
The counter discourses are different in the two cases. In the public schools case there is a pragmatic 
discourse which ultimately rests on a conception of toleration and respect which views others as moral 
and political equals (even when they endorse the ‘wrong’ values). This is far from the Danish 
liberality tradition and close to a concept of civility (Lægaard 2011). In fact it even seems to go 
‘beyond civility’ as it entails a form of curiosity towards that to which one objects. At the same time, it 
is less than positive recognition of differences, identities and values as valuable per se.  
The other counter discourse invokes the Danish tradition of liberality. Sometimes it shades into a 
defence of free school autonomy and parents’ choice based on universal liberal principles and on the 
notion that people (parents and schools) should be trusted to use their freedom responsibly. In the 
universalistic version, it relies on the concept of regarding others as moral and political equals who 
can make these choices for themselves.  
Staying or Breaking With the Tradition? 
Public school autonomy has been reduced in the recent years despite a strong preference across the 
political spectrum for continued school autonomy. The permissibility of local accommodation 
according to experiences and conditions lie well within the tradition. As mentioned, part of the 
defence comes from a New Public Management perspective championing marketization. In fact, the 
possibility of being able to choose a public school outside of one’s assigned school district seems to 
undercut the idea that the school is tied to a specific local democratically constituted ‘school 
community’. 
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The pragmatic approach in the public school system to differences is also in line with the Danish 
tradition where ‘cooperation’ between different groups at the local level across differences has been 
seen as a virtue. On the other hand, the theoretical underpinning of ‘appreciative dialogue’ seems to be 
rather far away from the critical and confrontational ethos contained in the Danish idea about 
liberality.  
In the free school case both proponents and opponents of more regulation see themselves as protectors 
of the Danish free school tradition. For the opponents, the political ambition to control and monitor 
what free schools teach students is a radical break with the tradition. Indeed, in the tradition of the 
Danish liberality, the rights of the parents/schools should be protected from the majority, while the 
majority – or anybody – would have the right freely and bluntly to criticise views and practices they 
find wrong. 
In another interpretation, the free school tradition (the legacy of Grundtvig and Kold) is founded on a 
democratic movement against a repressive and anti-democratic state, meaning that the whole 
‘purpose’ of the tradition was to create democratically engaged citizens. The right of the minority 
(parents) to form their own school is seen as a democratic minority right. Accordingly, those who use 
this right do so out of respect for fundamental democratic principles. This can be seen in the Danish 
Government’s justification of its introduction and expansion of the ‘democracy and freedom clause’ in 
the law on free primary schools in 2002 and 2005. Educationalist and school historian Ove Korsgaard 
describes this break with the tradition as a way of defending it in these terms: 
Recent years’ tightening of the control represents a break with a tradition that goes way back in 
time. But the reason is that we now have a number of schools which do not place themselves in 
the classic free school tradition. Earlier some schools built on a different cultural or pedagogical 
foundation, but there were not a lot of schools whose support for the democracy we live in could 
be questioned (Ove Korsgaard, Kristeligt Dagblad, 20.09.2005).  
Of course, opponents of the restricted school autonomy would say that this represents a lack of trust in 
the ability of parents and schools to use their freedom responsibly and hence a lack of respect for 
minorities as moral and political equals who are entitled to make their own decisions, even ‘wrong’ 
ones.  
Danish Conceptions of Acceptance 
There are two types of intolerance in Denmark: nationalist and liberal intolerance. Nationalist 
intolerance is based on the view that certain cultural and religious practices non-acceptable because 
they may undermine core national values and eventually the identity of Danish society. Liberal 
intolerance appears in the public school case and in the free school case. The first modality of liberal 
intolerance is seen in the concern that central liberal norms are undermined (in casu gender equality, 
democracy and fundamental rights). The second modality is perhaps most easily traced in the free 
school case and regards the divisive and segregative effects of too many religious (Islamic) free 
schools. Too much diversity endangers the sociological basis for maintaining a liberal democratic 
society. The third modality regards the creation of ‘liberal people’ and/or ‘active citizens.’ Again this 
modality is most obvious in the free school case where Islamic free schools are criticised for not 
preparing students to become competent individuals and citizens in a modern society ‘with freedom 
and democracy’. Of course, it can be debated how ‘liberal perfectionist’ this criticism really is. Some 
non-perfectionist strands of liberalism would also be concerned about the potential harm done to the 
fundamental interests/rights of children by not providing them with the preconditions for a life 
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independent of others and/or of the pursuit of collective political goals of different groups, minorities 
as well as majorities (Gutman 1995; Brighouse 1998). 
In the Danish case it can be difficult to disentangle nationalist and liberal intolerance since nationalists 
often endorse very liberal values which they claim are special Danish values (or a special Danish 
interpretation of these values) rooted in a (Christian) national cultural tradition.  
Conceptions of tolerance are in the Danish case based on both pragmatic and principled reasons. The 
pragmatic defence of tolerance is in the public school case found, first, in the defence of school 
autonomy by the ministers. It is seen as suboptimal and epistemologically challenging to make rules 
on the (non) accommodation of cultural and religious differences which should apply uniformly to all 
schools in Denmark. Secondly, tolerance is defended pragmatically at the school level with reference 
to the goal at hand: accommodations have to be made to ensure the well-being and education of the 
children. In the free school case, the pragmatic argument for tolerance is less prevalent and atypical in 
a country obsessed with integration: free schools allow the peaceful co-existence of two 
religions/cultures which are fundamentally incompatible.  
In the public school case the argument for toleration on pragmatic grounds in the ‘integration through 
inclusion’ strategy shades into arguments which mirror more principled liberal arguments for 
toleration, namely that immigrant parents need to be regarded as moral and political equals who are 
entitled to make their own (even wrong) choices and that their views (as parents) have to be taken 
seriously as those of equals. In the free school case we find the same kind of argument with regard to 
the schools’ and the parents’ use of their freedom of choice. At times, this argument is based on the 
Danish free school tradition rather than on general liberal principles. This is the part of the ‘free 
mindedness’ or liberality tradition that underscores the guaranteed equal civil rights (legal tolerance). 
(The other part of liberality promotes a frank and confrontational ethos combined with the 
development ‘think skin’ and enables you to ‘endure’ ‘scorn, mocking and ridicule’ (Mohamed 
Cartoon crisis), is not very salient here). Underlying these arguments are ‘respect conceptions’ of 
tolerance. 
In the two cases, there are only very few instances of something which goes ‘beyond tolerance’ in the 
shape of claims about positive recognition. In the public school case, the theoretical framework 
underlying the idea of the ‘appreciative dialogue’ require respect for the status of immigrant parents as 
moral and ‘political’ equals, but stops short of demanding positive recognition of the identities and 
values of immigrant parents. The recognition of/respect for the parents concerns them as people who 
hold values, not their values. The central idea in the appreciative dialogue comes close to the notion of 
civility and perhaps even goes beyond, since it demands a principled curiosity towards that to which 
one objects and even towards that which one rejects. This arguably implies expanding the range of 
what is ‘normal’ and part of the ‘public space’ of the local school community. In the free school case 
one commentator noted that it was strange that nobody could recognise the positive value of 
immigrants acquiring Danish traditions for collective self-organisation in associations and free 
schools. Otherwise claims regarding any need to go ‘beyond toleration’ were sparse.  
Lessons Learned 
From the public school case it seems evident that the dialogue-based integration through inclusion and 
the related practical measures seem to be effective in ensuring the welfare and education of the 
students. Conversely, the more principled and symbolically laden ‘integration through values’ 
discourse can be counterproductive for the involved parties’ motivation and mutual communication.  
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In the free school case, it is unclear whether or not policies are necessary and/or should be regarded as 
a success. Undoubtedly they prevent schools from teaching openly divisive and fundamentalist 
doctrines and they are likely to have reduced the number of schools with low academic quality and 
deficient civic education strategies. However, the unintended consequence of state monitoring may be 
alienation rather than integration. The price to be paid may be that students, parents and teachers feel 
that they are under a general suspicion of not being full and trustworthy citizens; a suspicion they will 
never be able to remove. Moreover, the method for establishing whether or not a school lives up to the 
freedom and democracy clause is intransparent to the target group and gives them the feeling of not 
having secure rights. 
It is difficult to gauge the long term effects on toleration, feeling of community and reciprocal 
understanding of the general segregation that results from the existence of free primary schools and 
the free choice of public school. However, there is no doubt that segregation can have serious effects 
on the academic achievements of weak learners in particular. On the other hand, for some minority 
students Islamic free schools may give a more secure learning environment where their identity is 
positively reinforced or just not ‘an issue.’ This may improve their academic achievements. In fact, 
measured on their teaching effect the top 20 schools in Denmark include four Arabic/Islamic free 
schools (undervisningseffekt.dk; see the general introduction to the chapter).  
Key Messages for Policy Makers 
Public Schools 
In relation to the public schools it is advisable to continue to spread the ideas of the appreciative 
dialogue between the schools, the parents and the students. This ought to be the task of the Ministry of 
Education as well as the municipal school administrations. One risk pertaining to the local school 
autonomy in Denmark is that it can be random whether schools adopt best practices. Or even make the 
effort to seek out information and learn about new methods. At the same time it should be remembered 
that the appreciative dialogue itself presupposes local autonomy since solutions found through 
appreciative dialogue require local decision makers to act in a flexible manner. It is procedural and not 
a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Private Schools 
For national level policy makers wanting to maintain a diverse free school sector it is important that 
the costs of establishing and maintaining a free primary schools with an alternative philosophy and 
pedagogy is not too high in terms of having to document and monitor academic standards and the 
requirement to teach freedom and democracy. The apparent uncertainty that schools some schools feel 
about what it takes to live up to requirements and their reluctance to run the risk of not being found to 
live up to them may well lead them to not use the degree of freedom that the current law actually allow 
them. While there is a dilemma contained in forcing a limited definition on how schools ought to teach 
in line with the freedom and democracy clause because it invariably will reduce the flexibility in how 
the requirement can be met, a more simple and transparent evaluation model could increase the feeling 
of certainty. Moreover, it would be fairer to schools if the model was mainly oriented towards the kind 
of knowledge that should be transmitted through lessons since a requirement to create a specific 
democratic ethos among students arguably is much more difficult to measure. When does for example 
criticism of certain aspects of democracy as a form of government represent lack commitment to 
democratic values? After all criticism of democracy abound, even among people who carry no 
totalitarian convictions. The emphasis on knowledge rather than on ethos also seem to be in line with 
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the experience of the Ministry of Education has had with monitoring, namely that is usually lack of 
knowledge transmitted through lessons that is the problem, not attitudes towards democracy and 
freedom. Moreover, increased certainty among schools may also lessen potential alienating effects of 
monitoring, resulting from the experience of being under general suspicion. 
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CHAPTER 3. NEGOTIATING LIMITS OF TOLERANCE IN PUBLIC DEBATES IN 
MUSLIM ACTORS 
 
By Lasse Lindekilde 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses attention on toleration of ethno-national, cultural and religious differences in 
political life in Denmark. It investigates what kinds of limits to tolerance are expressed in public 
debates regarding issues of minority political participation. Thus, it focuses on the active citizenship of 
immigrants and their descendants in Denmark, and the challenges to toleration this produces.  
Generally speaking political integration of minorities in Denmark is high and acceptance of this is 
widespread. A recent survey of active citizenship among immigrants and their descendants in 
Denmark, concluded that the political integration and participation among ethnic minorities is in fact 
in many regards comparable to that of ethnic Danes (INM 2011). Thus, citizens with immigrant 
background share with ethnic Danes to an equal degree basic citizenship virtues, such as finding it 
important to vote in elections or to be informed about current affairs. Also when it comes to perceived 
opportunities to achieve political influence through presenting opinions to politicians, citizens with 
immigrant background on average believe their opportunities to be as high as do citizens with Danish 
background (INM 2011: 22). General trust in fundamental institutions – parliament, public 
administration, police and the court system – is likewise high among citizens with immigrant 
background in Denmark. On average citizens with immigrant background have only marginally less 
trust in such fundamental institutions than citizens with Danish background (INM 2011: 25).  
A study of the level of participation by ethnic minorities in the last local election in 2009 shows that 
the level of participation in the election was considerably lower among immigrants (47% voter 
turnout) and descendants (36% voter turnout) than among to ethnic Danes (68% voter turnout) (Bhatti 
& Møller Hansen 2009). For eligible voters who were not Danish citizens the level of participation 
was only 33%. However, other research shows that this level of participation among immigrants and 
descendants in a cross national comparison is relatively high. Lise Togeby (2003, 2006) has 
convincingly argued that this pattern of participation should be understood as an effect of the specific 
election rules in Denmark, which gives the opportunity to personalize votes so that votes are cast for a 
specific candidate and not a party. Participation in national elections for parliament in Denmark 
requires Danish citizenship. As it has become increasingly difficult to obtain Danish citizenship over 
the last decade, it has become more difficult for foreign nationals to become fully integrated in Danish 
politics. The patterns of participation in national elections for parliament among citizens with 
immigrant background seem to be parallel to the patterns at local elections (Mikkelsen 2008: 156-
157).  
A range of non-institutionalized ways of political participation is, in principle, also open to ethnic 
minorities in Denmark. Through freedom of organization, ethnic minorities have set up a large number 
of civil society organizations/associations (social, cultural, religious). If we look at the level of 
membership of and participation in associational life among immigrants and descendants in Denmark 
we find that they are very active, although to a lesser degree than ethnic Danes (INM 2011: 36). On 
average an ethnic Dane is member of twice the number of associations as a Dane with immigrant 
background. The extensive right of freedom of expression and assembly in Denmark also gives ethnic 
minorities an opportunity to influence the public debate and indirectly political decisions. Ethnic 
minority members as individuals and as a collective often make use of these opportunities. Out of 
seven forms of non-institutionalized political participation, which have been investigated, citizens with 
immigrant background scored higher or as high as ethnic Danes on five parameters (wrote letters to 
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the editor; posted on a debate forum; signed an online petition; participated in public demonstrations 
and strikes). Only when it comes to participation in political meetings and signing regular petitions do 
ethnic Danes scores higher.  
3.1.1. Main Challenges to the Toleration of Participation in Political Life among Danes with 
Immigrant Background 
The results presented above, indicating a relatively high degree of active citizenship among Danes 
with immigrant background to some extent contradict generalized media descriptions of immigrants 
and descendants, in particular Muslims, as passive and marginalized citizens living in parallel 
communities isolated from majority society, its institutions and political life (see Hussain 2003). Thus, 
participation is not always recognized. Furthermore, it is fair to say that political participation among 
immigrants and descendants in Denmark is not always appreciated, or believed to take an appropriate 
form. On many occasions the nature of issues raised, opinions put forward and the norms and values 
that underlie these opinions among citizens with immigrant background have been challenged in the 
media and by majority society in general as being ‘too different’. This has been the case in particular 
regarding demands and views put forward by individuals or collective actors who are identified (or 
identify themselves) as Muslims (Hervik 2011). Recurrently public debates have evolved around 
questions such as: Is orthodox Islam a threat to secular democracy? Do religious argumentation and 
values have a place in public debates in a secular society? How to deal with the few, but at times 
rather outspoken, Muslim actors who do not accept majority society standards of gender equality or 
who preach non-integration? Should we tolerate the intolerance of some Muslim actors regarding 
homosexuals? What to do about Muslims who openly speak against liberal democracy and endorse 
forms of terrorism? All these questions pertain to the way fundamental political rights are exercised by 
Muslim actors, rather than the fundamental rights to participation. Thus, at the core of debates are the 
norms and values displayed in political life by some Muslim actors, and questions of how much 
difference can and should be tolerated in political life without undermining cohesion and allowing 
intolerance to flourish. Put another way, what is characteristic about these debates is that they all turn 
the political mobilization and participation of ethnic minorities into a political problem. In most cases 
the ‘cultural baggage’ of Muslim actors is framed as an obstacle to legitimate exercise of these actors’ 
political rights. Debates of this kind, I argue, are the most common way tolerance of political 
participation of immigrants and descendents in Denmark is problematized and has been challenged in 
recent years.  
 
3.1.2. The Two Case Studies: Overview, Relevance and Key Questions 
The two case studies selected for investigation in this chapter regard two recent episodes of public 
meetings/conferences involving ‘radical’ Islamic actors that have questioned the limits of toleration in 
regard to Muslim minority articulation of controversial views in the public sphere in Denmark; views 
that are not prohibited by law, but in conflict with majority norms and values. Common for these two 
public controversies has been discussions of what kind of norms, attitudes and values displayed by 
Muslim minority actors can be tolerated in the public sphere, and which ones are considered a threat to 
public order, social cohesion and secular democracy. As such both debates offer a prism for studying 
the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors in the form of public 
meetings, conferences, etc. Both episodes highlight what kind of norms, attitudes and values Muslim 
actors, implicitly and explicitly, are asked to subscribe to and denounce in order to be accepted as 
legitimate actors in public debates. 
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Case 1 – Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public meeting at the Danish National Library (January 2011) 
In January 2011 an intense debate evolved around a public meeting arranged by the Danish branch of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir under the title ‘Afghanistan: Scandinavian Governments in the service of the US’. Hizb 
ut-Tahrir has previously held similar public meetings in Denmark, always generating extensive public 
debate. However, this time the debate reached new heights for two main reasons: the nature of the 
invitation to the meeting, and the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir had chosen the Danish National Library as 
the venue for their meeting. In the invitation for the meeting Hizb ut-Tahrir wrote:  
In this meeting we will focus on the obligation of armed resistance that falls upon Muslims in 
Afghanistan and surrounding areas. We believe this resistance to be fully legitimate. We will 
also discuss the attempt by authorities to criminalize and intimidate any kind of opposition to 
the war in Afghanistan (Ritzau 28-12-2010). 
Next to this text the invitation showed a map of Afghanistan, on which was placed coffins draped in 
Danish, Swedish and Norwegian flags. To many the invitation suggested that Hizb ut-Tahrir condoned 
the killing of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan and that they were inciting violence against Danish 
troops. Regarding the National Library as venue for the meeting, many voices found that Hizb ut-
Tahrir are free to have their meetings, spread their intolerant views, but that the National Library as a 
publicly funded institution and historical symbol of enlightenment should not have hosted the meeting 
and thereby indirectly legitimize Hizb ut-Tahrir. Indirectly tax money was used (although Hizb ut-
Tahrir paid to book the venue) to give voice to people who were (potentially) inciting the killing of 
Danish soldiers.  
Among the political elite protest against the meeting was very visible, both at an arragned counter-
demonstration, and in the public debate prior to the meeting, which included representatives of all 
major political parties, including several ministers. In addition, a number of representatives of NGOs, 
Muslim organizations and think tanks participated in the debate, including representatives of military 
veterans associations.  
On January 21 2011 the meeting took place as planned, despite different political attempts to stop it. 
 
Case 2 – The visit of the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips (April 2011) 
In April 2011 the Canadian Muslim convert and preacher, Bilal Philips, was invited to give a public 
talk on ‘Islamophobia – is Islam a threat to the West?’ in Copenhagen. The conference was organized 
by the youth branch, MUNIDA (Muslim Youth in Denmark) of the Danish Islamic Faith Community, 
which was the Muslim organization primarily responsible for the protests against the Muhammad 
cartoons published in 2005. Bilal Philips’ visit became an issue of great public controversy due to his 
controversial and intolerant views on homosexuals and Shia Muslims, his endorsement of Sharia (e.g. 
the beating of women) and of violent jihad expressed in a number of books, public lectures and 
performances posted on Youtube. In addition, Philips’ name has appeared in a number of terrorism 
trials, including the trial regarding the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. Paradoxically, Philips 
was invited to talk about islamophobia, intolerance and discrimination vis-à-vis Muslim minorities in 
the West, while he himself is an exponent of quite intolerant views.  
In the public debate prior to his visit different discursive positions and arguments both for and against 
toleration of his public lecturing were articulated. To a large extent the public debate on Philips’ visit 
was also centered on the role of the Islamic Faith Community in inviting Philips to Copenhagen. The 
question was to what extent they shared Philips’ views. On April 16 2011 Bilal Philips arrived at 
Copenhagen airport under great media coverage. The day after Philips spoke to an assembly of about 
1000 Danish Muslims. Outside the meeting venue a demonstration was arranged which counted 
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between 200-300 people. Philips has previously been denied entry into Britain and Australia, and few 
days after his visit in Denmark he was denied entry to give a similar speech in Germany.  
3.1.3. Situating the case studies: relevance and questions 
The two instances described above highlight how tolerance as a boundary drawing activity is taking 
place vis-à-vis concrete instances of Muslim non-institutionalized political participation in the public 
sphere. I find that these episodes offer interesting perspectives into the negotiations of the limits of 
tolerance of divergent views and practices as the play out in public debates regarding controversial 
statements by Muslim actors. As such the case studies deal with less conventional and institutionalized 
forms of immigrant political participation and representation. As already indicated, it is this form of 
political participation among citizens with immigrant background that has caused most challenges to 
tolerance of difference in political life in recent years in Denmark. Furthermore, I believe that these 
debates offer good insights into the different discursive positions on toleration in the political sphere in 
the Danish context, the dynamics and strategies of positioning in such debates as well as the effects of 
boundary drawing on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in public debates.  
As mentioned, the two cases regard the boundary drawing between intolerable and tolerable norms, 
attitudes and values. Nobody in the debates argued for the recognition, respect as equal or admission 
to the realm of normal for the views raised at the meetings. Arguments were either for intolerance of 
the views, however for quite different reasons, or for some kind of ‘teeth-grinding’ tolerance. The 
episodes also highlight issues of ‘principled’ or ‘liberal’ intolerance, i.e., the way interventions and 
limitations to tolerance are based on arguments for the need to create a ‘liberal state for liberal people 
only’ (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012). Furthermore, the episodes show how such intolerance of illiberal 
values in the public sphere contribute to actively endorse ‘good’ liberal citizenship and integrationist 
views a prerequisite for the participation of Muslim minority actors in political debates in the public 
sphere.  
Building on this, the chapter uses the two selected cases to address the following key questions: 
1) What were the main discursive positions of toleration articulated in the public debate in regard to 
the two cases?  
2) What are the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors, as 
articulated in the two cases? And are they the same in the two cases? 
3) How does tolerance as a boundary drawing activity play out in practice in the two public debates 
analyzed, i.e. how are limits to tolerance negotiated in the public sphere, and what kind of 
discursive strategies do different actors make use of in promoting exactly their boundary 
drawing? 
4) How, and through which mechanisms does the toleration boundary drawing in the two public 
debates affect Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights? 
 
3.2. Methodology 
The public debate regarding the two episodes evolved from December 1 2010 to about May 1 2011, 
which will be the time-frame of investigation. The basic research design of the study in this chapter is 
a comparative case study, including within case comparison (comparing across types of actors and 
discursive strategies in the debates). 
As indicated, the two cases do not concern instances of direct Muslim claims making on Danish 
authorities, for example raised claims of building mosques, establishing Muslim burial grounds or 
introducing halal food in kinder gardens. I expect this circumstance to weigh on the side of intolerance 
as authorities are less committed to finding practical solutions and more free in these cases to engage 
in principled boundary drawing. In addition, the two cases concern issues of Danish foreign policy 
(Danish engagement in Afghanistan) and the visit by a foreign controversial preacher. Especially in 
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the case of Bilal Philips, I expect this ‘foreign’ element to make toleration boundary drawing skewed 
towards intolerance. This has to do with the limits of tolerance historically being more narrowly 
defined regarding non-citizens.  
The case studies build upon analysis of the press coverage of the two episodes as well as interviews 
with central stakeholders in the debates. The newspaper articles have been selected using the Danish 
media archive, Infomedia. The searches included all nationally distributed newspapers in Denmark as 
sources, including broadsheets, tabloid and free-of-charge newspapers as well as the largest news wire 
Ritzau. The sources of the articles collected are the following newspapers: Jyllands-Posten, Politiken, 
Berlingske Tidende, Information, Weekendavisen, Kristeligt Dagblad, B.T., Ekstra Bladet, 
MetroXpress and Urban. The collection of articles resembles that of a ‘population study’, as all 
articles regarding the two cases from the mentioned sources have been included in the constructed 
database. However, articles of less than 200 words have been omitted as have article ‘duplicates’, for 
example Ritzau telegrams published in more than one newspaper. Furthermore, letters to the editor 
regarding the two episodes have also been omitted in order to keep the number of articles at a 
manageable level. This sampling strategy resulted in a data corpus of 112 articles, 59 articles 
regarding the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting (case 1), and 53 articles regarding the Bilal Phillips meeting 
(case 2).  
The collected newspaper articles have been coded using Nvivo 9. First all articles were coded 
classifying the articles regarding source, data, length, and case number. Then the units of analysis, the 
particular individuals who in the articles express a tolerance view, claim or stand regarding the two 
cases, were identified.  All statements made by a particular actor during the course of the episodes 
were collected in one ‘node’, rendering it possible to look at all the interventions of one actor, and 
compare it to others.  
The coding of the actual content of statements followed a strategy of combined closed (deductive) and 
open (inductive) coding. From the general conceptual framework of toleration as identified by 
Modood and Dobbernack (2011) a number of closed categories of toleration positions were deduced 
and applied. Thus, statements and standpoints on the respective cases were in an initial step coded and 
categorized as expressions of either a) recognition/inclusion to the realm of the normal, b) tolerance or 
c) intolerance. This crude categorization was then refined using further theoretically deduced sub-
codes and supplementing with inductively driven sub-codes stemming from the material itself. The 
coding scheme for this analysis of instances of toleration boundary drawing can be found in Annex I.  
In addition to the newspaper material the analysis is based on interviews with central stakeholders in 
the two episodes identified on the basis of the newspaper material. These stakeholders include: 
Political elites; Muslim organizers of the meetings/conferences; organizers of the counter-
demonstrations; NGOs and venue owners/representatives. The interviews were carried out using semi-
structured interview guides, and evolved around tapping the interviewees’ toleration boundary 
drawing and arguments in regard to the particular episode as well as their reflections on the dynamics 
and effects of the debates. In total seven interviews were conducted – two with actors involved in case 
1, two involved in case 2, and three involved in both (see Annex II). In combination with the 
newspaper material this amount of interviews proved sufficient to flesh out the main discursive 
positions of toleration in the debates, and I found that further interviews would have added little to the 
investigation. The interviews were transcribed, and transcriptions imported to Nvivo where they were 
coded using the same coding scheme applied to the newspaper material. This procedure made it 
possible to collect all material regarding one actor (newspaper statements and interview transcriptions) 
in one node.  
The descriptive and comparative analysis of toleration positions in the two cases building on Nvivo-
coding was supplemented with elements of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis was applied in order 
to delve further into how specific arguments and meanings in the debates are constructed, discursive 
coping mechanisms enacted and analyze the effects different toleration positions have on the 
opportunities for Muslim political participation in public debates.  
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3.3. The main discursive positions of toleration boundary drawing in the debates 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2 the main discursive positions of toleration boundary drawing in the two cases 
will be mapped and analyzed. The purpose is to investigate what political practices are considered 
tolerant or intolerant, and what values/norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in the 
particular cases. Section 2.3 compares the main positions in the two cases, and explains important 
differences in toleration boundary drawing. Section 3 focuses on the dynamics of toleration boundary 
drawing as it plays out in the two cases with a view to explaining the different strategies of positioning 
in the debate employed by actors promoting exactly their version of boundary drawing. Finally, 
section 4 explores how the public toleration boundary drawing of the two cases affect Muslim actors’ 
exercise of political rights. 
3.3.1. Case 1 – Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public meeting at the Danish National Library  
In the 59 newspaper articles collected focusing on the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting at 
the Danish National Library in January 2011 the coding procedure applied returned 101 identifiable 
instances of toleration boundary drawing. By instances of toleration boundary drawing I mean 
articulated positions by an individual either for toleration or intoleration of the meeting, accompanied 
by a discursive rationale or argument for the boundary drawing. Table 1 below shows the basic 
distribution of instances of toleration boundary drawing according to types of argumentation.  
 
Table 3.1. Main arguments of toleration/in-toleration in case 1 
Toleration/intolerance code Number of appearances in material 
Toleration  
Toleration as a must due to the rule of law 22 
Toleration, but active protest 15 
Toleration, because we need to challenge and reconfirm our values 7 
Toleration, because intervention would be counterproductive 5 
Toleration, but no obligation to promote intolerant views 5 
Toleration as long as now physical harm is likely (Mills harm principle) 3 
Toleration, because of autonomy 3 
Other 2 
Intolerance  
Intolerance, because of perceived threats and harm 18 
Intolerance, because of liberal perfectionism 12 
Intolerance, because of concerns vis-á-vis cultural cohesion 4 
Intolerance of illiberal intolerance 4 
Other 1 
 
Toleration/intolerance code Number of appearances in material 
Toleration  
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Table 1 shows that more instances of toleration boundary drawing in the case were arguing in favor of 
toleration than of intoleration (62 vs. 39). Obviously, we cannot conclude anything substantial about 
the general toleration boundary drawing among Danes on the issue based on this result. Only that 
among the actors given voice in newspapers, boundary drawing was skewed towards toleration. 
However, the distribution also indicates that arguments of intolerance were not marginal, but 
substantial in the debate. This distribution is partly a product of the media’s balancing norm – the 
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tendency of journalists to collect quotes for an article from both actors who are ‘for’ and ‘against’ a 
particular issue – but also indicates a substantial line of conflict and disagreement, which was the 
driver of the intense public debate. 
In the following sections I will substantiate the different toleration boundary drawing positions 
presented in table 1.  
3.3.1.1. Positions of toleration 
The most frequent argument in the public debate for tolerating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, despite its 
provocative nature and illiberal views, simply stated that as long Hizb ut-Tahrir had not done anything 
illegal or could be reasonably expected to express views that would be illegal, the practices of gender 
separation and the indirect legitimation of killing Danish soldiers must be tolerated. In a democracy, 
liberal freedoms of organization, assembly and free speech must apply to all, and cannot be limited 
due to feelings of unrest and outrage, but only by stipulated legal regulation. One central exponent of 
this position was the director of the National Library, Erland Kolding Nielsen, who argued to uphold 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s booking of the venue on the grounds of liberal freedoms, even though the Minister of 
Culture, Per Stig Møller, asked him to reconsider the decision twice. In support of Kolding Nielsen the 
legal advisor of the liberal think tank CEPOS, Jacob Mchangama, said:  
In Denmark we hold freedom of speech to be a core value, and this is why politicians should 
not dictate cultural institutions’ decisions on meetings and debates, according to whom they 
like and don’t like. Because politicians exist who would in one case argue for unlimited 
freedom of speech and who would be ready to reduce freedom of speech in others. We should 
not sort and categorize opinions and views in this manner (Interview 5) 
Such arguments involve an element of ‘liberal absolutism’ stipulating that the same kind of toleration 
boundary drawing must apply to all groups.  
Other actors argued for toleration on these classic liberal grounds, including most newspapers in the 
sample, which in editorials stressed liberal democracy’s unavoidable dilemma of having to tolerate 
organizations, views and practices of which the large majority strongly disapproves:  
It is characteristic of a democracy like the Danish one that it makes room also for voices and 
views, which most find distasteful. It is not illegal to be against the war in Afghanistan, 
although the resistance of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not driven by pacifism. And it is likewise fully 
legal to arrange public meetings about the issue as long as there are no concrete incitements 
to violence against Danish soldiers. In Denmark we have freedom of organization, assembly 
and speech. We hold these rights dearly. Thus, no matter how provocative Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
meeting may seem, we cannot compromise these fundamental rights and principles (B.T. 20-
01-2011) 
These classic liberal arguments were in the debate found across the political spectrum, constituting a 
common argumentative platform and position in the debate bringing together otherwise political 
opponents. Thus, politicians and commentators adhering to both the then liberal-conservative 
government and the centrist-left opposition used arguments of a pre-toleration legal ‘must’ to 
legitimate non-intervention.  
In many ways the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position argues that toleration in this case is not a matter 
of moral judgments and boundary drawing, but narrowly a question of legal boundary drawing. If 
intervention against Hizb ut-Tahrir is found to be necessary then politicians need to change the legal 
framework. In fact, several actors in the debate, most significantly members of the Danish People’s 
Party, called for exactly this. 
Many of the actors adhering to the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position would occasionally develop 
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the argument to include a call for explicit airing of protest and disagreement with the views of Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Just as Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to speak their views in public so do we, the argument goes. 
We must tolerate, but we must also publicly challenge what we find to be outrageous and wrong. This 
was the general attitude of the people who participated in the counter-demonstration on the day of the 
meeting. In the words of the main organizer of the demonstration, Lars Aslan Rasmussen (city 
counselor for the Social Democrats): 
Hizb ut-Tahrir should not be allowed to spread hatred and incitements to violence against 
Danish soldiers without anybody resisting. We will do this in a peaceful and calm way. 
Political fanatics’ and extremists’ hijacking of religion should not be fought with bans and 
threats. They should be met with protest and visible counter-reactions (JP 21-01-2011) 
At the counter-demonstration politicians from across the spectrum stood side by side marking a rare 
united front in Danish politics on issues of value pluralism and management of difference. After the 
demonstration chief editor of Berlingske Tidende, Lisbeth Knudsen, wrote: 
The demonstration yesterday outside the National Library showed that the statements and 
attitudes of Hizb ut-Tahrir and likeminded are not just met by an ‘ohh well’ in Denmark. It is 
something which we in a democratic manner will sharply protest. The demonstration showed 
that whether you are for or against the war in Afghanistan, leading Danish politicians, public 
intellectuals and ordinary citizens were able come together in protesting Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
incitement to kill Danish soldiers (Berlingske Tidende 23-01-2011) 
However, as we shall see below, not all participants in the counter-demonstration identified with 
the ’toleration-but-protest’ position. 
A more sophisticated, but in many ways related argument stated that the meeting should be tolerated, 
views discussed and counter-arguments displayed. Not so much because marking disagreement is 
important in itself, but because we by airing disagreement and debating views we disapprove of are 
forced to reconfirm, reconsider and refresh our commitment to our own basic values and beliefs. This 
Millian argument of the need to tolerate and engage with views we find wrong rests on a logic of 
potential ’dead dogma’ – that is the belief that the values and norms we live by and hold dear will 
become empty and meaningless if they are not at times questioned, debated and defended (Mill 2009). 
In this perspective the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting can be said to serve an important and positive function 
of normative integration and re-confirmation. From an editorial in the centrist-left newspaper 
Politiken: 
There is one good thing to say about the meeting the darkened Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
hosting today at the Danish beacon of enlightenment, The Royal National Library: As a 
society we are forced to actively engage with an ultra conservative, freedom denying and 
fanatic movement, which challenges our modern values. Values that are not challenged 
disintegrate and disappear. By having the madness brought into daylight, we are at least 
forced to think about what kind of anti-democratic and anti-Semitic phenomenon Hizb ut-
Tahrir is, and what we in common can do to fight the party’s reactionary attack on 
enlightenment freedoms (Politiken 21-01-2011) 
In addition to these toleration arguments stressing legality, toleration but open protest and the need to 
actively reconfirm and rearticulate values, I shall mention two further arguments of toleration that 
appeared fairly frequently in the debate (coded five times each). The first argument connects to the 
public/private divide and concerns the degree to which public institutions are obliged to be equally 
open to all groups of citizens. This argument, which was aired by the Minister of Culture, Per Stig 
Møller, as well a number of legal scholars, stated that although Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to hold 
their meeting at the National Library and we, thus, should tolerate it, this does not mean that a public 
institution like the National Library is obliged to accept all bookings. There is scope for moral 
judgment within the legal framework of self owned public institutions, and the National Library could 
legally have said no to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the argument goes. This argument, on the border of intolerance, 
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tries to connect the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position to an element of individual moral judgment. 
The reasoning is that although Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to preach hatred and provoke feelings we 
should not actively support them in promoting their views. Legal rights do not translate into an 
obligation for public promotion.  
Finally, we find in the public debate an argument for toleration and non-intervention, which in a 
pragmatic manner argues that political intervention (outlawing Hizb ut-Tahrir or forcing the National 
Library to cancel the meeting) would be counter-productive in terms of fighting unwanted views and 
practices. In this perspective, what matters is neither legal nor moral boundary drawing, but pragmatic 
boundary drawing in terms of what will and what will not work to combat illiberal and potentially 
dangerous views. For example, Karen Hækkerup (Social Democrats) argues that by suppressing such 
views ‘support and mobilization for Hizb ut-Tahrir would only intensify due to a massive media 
coverage’, and turn Hizb ut-Tahrir into ‘martyrs’. Intolerance would make the views of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
an interesting ‘forbidden fruit’, which would be counter-productive (JP 19-03-2011).  
3.3.1.2. Positions of intolerance 
The argument of toleration because of counter-productive effects of intervention was in the public 
debate used in contrast to the most common argument of intolerance and intervention, reasoning that 
Hizb ut-Tahrir and the meeting should be stopped due to the potential security threat posed to Danish 
society and Danish soldiers in Afghanistan. The potential physical threat that the diffusion of Hizb ut-
Tahrirs views would pose to Danish society and soldiers is enough to justify preemptive/preventive 
intervention. A concrete example of this line of reasoning: 
It testifies to a sick and anti-democratic mind when Hizb ut-Tahrir is inciting armed 
resistance. To me there is a hidden threat in this message, and it terrifies me to think of how 
Hizb ut-Tahrir might influence young people (Karen Lorentzen, Socialist People’s Party: 
Ritzau 29-12-2010) 
Common to this position is a discourse of radicalization and terrorism. In short, this position is 
characterized by using security as boundary marker for toleration. Hizb ut-Tahrir and the concrete 
meeting is ‘securitized’ and seen as a threat to society (see also section 3 below). Not necessarily an 
imminent or concrete security threat, but a potential threat that we cannot afford to just tolerate. Thus, 
it is not current demonstrable harm that defines the limit of tolerance, but increasingly potential future 
harm (see Schiffauer 2012: 17). Discursively a scenario is built that suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir 
through their rhetoric, glorification of terrorism and meetings is radicalizing youngsters so that 
eventually somebody will respond to their call for armed resistance, maybe even interpret it as 
legitimizing terrorist attacks in Denmark. Preventive intervention is therefore needed. This position of 
intolerance due to potential threat and harm had in the debate exponents from most political parties.  
A variant of the ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ argument emphasizes not the potential 
physical, but rather the more imminent psychological harm of the meeting. In particular, a number of 
actors in the debate point to the psychological distress caused to Danish veterans and families of fallen 
soldiers by the content of the meeting. This was the position taken by e.g. the Association of 
Permanent Military Personnel: 
It is not right that families where spouses, kids or loved ones are away in battle, and those 
who have lost family or friends in battle in Afghanistan, should have to listen to this (Interview 
6) 
Here non-toleration is argued on the grounds of the distress toleration would mean to a rather small, 
but vulnerable minority. Often this line of reasoning is further strengthened by invoking elements of a 
nationalistic discourse of ‘treason’, ‘fourth column activity’, and ‘national pride’. In the light of what 
veterans have done for their country, the argument goes, we as a society, should show our appreciation 
by shielding them from the distress caused by the meeting.  
Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde 
78 
The second most common position of intolerance found in the material (covering twelve instances of 
toleration boundary drawing) argues that intervention is needed and legitimized, not only because of 
the content of the concrete meeting, but also because Hizb ut-Tahrir and its members in general are 
exponents of illiberal and fundamentalist attitudes, practices and identities, which are unsuited for a 
modern liberal democracy. What matters to toleration boundary drawing is not just the legality and 
content of concrete statements, but also the larger identity of those making the statements. In this 
perspective, the illiberal attitudes, views, practices and goals of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir – their 
way of life – is believed to justify intervention. Often the gender division at Hizb ut-Tahrir meetings is 
the concrete hook for this kind of reasoning. This practice is seen as ‘medieval’, ‘gender apartheid’, 
‘insane’, and ‘in opposition to everything Danish’: 
Hizb ut-Tahrir with their medieval gender practices and antidemocratic views represent the 
antithesis to enlightenment values. Should we tolerate that they spread their hatred and way of 
life through public institutions? No! We should prevent them from doing so, and insist on 
Danish values and Danish culture (Pia Kjærdsgaard, Danish People’s Party: Berlingske 
Tidende 9-03-2011). 
This position of intolerance forms part of a larger ‘liberal perfectionism’ discourse where the end-goal 
of integration and the yard stick of good citizenship is not just labor market integration, educational 
integration or active political participation, but also forming a liberal identity and a liberal way of life. 
In line with this discourse of ‘liberal perfectionism’ then Minister of Integration, Søren Pind 
(Liberals), used the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting to publicly formulate a demand for assimilation among 
immigrants: ‘There exist in Denmark norms and culture, which you should basically respect and adopt 
if you come here as a foreigner. You should not mock or disrespect these basic values and norms’ (JP 
16 January 2011). Denmark is a liberal society with room for liberal people only, the argument 
indirectly seems to say. This kind of intolerance has been referred to as a form of ‘liberal intolerance’, 
as boundary drawing here is tied up with evaluation of the liberalness of norms, practices and 
identities, and intolerance accompanied by liberal reasoning stressing the lack of autonomy, free 
choice etc. (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012).  
A closely related variant of ‘liberal intolerance’ found in the material (coded four times) elaborates on 
why Danish society should insist on liberalness as a threshold/boundary for integration and 
participation in political life. The core of this argument is a concern with societal cohesion and parallel 
communities in the light of too large cultural, religious and normative differences, as exemplified by 
Hizb ut-Tahrir. Without a common ‘leitkultur’ and shared basic liberal democratic principles, society 
will disintegrate and social conflict escalate. Here two examples of this argumentation: 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is in no way concerned about world peace or the well-being of Danish society, 
and they constitute a threat to social cohesion in our otherwise harmonic society (Fathi El-
Abed, Muslim intellectual: JP 21-01-2011) 
The power of Islam has become a part of our reality. It is the tribal culture, which continually 
plays a role in Muslim countries, and which to a large degree influences Muslim immigrant 
communities in European countries. The tribal culture means that you will always take side 
with your family or tribe against other families or tribes … […]… We know from research 
that young Muslims in Europe often feel more Muslim than Danish, German or French. They 
will side with other Muslims against non-Muslims (Karen Jespersen, Liberals: Berlingske 
Tidende 21-01-2011). 
In the last quote Hizb ut-Tahrir is made an exponent of a wider problem of lacking societal cohesion 
and shared identity, which is perceived to be rooted in the proliferation of Islam following 
immigration in general. Here mobilization and political participation based on a Muslim rather than a 
Danish identity is seen as problematic and as a barrier to rational deliberation and peaceful 
coexistence. In this perspective, intervention blocking Hizb ut-Tahrir from spreading their illiberal 
views in the public sphere and intensifying ethno-cultural conflict in society become minimum 
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requirements in terms of boundary drawing. However, the position is connected to much wider calls 
for boundary drawing, and has been used to legitimize a range of integration policies and 
requirements, which aim at securing social cohesion, common values and liberal outlooks among 
immigrants in Denmark (see Jensen et al. 2010). In the case material arguments of ‘liberal intolerance’ 
of either kind are predominantly found among representatives of the Danish People’s Party and the 
Liberals. But also individual Muslim actors and other protesters of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting 
interviewed express such views.  
The final type of boundary drawing, which I shall highlight here, marks an outer limit of legitimate 
forms of intolerance expressed in the public sphere. This kind of boundary drawing was expressed in 
particular in connection with the counter-demonstration outside the National Library. As mentioned, 
although the demonstrators stood united outside the venue they did not protest for the same reasons or 
used the same kind of argumentation. Some had come to mark their disagreement and disgust with the 
meeting, but recognized Hizb ut-Tahrir’s basic right to hold the meeting, while others had come to 
mark intolerance of Hizb ut-Tahrir and believed that the meeting should have been stopped for some 
of the reasons discussed above. During the demonstration such differences in positioning came to the 
fore, as a group of skinhead activists started to shout racist statements at Muslims who were entering 
the National Library. This led to internal quarrels among the demonstrators, and the skinheads were 
‘loudly told to shut up and go home’ by fellow demonstrators (BT 21-01-2011). In his speech at the 
demonstration one of the organizers, Lars Aslan Rasmussen said that ‘any racist or intolerant people at 
the demonstration should cross the street and join their friends inside the National Library’ (Interview 
3). Thus, a boundary was drawn between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for non-toleration, 
excluding the racist positioning of the skinheads to the realm of the intolerable. Put in a different way, 
we can say that a boundary was drawn between liberal and illiberal forms of intolerance.  
3.3.2. Case 2 – The visit of the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips 
In the 53 articles collected on the Canadian preacher Bilal Philips’ visit to Copenhagen in April 2011, 
the coding procedure returned 91 instances of toleration boundary drawing. In contrast to case 1, the 
arguments in the public debate on Philips’ visit were skewed towards intolerance (52 vs. 39). The 
possible reasons for this difference are discussed in the comparative section 2.3. below. However, also 
the relative distribution of toleration and intoleration positions is somewhat different from case 1, as 
indicated by table 2. Nevertheless, it is basically the same kind of arguments of toleration boundary 
drawing that were put forward in the two public debates, which is not surprising given the two cases’ 
proximity in time and nature. For this reason, the following discussion of argumentative positioning in 
case 2 focuses on main differences and nuances as compared to case 1. 
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Table 3.2. Main arguments of toleration/in-toleration in case 2 
Toleration/intolerance code Number of appearances in material 
Toleration  
Toleration, but active protest 10 
Toleration, because intervention would be counterproductive 10 
Toleration as a must due to the rule of law 7 
Toleration, because we need to challenge and reconfirm our values 4 
Toleration as long as now physical harm is likely (Mills harm principle) 3 
Toleration, but no obligation to promote intolerant views 2 
Toleration, because of autonomy 1 
Other 2 
Intolerance  
Intolerance, because of perceived threats and harm 17 
Intolerance, because of liberal perfectionism 10 
Intolerance because of danger of slippery slope 8 
Intolerance, because of concerns vis-à-vis cultural cohesion 5 
Intolerance of illiberal intolerance 4 
Intolerance, because of need to maintain secular divide  3 
Other 5 
 
3.3.2.1. Positions of tolerance 
As indicated by table 2, the public debate surrounding Philips’ visit to Denmark showed much less 
importance of the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position, which was the dominant position of toleration 
in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting. From a legal point of view, this is probably because the 
existing legal possibilities for intervention in the case of foreigners are larger than with regard to 
national citizens. As pointed out in the debate by legal scholar Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen: ‘It is 
always the sovereign right of states to deny entry on grounds of for example disturbance of public 
order’ (Berlingske 11-04-2011). Thus, there was no hindrance in the existing legal framework of 
having Philips stopped at the airport upon arrival and returned to his destination of departure, as it had 
happened to him in both Australia and Britain on prior occasions. As indicated, this did not happen in 
Denmark, although a number of actors, including MPs, local politicians, public intellectuals and 
newspapers, argued for exactly this move, among them Mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture in 
Copenhagen, Pia Allerslev (Liberals): ‘When I realized that other countries, with which we normally 
compare, had denied him access I appealed to the government for the same reaction in Denmark. 
Because why does Denmark always have to be the ‘nice guy’ on these matters?’ (Interview 2).  
One of the primary reasons that the legal possibilities of stopping Philips from speaking was not 
utilized was probably the strong advocacy of the position in the debate that such a move would be 
counter-productive. Here the memory of Geert Wilders denial of entry to Britain in February 2009 
played an important role. Karen Hækkerup (Social Democrats) argued along these lines:  
Imagine that he is denied access, but turns up and pulls a ‘Geert Wilders’, making a media 
stunt which would only further diffuse his views. It will be much more effective to meet his 
views with protest and argumentation (Information 12-04-2011). 
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As indicated by the last part of the quote and table 2, the ‘toleration-but-protest’ position also played a 
significant role in the debate on Philips’ visit. The main organisor of the counter demonstration outside 
the meeting venue was again Lars Aslan Rasmussen (Social Democrats), who like with the Hizb ut-
Tahrir meeting argued a need to visualize to Muslim adolescents ‘that an alternative to radical views 
exists’ (Interview 3). However, in this case Lars Aslan Rasmussen had done anything ‘politically 
possible’ to stop the meeting with Philips from taking place, thus, demonstrating as a last resort 
(Interview 3).  
3.3.2.2. Positions of intolerance 
In terms of intolerance positions it was in case 2 the same two dominant positions – ‘intolerance-due-
to-potential-threat-and-harm’ and the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’ – as in case 1. Thus, one basic 
conclusion to be drawn is that these modalities of intolerance are fundamental to the boundary 
drawing vis-à-vis Muslim non-institutionalized political participation in Denmark today.  
In terms of ‘liberal intolerance’, arguments that Philips represents ‘backwards’ and ‘illiberal’ views, 
practices and identities unfitted for modern liberal democracy – arguments very similar to those raised 
against Hizb ut-Tahrir – were relatively common in the public debate (coded ten times) and in 
interviews (Interview 2, 3, 5, 7). Philips’ views on women, homosexuals and Jihadism cannot be 
tolerated, it was argued, as they undermine fundamental liberal principles of equality, autonomy and 
secularism.  
Although the basic argumentative figure of the ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ likewise 
was the same in the two cases, a difference can be identified in the threat scenarios constructed. Where 
the risk of direct physical harm against Danish soldiers was highlighted in the case of Hizt ut-Tahrir’s 
meeting, the threat from Philips was more seen to stem from future radicalization among Muslim 
adolescents who would be inspired by his views. Furthermore, several actors stressed that it was an 
aggravating circumstance that the Islamic Faith Community was the sponsor of the event, as it is often 
perceived as a relatively mainstream and integrationist Muslim organization. Later Minister of 
Equality, Manu Sareen (Social Liberals) argued: 
When the Islamic Faith Community is the organizer, it can seem like an approval of Philips’ 
views. Marginalized, young Muslim adolescents can all of a sudden get the impression that it 
is okay to hate Jews and homosexuals (Ekstra Bladet 11-04-2011). 
As I shall argue below this perceived aggravating circumstance was one of the main reasons boundary 
drawing was skewed more towards intolerance in case 2 than in case 1. 
A last argument of intolerance, which I will highlight here (absent in case 1), is the position that by 
tolerating Philips spreading his views in public we will enter a slippery slope which will slowly erode 
the liberal democratic society we praise (coded eight times). In many ways this argument is the 
intolerant counterpart of the classic liberal argument for toleration that if society intervenes to stop 
practices that are disliked, pressure will build to repress more and more practices, in the end 
undermining freedoms and liberties. With regard to Philips it was argued that non-intervention in the 
name of ‘misunderstood tolerance’ would allow repression of women, homosexuals and more 
moderate Muslims to flourish, eventually leading to ‘Sharia zones’ and ‘ungovernable spaces’ 
(Interview 3; Interview 7; Berlingske 15-04-2011). One reason this particular position is found to be 
influential in case 2, and not in case 1, could be the perception that Philips as an internationally 
renounced authority of Islam would be more likely to influence wider circles of Muslims than Hizb ut-
Tahrir (see also next section).  
3.4. Comparing Main Positions in the two Cases 
Reading across the two cases, and the main discursive positions on toleration boundary drawing 
articulated, what springs to mind immediately are the many similarities. I will reflect on four such 
similarities here, before turning to the most important differences. First, it is striking how closely 
Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde 
82 
public debates on the limits of tolerance are linked to issues of free speech in the Danish context. This 
has to do with the kind of cases investigated here – public meetings where controversial views are 
articulated – but also with Danish political culture, which has traditionally been characterized by 
strong endorsements of free speech. The 2005-2006 Danish cartoon controversy to a large degree 
reaffirmed this tradition (Lindekilde 2009). This coupling of toleration and free speech regulation 
helps explain the prominent position of the toleration-as-a-must argument in the two cases. In this 
perspective toleration becomes a matter of legality rather than moral considerations, political opinions, 
etc. 
Second, both cases exemplify the importance of radicalization scenarios to debates of toleration vis-à-
vis Muslim actors’ political participation today. In both cases the views articulated at the meetings are 
construed as radical, posing a threat to integration, social cohesion and potentially to security 
(providing the breeding ground for violent extremism). In the radicalization scenarios constructed a 
direct line seems to run from attitudes and opinions to actions. Thus, the young Muslims attending the 
meetings are accordingly constructed as both ‘at risk’ in terms of integration and potentially ‘risky’ in 
terms of security (see Heath-Kelly 2011). This is the underlying logic of the intolerance-due-to-
potential-threat-and-harm position playing a prominent role in both debates. In this way radicalization 
scenarios work to narrow the room of toleration by excluding to the realm of intolerance, practices and 
views, which are not forbidden by law, due to their potential destabilization of security.  
Third, the absence of a particular position in both cases is striking. A prominent position, when 
debating in Denmark similar public meetings and marches arranged by the far right, at least until the 
terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in June 2011, has been the view that such racist and neo-nazi 
views should be met with silence. The best way to combat such ideas is not intolerance or tolerance-
but-protest, but simply to ignore the events and meetings. However, when it comes to controversial 
meetings arranged by Muslim actors it seems as if the marking of toleration boundaries has become 
increasingly important. This, I believe, has to do with the interdependence between toleration 
boundary drawing and mechanisms of ‘othering’ (see also section 4 below). Islam, and in particular 
radical Islam, serves in Denmark, as in many other Western countries today, as the main ‘other’, 
which constitutes the negative opposite of the ‘us’ and its positive traits (Schiffauer 2012: 2). In this 
perspective marking the boundaries of toleration becomes also an issue of necessary identity 
maintenance, and ignoring the meetings become unfeasible. 
Fourthly, the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing in the two cases and othering of 
Muslims in Denmark, also helps to explain the prominent role played by ‘modalities of liberal 
intolerance’ in both cases (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012). These arguments of intolerance are exactly 
characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the meetings, but 
to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ 
liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary drawing becomes 
entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must be shared. By 
highlighting the liberal way of life and enforcing it on others these arguments squeeze the room of 
toleration. 
Despite these significant similarities across the two cases, important differences also exist, not least 
regarding the overall distribution of toleration boundary drawing in the debates with case 2 being more 
skewed towards intolerance than case 1. What can explain this observed pattern? A number of 
interviewees pointed to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad regarding the two 
meetings.  
At the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, the senders of the invitation and the message entailed are, despite the 
problimatization hereof, Danish citizens. Bilal Philips is a foreign citizen, who came to Denmark to 
speak only to leave again right after. This seems to make a difference to toleration boundary drawing. 
The mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture in Copenhagen, Pia Allerslev (Liberals) puts it this way:  
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You should not just be allowed to come and stir up emotions and then leave again. I have 
more respect for Hizb ut-Tahrir, because they have stakes in this. They will be held 
accountable for what they say tomorrow and in a year (Interview 2). 
The quote shows, maybe not very surprising, how the limits of toleration are dependent on the subject 
of toleration’s citizenship position and embeddedness in Danish society. However, the comparison of 
the two cases also shows that the limits of toleration are linked to the tolerator’s expectations to the 
subject of toleration. Thus, the fact that the organizers of Bilal Philips’ visit, Islamic Faith Community 
and its youth section, are involved in a number of collaborations with local authorities and like to 
present themselves as integrationists bridging cultures, led to disappointed expectations hampering 
toleration of their engagement with Philips. In fact, it was by many deemed to be an aggravating 
circumstance that the Islamic Faith Community by being conceived of and treated as a relative 
‘mainstream’ Muslim actor was legitimizing the views of Philips. 
Regarding the intended and perceived message of the two meetings, several interviewees point to the 
difference between raising issues of homophobia, gender inequality and endorsement of terrorism 
(case 2) and challenging Danish engagement in Afghanistan (case 1). The difference highlighted is 
that if you disregard the provocative invitation to the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, the articulated criticism 
of Danish foreign policy resonates with significant parts of the majority population in Denmark, while 
Bilal Philips’ views resonate with very few in majority society (and within the Muslim minority). As 
indicated by one interviewee; ‘I think it is legitimate to question Danish engagement in Afghanistan 
and believe that there should be room to air criticism’ (Interview 3). In short: Toleration boundary 
drawing seems also to be dependent on distribution of support for the issue/object of toleration.  
Finally, a difference in the targeted audience of the two meetings is pointed out:   
With Hizb ut-Tahrir we know more less who they appeal to. But with Philips the Islamic Faith 
Community legitimized that a much broader crowd of young Muslims could come and listen 
out of interest. When you show up at HT meetings you declare much clearer that you share 
their views (Interview 2) 
In other words, the fact that the Bilal Philips meeting targeted a much bigger audience of ‘ordinary’ 
young Muslims than the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting was by many believed to make boundary drawing 
more acute in case 2.  
 
3.5. The dynamics and strategies of toleration boundary drawing in the two cases 
When trying to understand why particular actors draw toleration boundaries and legitimate boundary 
drawing as they do, important explanatory elements have been found to be the value system/ideology 
and the life world/experiences of the actor. Research has shown correlates between individuals’ 
general political orientation and beliefs, and their propensity to tolerate particular practices (Bang 
Pedersen, Slothus, Stubager & Togeby 2007). Likewise, research has shown, although less clearly, a 
connection between individuals’ lived experiences with particular practices and their propensity to 
tolerate them (Frølund Thomsen 2012). Other research has shown how the context and specificities of 
practices (e.g. public vs. private; Christian vs. Muslim symbols etc.) matter to toleration boundary 
drawing in practice (Aarøe 2012). However, much less researched and understood is how the 
dynamics of engaging in public debates help to shape toleration boundary drawing and positioning. 
And, in addition, how discursive strategies are employed to legitimize positions, cope with pressures 
of boundary drawing and refute counter-arguments. Thus, my argument in the following section is that 
the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determine the 
toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope with 
pressures. In the following I will highlight across the two cases three such dynamics or discursive 
strategies of dealing with toleration boundary drawing. 
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3.5.1. From Political to Legal Boundary drawing 
The first prominent discursive strategy of dealing with toleration boundary drawing can be seen by 
looking at the argumentative strategies of the two primary ministers involved in the debates – Minister 
of Justice, Lars Barfoed (Conservatives), and Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller (Conservatives). 
When the news of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting first broke, journalists approached the ministers for a 
comment and asked about their view on toleration boundary drawing in this specific case. Lars 
Barfoed initially responded by stating his disapproval of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, but argued that any 
substantial boundary drawing had to be done by legal experts and the courts. Thus, he asked the State 
Attorney’s office to look into the matter. This move had at least two strategic advantages for the 
minister. First, by asking the State Attorney to investigate (like it had been done on two earlier 
occasions) if Hizb ut-Tahrir could be banned, he signaled action and a degree of intolerance of the 
meeting, while at the same time upholding basic liberal freedoms and the rule of law. Second, the 
move shifted the responsibility for boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena. In doing so 
the minister avoided having to choose between either ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ or ‘intolerance-
because-of-threat-and-harm’, which were the two main positions he was trying to balance. Interpreted 
as a strategic move, the transformation of a political issue into a legal one, helped the Minister of 
Justice bypass a decision, which would most certainly be criticized no matter what position he ended 
up taking.  
In a very similar manner, the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, responded by shifting the 
responsibility of boundary drawing from the public and political arena to the semi-private arena. This 
was done by calling upon the venue owner, the National Library, to reconsider the decision to rent the 
venue to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Again, this move seems strategically favorable from the perspective of the 
minister as it signals action, shifts responsibility and avoids difficult political decision-making here 
and now. The director of the National Library, Erland Kolding Nielsen, responded by trying to shift 
responsibility back to the politicians by calling for clearer policy guidelines for such situations. 
Kolding Nielsen argues: ‘Drawing the limits of tolerance and freedom of speech is most certainly a 
political responsibility. You cannot expect a public employee to do this on behalf of the Minister, the 
government or the majority’ (interview 1). In the interview Kolding Nielsen links this strategy of 
pushing responsibility downwards in the bureaucratic system to a more general tendency, which he 
refers to as ‘the syndrome of increasing responsibility avoidance’ (interview 1). 
In both debates this kind of strategic shifting of responsibility for boundary drawing and blame 
avoidance, was criticized by several actors, not least the Danish People’s Party. Representatives of the 
party on several occasions called upon the two ministers to ‘step up’, ‘take responsibility’, ‘be more 
proactive’ and, thus, intervene to stop the meeting (Ritzau 10-04-2011; Berlingske Tidende 9-03-
2011). If necessary the relevant ministers should change the legal framework to make it possible to 
intervene, it was argued. Through their outspoken criticism of the political handling of the meeting, 
The Danish People’s Party tried to position itself as the only ones with the political courage to clearly 
draw boundaries and intervene to stop Hizb ut-Tahrir. However, others, like Lars Aslan Rasmussen 
(Social Democrats), shared the view that toleration boundary drawing was in fact a clearly political 
responsibility, which should not be delegated to legal or private arenas: ‘Of course politicians should 
have an opinion as to whether or not this is okay. That is our job’ (Interview 3). 
This dynamic positioning in the debate, I will argue, exemplifies how the two ministers used their 
political power and position to sidestep a politically controversial issue, while The Danish People’s 
Party, as well as members of the central-left opposition, embraced the issue to score political points by 
drawing boundaries, either for or against toleration of the meetings. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s strategy in the 
debate was clearly to provoke a public outcry and thereby force the political elite to react and 
negotiate limits of tolerance. The invitation to the meeting and the choice of venue was, as indicated, 
deliberately designed to stir up emotions. From Hizb ut-Tahrir’s perspective this strategy of deliberate 
provocation created a ‘win-win situation’ for the organization. Either the political elite would 
intervene and stop the meeting, which would make possible an argument of victimage and freedom of 
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speech violation (cf. the ‘intolerance-as-counter-productive’ position). Or the political elite would 
tolerate the meeting, giving Hizb ut-Tahrir a public and heavily medialized platform to spread their 
views.  
3.5.2. Securitization: Pushing boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political 
Securitization is another central discursive strategy of removing issues at hand from the realm of 
politics that is employed in both cases. In line with the Copenhagen School of security studies, 
securitization can be seen as ‘speech acts that frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as 
above politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). Thus, by making an issue a matter of security, securitizing 
actors close down politics and push the issue into the realm of ‘exception, emergency and decision’ 
(Wæver 2011: 651). Through the creation of particular radicalization scenarios of the two meetings, a 
number of actors across the political spectrum argue that the matter at hand is really not about 
toleration of dissident views, but about security and risk management. Although the Danish 
Intelligence Service in both cases found no imminent risk connected to the meetings, these actors 
stress the potential threat to security posed by allowing the meetings to take place, and thereby attempt 
to push the issue of toleration boundary drawing out of normal politics. Here securitization functions 
as a discursive strategy which constructs decision making and boundary drawing as necessary and 
extra-political. The meetings pose potential security threats and therefore they must be avoided. When 
successful, securitization functions as a conversation stopper – the debate of the limits of toleration 
become irrelevant as the issue at hand is framed as calling for extra-political measures. As shown, 
strategies of securitization were linked to the position of ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, which 
was the main position of intolerance in both cases. However, the securitization of the two meetings 
was not complete, and in several ways challenged, as testified to by the diverse arguments put forward 
in the debates.  
In the case of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting the strategy of securitization was easily applied with 
reference to the direct and existential threat posed by the supposed appeal to violence against Danish 
soldiers in Afghanistan. But the strategy of securitization is, as exemplified clearly by the constructed 
radicalization scenarios in the two cases, not limited to imminent existential threats. Thus, more 
indirect and lagged threats to integration and social cohesion can also be securitized. In fact, the Bilal 
Philips case shows how securitization can work to problematize, not just the direct exponent of radical 
and supposable security-threatening views (Bilal Philips), but also anybody engaged with such actors 
(The Islamic Faith Community). Despite all arguments by the Islamic Faith Community that they had 
invited Philips due to his expertise on islamophobia, and repeated public statements distancing the 
community from homophobia and violence against women, the invitation of Philips was securitized, 
said to show ‘the true face of the Islamic Faith Community’ (interview 2). In this way the Islamic 
Faith Community was found ‘guilty by association’, and accordingly constructed as a latent security 
threat due to its ‘two-faced Islamists’ who pose as tolerant, but who in fact have a ‘hidden agenda’ of 
using the principles of democracy to undermine them (Interview 3). By introducing doubt vis-à-vis the 
sincerity of statements and motives of Muslim actors the strategy of securitization poses serious 
challenges to Muslim actors’ possibilities to participate at face value in public debates and engaging in 
rational discussion (see also section 4 below). 
3.5.3. Strategies of Coping among Muslim Actors: Reframing, Adaptation and Avoidance  
In terms of the discursive strategies used by the main Muslim actors in the two cases – Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and the Islamic Faith Community – three strategies can be identified that seek to counter 
securitization, shift responsibility, perform safety and avoid boundary drawing.   
The first coping strategy I will call ‘reframing’. For example, as a response to the argument that the 
organization was inciting violence and putting Danish soldiers at risk one spokesman of Hizb ut-
Tahrir, Sharif Redji, said: If there is anybody to blame for the fact that Danish soldiers are dying in a 
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pointless battle in Afghanistan, it is Danish politicians who have cynically chosen to send them on a 
mission, which only serves American strategic interests in the regions (Ritzau 28-12-2010). Here the 
spokesman is trying to shift responsibility and blame to the political elite, and recast the object of 
debate and toleration from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting to politicians’ decision to send troops to 
Afghanistan. In a similar manner, another spokesman, Chadi Freigeh, argued that: When the people of 
Afghanistan defend themselves against aggressions from the occupying forces you cannot blame them. 
It is their right to defend their lives (Ritzau 21-01-2011). By reframing the armed resistance of the 
Afghan people away from terrorism and towards legitimate self-defense, Hizb ut-Tahrir is tying in 
with and challenging dominant arguments and positions in the debate. In a way the securitization 
strategy is turned upside down by recasting the threat to security as caused by decisions made by the 
political elite.   
The second coping strategy employed by Muslim actors – which I will call ‘adaptation’ – is most 
visible in regard to the Bilal Philips meeting. Faced with intense criticism, securitization attempts and 
a public debate skewed towards intolerance, the Islamic Faith Community, personalized in their 
spokesperson, Imran Shah, was under severe pressure to distance itself from Bilal Philips. In the hours 
before Philips’ speech this was done by publicly declaring that the community regretted having invited 
Philips. Imran Shah said:  
If we could do it all over we would not have invited him. It is not fruitful for the dialogue here 
in Denmark that we have demonstrations outside Korsgadehallen [the venue of the meeting]. 
On the other hand we will not be dictated (B.T. 18-04-2011; Interview 4). 
This move can be understood as an attempt to cope with intense pressure by acknowledging mistakes 
and adapting to articulated boundaries. In this perspective regretting the invitation is seen as a sign of 
learning and readjustment to mainstream formulations of the limits of tolerance. However, critics 
argue that it is a purely strategic move designed to maintain privileges, because ‘if they [the Islamic 
Faith Community] are cut off from close dialogue with politicians at the town hall they lose all their 
power and influence in the community’ (Interview 2). 
Besides airing remorse for having invited Philips, the Islamic Faith Community also tried to adapt to 
pressures by ‘performing safety’ (Mythen 2011). Performing safety is a discursive (or behavioral) 
strategy meant to signal safety in the face of securitization. One example is the move of the Islamic 
Faith Community to arrange for coffee and cake for the demonstrators outside the meeting venue 
(Interview 4). Nobody who meets their opponents with coffee and cake can be truly dangerous. Rather 
they signal peaceful coexistence and respect. The ability to perform safety seems important as a way 
of countering securitization and trying to influence negotiations of the toleration boundary drawing 
among Muslim actors in public debates today. 
The last identified coping strategy has to do with Muslim actors who avoid drawing boundaries 
essential to toleration/non-toleration. In the debate regarding Bilal Philips, spokesperson of the Islamic 
Faith Community, Imran Shah, was heavily criticized for not answering directly if the community 
supports the beating of women or the view that homosexuals should be punished by death, as 
suggested by elements of Sharia law. In a number of interviews he argued that these questions were 
irrelevant as ‘we are in Denmark, and here the Danish constitution applies and not Sharia’ (Interview 
4). By insisting on a fundamental distinction between evaluating certain practices and views in a 
Muslim versus a non-Muslim context, Shah is avoiding having to either dismiss aspects of Sharia law 
or openly endorse Bilal Philips’ views. However, the lack of clear boundary drawing was by many 
commentators read as constituting support of Philips’ views. In the words of former Minister of 
Integration, Birthe Rønn hornbech (Liberals): 
As long as the Islamic Faith Community does not speak out against the views of Philips, but 
instead refuses to answer simple questions, believing that these vital questions are irrelevant, 
we can only conclude that that the Islamic Faith Community accepts these views (Berlingske 
14-04-2011). 
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3.6. Effects of public boundary drawing on Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights  
In this section we shift focus from the content and strategies of toleration boundary drawing in the 
debates, and focus instead on the effects this boundary drawing can be said to have on Muslim actors’ 
possibilities for participation in future public debates. My basic argument is that although the 
controversies regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting and Bilal Philips’ visit did not generate any concrete 
policy implication, which directly altered Hizb ut-Tahrir’s or the Islamic Faith Community’s (or other 
Muslim actors) possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there 
seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, I argue, with the fundamental interdependence 
of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering (Schiffauer 2012: 2-3). Toleration boundary 
drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and 
tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same 
time constructing an in-group and an out-group. As the differences that generate public debate and 
activate toleration boundary drawing today primarily are differences of Muslim views and practices, 
the main out-group constructed is that of the ‘Muslim other’. Often it is Muslims in general who are 
designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community.  
One way this interdependence between toleration boundary drawing and processes of othering affects 
the Danish Muslim community was suggested by Per Ørum Jørgensen from the Christian Democrats 
among others: 
I believe that the statements of Hizb ut-Tahrir and all the attention their meeting has received 
is most harmful to the many liberal, peaceful Muslims in Denmark, who too often are equated 
with extremist Islamists like Hizb ut-Tahrir. And after all, peaceful Muslims constitute the 
majority (Kristeligt Dagblad 19-01-2011) 
The thrust of this argument is that the intense focus on toleration boundary drawing in regard to 
specific views/practices can lead to a lack of boundary drawing vis-à-vis internal differences in the 
Muslim community. The public drive to cast Hizb ut-Tahrir and its views and practices as intolerable, 
may implicitly lead to misrecognition of variation in views and practices within the Muslim 
community. Likewise, it was argued that the Islamic Faith Community by inviting Philips and not 
clearly denouncing his views e.g. on homosexuals ‘was taking moderate Muslims hostage’ and 
‘undermining general trust’ (Interview 2). This indirect othering of all Muslims as potentially 
problematic may serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public 
debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims. In the case material, the tendency to equate 
particular views and practices to all Muslims is in particular connected to the position of ‘liberal 
intolerance’, as boundary drawing here is less concerned with specific statements/practices, and more 
with liberal identities and general challenges posed to societal cohesion by cultural difference.  
In a similar way, Zubair Butt Hussain, spokesman of the Danish moderate Islamic umbrella 
organization, The Muslim Common Council, used the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting to raise a principled 
issue of excommunication of Muslim actors through the labeling of actors as ‘radical’. Butt Hussain 
was arguing how he dared not go to the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, or other controversial arrangements or 
mosques in the Muslim milieu, as he said to ‘hear with his own ears what kind of nonsense they were 
preaching’, as this would most certainly lead the media and certain politicians to label him as ‘radical’ 
(Politiken 28-02-2011). Thus, the argument was that important limitations on Muslim actors’ 
maneuvering in public debates are inflicted through mechanisms of ‘guilt by association’. In other 
words, the fear of the label ‘radical’, which can have great consequences for Muslim actors with 
ambitions to participate in political life, leads to self-censorship in terms of argumentation and 
participation in particular events. At a more general level, the debate highlighted how the discourse of 
radicalization and connected strategies of securitization may shrink the room of tolerance for Muslim 
actors participating in public debate (see also Lindekilde & Kühle 2012). 
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A further effect of the great outrage regarding the two meetings on Muslim actors’ possibilities for 
participation in political life was suggested by Butt Hussain. Asked about the possibilities of 
participating in public debates as a Muslim he answered: 
I would say that a different set of premises or unwritten rules apply to Muslims in public 
debates as compared to others. When I speak about radicalization, terror or integration, I do 
so from a predefined vision of what Islam is about and how it should be practiced. This is why 
I am constantly asked to distance myself from a range of scary interpretations of Islam and 
Muslim practices before I am allowed to talk about the particular topic in question. This is 
really constraining (Politiken 28-02-2011) 
As a Muslim actor you are, Butt Hussain argues, expected proactively to endorse central liberal values 
(freedom of speech; gender equality; non-violence, secularism; rule of law etc.), and dismiss certain 
illiberal ideas and values (Sharia; support of violent jihad; gender segregation; homophobia etc.) as a 
prerequisite for participation in public debates and political life. If you fail to do this or dismiss it as 
irrelevant to the question at hand, Muslims risk being excommunicated and having their 
‘moderateness’ or ‘liberalness’ drawn into question. Thus, an indirect effect of the intense public 
debate about the illiberal views and practices of Hizb ut-Tahrir or Bilal Philips is that more liberal 
Muslims are forced to spend time and resources distancing themselves from certain views and 
practices, and endorsing others, before they are certified as tolerable and legitimate public debaters. 
Put another way, Muslims are forced to discursively ‘perform safety’ and certify boundaries in order 
to be accepted as part of the in-group. In this way the boundary drawing regarding ‘radical’ Muslim 
actors in public debates generates special conditions for participation vis-à-vis also ‘moderate’ 
Muslims actors.  
That special conditions for participation and argumentation exist for the out-group of Muslim actors is 
further underlined by the fact that toleration boundary drawing in practice often varies from group to 
group. As pointed out in several interviews, the same kind of views and practices seem to be 
unimportant and tolerable differences when practiced by in-group actors, but significant and 
intolerable differences when performed by the out-group (see also Schiffauer 2012: 11). Concretely it 
is pointed out how the gender division at the two meetings, and in Muslim communities in general, is 
pointed out as intolerable, while the same practice in Jewish communities is rarely problematized 
(Interview 4). Likewise, while the tendency to isolate and create parallel societies among some 
Muslims is securitized, the same practice among Chinese immigrants is left uncommented (Interview 
1). In practice this means to Muslim actors that certain practices and views cannot be defended 
without the actors losing legitimacy, although such practices and views are tolerated in other contexts.  
Finally, as stressed in an interview with Lars Aslan Rasmussen, there can be negative effects on 
moderate Muslim voices of not drawing the boundaries of toleration clearly enough vis-à-vis ‘radical 
Islam’. Because if the majority society does not communicate boundaries clearly, e.g. by stopping 
Philips from entering the country or by outlawing Hizb ut-Tahrir, it ‘signals that anything goes, and 
then it becomes the most extreme voices within the Muslim community who dictate the direction’ 
(Interview 3). In other words, the absence of external boundary drawing affects possibilities of internal 
boundary drawing.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that in Denmark the limits to tolerance of ethnic and religious difference in 
political life have been most significantly challenged in recent years by the non-institutionalized 
political participation of ‘radical Muslim’ actors, who through public meetings have pushed 
controversial views and practices into the public sphere. The chapter has investigated the negotiations 
of toleration boundary drawing as it plays out in public debates by comparing the arguments and 
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discursive strategies put forward in regard to the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting at the Danish National Library 
and the visit of the Islamic preacher Bilal Philips to Copenhagen both in 2011. Based on this 
comparison a number of conclusions can be reached. First, it is found that despite the proximity in 
time and resemblances of the illiberal and undemocratic views aired at the two meetings, the public 
debate regarding the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting was skewed towards tolerance while the debate regarding 
Bilal Philips’ visit was skewed toward intolerance. In explaining this difference the chapter points to 
important differences in the sender-message-audience triad of the two meetings. The significance of 
intolerance arguments in connection with Philips’ visit is connected to the fact that 1) Philips is a 
foreign citizen, 2) his views on homosexuality and gender equality resonated purely with audiences in 
Denmark (as compared to the criticism of Danish engagement in Afghanistan aired by Hizb ut-tahrir), 
and 3) that the audience at Philips’ lecture was perceived to be much wider than the audience at the 
Hizb ut-tahrir meeting, due to Philips’ international status as an Islamic authority, and because of the 
perceived ‘mainstream’ status of the Islamic Faith Community, who invited him to Denmark. Thus, it 
can be concluded that toleration boundary drawing is shaped significantly by the citizenship status and 
the perceived impact of the object of toleration. 
Secondly, the comparison shows a number of recurrent positions of tolerance/intolerance across the 
two cases and involved actors. In both cases the two most prominent positions of tolerance are what I 
have called ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ and ‘tolerance-but-protest’. The prominence of these 
positions, it has been argued, are linked to the importance of free speech considerations in Danish 
political culture, which connects toleration boundary drawing narrowly with legal limitations on free 
speech, and a widespread view that views and practices which are disapproved of are best challenged 
by debating them in public and marking opposition. However, it is also found that the public marking 
of opposition depends on who is the object of toleration, as views and practices deemed controversial 
among Muslim actors are left uncommented when practiced among other groups. This has to do, the 
chapter argues, with the important interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and 
mechanisms of othering, with Islam and Muslims, especially ‘radical’ Islam, posing as the significant 
other in a Danish context today. Regarding the most dominant positions of intolerance these are in 
both cases found to be ‘intolerance-due-to-perceived-threat-and harm’ and modalities of ‘liberal 
intolerance’. In both cases radicalization scenarios of the meetings are constructed and linked to a 
discursive strategy of securitization, which attempts to push toleration boundary drawing out of the 
political arena and into the realm of the extra-political. The meetings hereby become, it is argued, not 
a matter of political or moral boundary drawing, but of security concerns, and toleration is therefore 
not an option. The prominence of the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance, I argue, has to do again with 
the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering. These 
arguments of intolerance are exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and 
practices articulated at the meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, 
which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way 
toleration boundary drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and 
identities which must be shared.  
Thirdly, the comparison of the two cases points to a number of recurrent discursive strategies of 
positioning and coping with public pressures of boundary drawing. Here the chapter highlights three 
such strategies: 1) the attempts by leading politicians to make boundary drawing a matter of legality 
rather than politics, 2) the attempts to securitize the meetings by especially actors on the political 
centre-right, and thereby remove boundary drawing from normal politics, and 3) the attempts by some 
Muslim actors to reframe the issue at hand, perform security in the face of securitization and avoid 
clear boundary drawing by recasting the terms of debate. 
Finally, the chapter points to a number of potential effects that public toleration boundary drawing 
may have on the room of maneuvering of Muslim actors in political life in Denmark. Most importantly 
it is showed how the marking of opposition to certain illiberal views and practices, and connected 
mechanisms of othering, may squeeze the room of tolerance for also more ‘moderate’ Muslim actors 
in the public sphere. Often opposition and boundary drawing in public debates are made in regard to 
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Islam in general, not paying attention to the important internal differentiations of the Muslim 
community in Denmark, which forces also ‘progressive’ Muslim voices to confirm certain liberal 
views/practices and disconfirm specific illiberal ones in order to be accepted as legitimate participants 
in public debates. Even if this is done, the chapter shows, the prospect of having ones arguments taken 
at face value as a Muslim actor is challenged by a widespread view that Muslim actors speak with 
‘two tongues’. 
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CHAPTER 4. CONCEPTIONS OF TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE IN 
DENMARK: FROM LIBERALITY TO LIBERAL INTOLERANCE? 
 
By Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we draw together the studies of conceptions, debates and arguments of tolerance and 
intolerance in Denmark presented above. The chapter is structured in five main parts. The first part 
brings together the major insights from the presented studies in order to provide an answer to the 
question to what extent current conceptions of toleration and intolerance are challenging or 
reproducing the Danish tradition of ‘freemindedness’ or liberality. The second part concludes on the 
degree to which we witness examples of going beyond toleration in Denmark towards ‘positive 
recognition’ or inclusion to the realm of ‘the normal’ of particular cultural and religious differences. 
The third part likewise draws comparative conclusions on the conceptualization and limits of tolerance 
across issue fields (education and political life), in particular addressing the question of whether or not 
it makes a difference to perceptions of toleration if the issue at hand is one that demands practical 
solutions (concrete decision-making) or one that operates more at a symbolic level (more principled 
debates). The fourth part of the chapter discusses across the studies if Danish debates on limits of 
tolerance and policies of difference are excluding groups or making it difficult for them to participate 
in school or political life. Thus, it is discussed how toleration boundary-drawing impacts on not least 
Muslim minorities in these two spheres. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving some reflections as 
to what could be done vis-à-vis toleration of cultural and religious difference in the studies area in the 
future.  
 
4.2. The Connection between the Danish Tradition of Free-mindedness/Liberality and 
Current Conceptions of Toleration and Intolerance 
 
4.2.1. The Danish Tradition of Toleration 
Historically, in Denmark tolerance has in a widely received interpretation been dismissed as a form of 
indifference and relativism with regard to the beliefs and actions of others. As such it connotes the 
idea that all beliefs, values, and practices are of equal value and therefore also of no value. Tolerance, 
in this sense, means the inability to make judgements, or to differentiate properly between right and 
wrong, good and bad, true and false (Bredsdorff & Kjældgaard 2008: ch. 15). While this idea is based 
on a biased (or misunderstood) reading of Enlightenment philosophy, many In Denmark have wished 
to employ an alternative term, a favourite being frisind, meaning ‘liberality’ or ‘free mindedness’.  
This term, originating from the influential populist leader, author and priest N.F.S. Grundtvig, 
originally refers to the idea that the state should stay out of matters of religion and let the exponents of 
different views of religion use all verbal powers at their disposal to promote their own views and 
criticise those of others. By contrast, ‘tolerance’ would here be indifference towards, and refraining 
from judgment on that which one considers wrong, and thereby losing an essential moral faculty as a 
human being.  
Yet with the state as the guarantor of equal civic freedoms – securing, as Danes have put it since 
Grundtvig, freedom for Loke as well as for Thor  – liberality means that one is able to speak truth 
against a lie without holding back in dull indifference or adopting social conformism in order to ensure 
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social and political peace (ibid.). Liberality means fighting for the values one holds dear while 
insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a 
strong commitment to equal citizen rights by all and their protection by the state. Liberality, secondly, 
implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. While this leaves some space for legal 
tolerance, understood as the right to think and act in ways that are considered wrong, it leaves little 
space for social tolerance, understood as abstention from criticism of, among other things, cultural and 
religious sensibilities. Liberality is a ‘republican’ virtue that enables you to participate in blunt public 
exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you can reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements 
with your opponents at all levels of society. Indeed, the notorious Danish cartoon crisis referred to this 
understanding of liberality: by those who argued for the right to criticise and ridicule the beliefs of 
others, as well as by those who were concerned that all the relevant parties did not in fact have equal 
civic standing in Danish society (Ibid.; Meer & Mouritsen 2009). 
The preference for liberality over tolerance is particularly conspicuous among right-of-centre 
politicians in Denmark today. A competing conception of tolerance developed in connection with a 
split up of the Liberal party in 1905 (in Danish the party is called Venstre, literally ‘Left’). Ongoing 
debates in Parliament led to an institutionalisation of the split-up and the creation of two separate 
liberal parties, one mainly consisting of farmers and members of the liberal professions (Venstre), and 
another made up by small peasants and intellectuals (Radikale Venstre, literally ‘Radical Left’). The 
political views of both groups were by and large inspired by the thoughts of Grundtvig, but the latter 
also found inspiration in the thoughts of brothers Georg and Edvard Brandes and the editor Viggo 
Hørup, representing a new, radical, form of liberalism. Due to this ideological difference not only two 
distinct liberal parties but two distinct liberal ideologies developed, and these two different 
interpretations of liberalism caused the reception of tolerance to follow two separate courses 
throughout the 20th century. In very general terms: in contrast to the right-wing liberals who, by and 
large, stuck to Grundtvig’s distinction between tolerance and liberality, left-wing liberals accentuated 
the importance of a universal concept of tolerance. 
Recent times have seen a change in the subjects and objects of toleration in Danish discourse. While it 
never acquired an unequivocally positive meaning, the main concern with tolerance has shifted: from 
the intolerance of the majority against immigrants in the 1970s and the 1980s, to a concern, in the 
1990s and the 2000s, that too many immigrants (potentially intolerant themselves) being reluctant to 
integrate would have a corrosive effect on the otherwise well-established, traditional tolerance of the 
majority. There has never been any celebration of multiculturalism in Denmark, beyond seeing 
cultural diversity as an interesting spice of life (foods, folklore, etc).  
 
4.2.2 The Civic Turn in Denmark 
Over the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural 
differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic 
and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of 
multiculturalism. The latter is synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political 
failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society. In general, cultural and 
religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, 
understood as the ability to live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying 
individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.  
The idea that we need to be mutually reassured at the symbolic level that we all belong to the same 
community (in that we affirm the same fundamental democratic values) is now a central part of a self-
conscious discourse on the necessity of ensuring the ‘cohesion’ of Danish society in order to sustain 
the support for the Danish welfare community and its social and moral achievements. While these 
achievements include equality and self-reflective moral and political autonomy for the individual 
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citizen, the idea of social integration through values is closer to the idea of a Gemeinschaft built on 
mechanic solidarity (Durkheim), than to that of a Gesellschaft premised on abstract norms of 
interaction, individualism and division of labour (organic solidarity).  
This ‘civic integrationism,’ with its comprehensive notion of citizenship, draws on central elements in 
national identity history that place a value on the society’s smallness, popular participation, consensus 
and the ability and duty to communicate in the same language across social and political cleavages. 
For the right-of-centre, it is rooted in a broader national and Christian culture. The centre-left also 
subscribes to the citizen ideal, but tends to reject the right wing’s somewhat nationalist interpretation 
of its basis. It is generally believed that status as an equal citizen with identical rights and duties 
provides sufficient support for the realisation of cultural and religious identities and that it is 
accessible to all with the right motivation. Danish citizenship as a social and legal status is not biased 
towards a specific nationality, culture or religion. The form of inclusion available for immigrants is 
hence based on a comprehensive concept of equal citizenship that pertains to all fields of life, 
including family and private life. The only form of recognition given to immigrants is that of 
becoming a full and equal citizen; a form of recognition nonetheless withheld for a considerable 
number of years, until immigrants have proved their determination and ability to become full members 
of society through economic self-sufficiency, Danish language literacy and knowledge of Danish 
history, culture and fundamental political values. The formal legal status is the prize at the end of a 
long trial period that is supposed to ensure and demonstrate the commitment by the new-comer to the 
fundamental democratic values of Danish society. Some symbolic (and legal) recognition is also given 
to working immigrants who bring special professional skills to the country and contribute to its 
economic growth. However, their positive contribution is seen as almost purely economic, not cultural 
(skills, not identity) (Mouritsen & Olsen 2011). 
The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to post-
immigration minorities who arrived from non-western countries in the last 40 to 50 years, most of 
whom are (identified as) Muslims. National and older religious minorities of Greenlanders, Germans, 
Poles and Jews are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal 
rights, symbolic respect and recognition. Immigrants from non-western countries, on the other hand, 
are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability to integrate into the 
‘modern’ and ‘liberal’ Danish society and democracy.  
The turn towards integration has pushed the question of toleration aside. In the discussion of the 
hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence 
or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as 
indifference or naivité, relies on the above mentioned historical preference in some parts of society for 
assertive ‘free-mindedness’ over the morally deficient ‘tolerance’.  
In terms of toleration, the civic integrationism can hence be interpreted as emergence of a somewhat 
paradoxical ‘liberal intolerance’ in Denmark. Liberal intolerance is, first, an increasing non-acceptance 
of too many non-liberal differences in society which make it impossible for people to (mutually) 
reassure themselves that all are willing to support the same liberal democratic values and hence the 
social and institutional basis for the maintenance of a liberal democratic society. This, secondly, 
especially manifests itself against cultural and religious beliefs and practices which are perceived to 
conflict with the constitutive divide in liberal society between the public and the private. A third form 
liberal intolerance is directed against ways of living which contradict the ideal of the ‘active citizen’ 
and autonomous individual who engages responsibly and self-reflectively with him or herself in 
relation to education, work and life in general. Not only are un-modern and un-liberal lives not good 
for persons living them, they also entail a risk of overburdening the institutions of modern welfare 
society through low productivity, welfare reliance and general dys-functionality, not to speak of their 
perceived inappropriateness as role models for coming generations (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012).  
But of course things are not completely one-directional. In the last 4 to 6 years concerns with 
radicalisation and extremism appear to have led policy makers to re-consider whether the swing 
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towards civic integrationism, also fuelled by post 9/11 fears of radical Islamism, has been too one-
sided. Slightly more emphasis is given to concepts like tolerance and equal respect in order to prevent 
minorities from being alienated and turning against society: these concepts are thus back on the 
agenda, not only to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but also improve the safety of the 
majority. Similarly, the centre-left government that replaced the centre-right government in September 
2011 has introduced a new emphasis in the immigration and immigration policy with more talk about 
the respect of differences and the rights of individuals. 
 
The Government wants to create a new balance in Denmark’s integration and immigrant 
policy. A new balance between rights and duties. A new balance where integration is 
prioritized over exclusion; in which ‘what works’ stands over symbolic politics and in which 
the rights of citizens are guarded (Danish Government 2011: 51).  
 
So far the most tangible result of this new policy emphasis is a loosening of the rules on family 
reunification and the conditions for obtaining permanent residency.  
The next section recapitulates the analysis of the conceptions of acceptance, toleration and intolerance 
found in our case studies on education and politics in chapters 2 and 3 and relates them to the Danish 
tradition of free-mindedness or liberality on the one hand and the civic  turn and liberal intolerance on 
the other.  
 
4.2.3. Conceptions of tolerance and intolerance in Danish education and politics 
In chapter 2 we studied the debates on the toleration and its limits in both public and private schools. 
In chapter 3 we studied the views on toleration and it limits in Danish politics pertaining to two public 
events involving controversial Muslim actors.  
 
4.2.3.1. Toleration in Education 
Studying the debates on schools we were able to trace both similarities and differences. First, as 
regards the similarities it is notable that in both cases the focus on integration is very central. There is 
a lot of emphasis on transforming parents and students into democratic citizens with the right values. 
This is what we in chapter 2 called integration through values. In both cases there is strong emphasis 
on democratic citizenship as an ideal that has to be taught and practiced in schools among parents, 
students and school representatives. While the free primary schools are not under the same formal 
obligation to develop students into autonomous persons in the private and professional realm, they are 
under some obligation to create democratic virtues which in fact come very close to this. This is 
reminiscent of liberal perfectionism, or even better a strong republicanism, i.e. the civic integrationism 
which is very dominant in Denmark and which extends to the private life and the family. As 
mentioned, becoming an ‘active citizen’ is regarded as a category which is and should be accessible to 
all. It represents the framework of the good life, including a reflexive relationship to one’s own life 
style and life choices encompassing family relations. There is here no conscious distinction between 
political and comprehensive liberalism.  
To some participants in the debate, the two cases are connected the other way around. The lack of 
tolerance and respect (but not necessarily positive recognition) resulting in an alleged lack of 
accommodation in the public school system partially explains why immigrant students feel forced to 
leave it and attend Islamic free schools. This relates to the general discussion whether it is better to 
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make exemptions to religious fundamentalists to keep them within realm of the public school (e.g. 
Brighouse 2008: 259-62). The alternative of having them leave and create their own private schools 
may on balance be worse because of the disintegrative effects etc. However, the Danish Government 
has not entered into this balancing act. It decided to ensure that also private schools are required to 
teach civic education.  
Another similarity is that both public school autonomy and private school autonomy is defended, 
while increasingly circumscribed by central state regulation (goals, civic education). Two other 
competing steering rationales blend into the discussion about school autonomy and the rights of 
parents to choose school for their children. One relates to the concern about the academic effects (on 
weak learners) of segregation, and segregation’s effect on the feeling of community and the 
acquisition of tolerance towards others. The other relates to New Public Management ideas in the 
governance of the school sector: the schools compete for students and parents as customers (the 
money follows the student). The schools’ ability to deliver educational service is measured on 
centrally set goals. This is a question of creating a market rather than a question of ideologies, culture 
and religion. It is not clear that the market necessarily protects or leads to diversity: the same reduced 
number of models may be pursued with more or less success and resources.  
In both the public school case and the Islamic free school case we see instances of nationalist and 
liberal intolerance although the distinction is easier to track in the Islamic free schools case (see 
below). 
However, the counter discourses are different in the two cases. In the public schools case there is a 
pragmatic discourse which ultimately rests on a conception of toleration and respect which views 
others as moral and political equals (even when they endorse the ‘wrong’ values). This is far from the 
Danish liberality tradition and close to a concept of civility (Lægaard 2011). In fact it even seems to 
go ‘beyond civility’ as it entails a form of curiosity towards that to which one objects. At the same 
time, it is less than positive recognition of differences, identities and values as valuable per se.  
The other counter discourse invokes the Danish tradition of liberality. Sometimes it shades into a 
defence of free school autonomy and parents’ choice based on universal liberal principles and on the 
notion that people (parents and schools) should be trusted to use their freedom responsibly. In the 
universalistic version, it relies on the concept of regarding others as moral and political equals who 
can make these choices for themselves.  
The question is then whether the debates on schools and the ensuing policies are in line with the 
Danish tradition for toleration or whether they represent a break with it. No doubt, public school 
autonomy has been reduced in the recent years. However, there is a continued strong preference across 
the political spectrum for continued school autonomy and the permissibility of local accommodation 
according to experiences and conditions lie well within the tradition. Moreover, part of the defence of 
local autonomy comes from a New Public Management perspective championing marketization. In 
fact, the possibility of being able to choose a public school outside of one’s assigned school district 
seems to undercut the idea that the school is tied to a specific local democratically constituted ‘school 
community’. 
The pragmatic approach in the public school system to differences is also in line with the Danish 
tradition where ‘cooperation’ between different groups at the local level across differences has been 
seen as a virtue. On the other hand, the theoretical underpinning of ‘appreciative dialogue’ seems to be 
rather far away from the critical and confrontational ethos contained in the Danish idea about 
liberality.  
In the free school case both proponents and opponents of more regulation see themselves as protectors 
of the Danish free school tradition. For the opponents, the political ambition to control and monitor 
what free schools teach students is a radical break with the tradition. Indeed, in the tradition of the 
Danish liberality, the rights of the parents/schools should be protected from the majority, while the 
Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde 
96 
majority – or anybody – would have the right freely and bluntly to criticise views and practices they 
find wrong. 
In another interpretation, the free school tradition (the legacy of Grundtvig and Kold) is founded on a 
democratic movement against a repressive and anti-democratic state, meaning that the whole 
‘purpose’ of the tradition was to create democratically engaged citizens. The right of the minority 
(parents) to form their own school is seen as a democratic minority right. Accordingly, those who use 
this right do so out of respect for fundamental democratic principles. This can be seen in the Danish 
Government’s justification of its introduction and expansion of the ‘democracy and freedom clause’ in 
the law on free primary schools in 2002 and 2005. Educationalist and school historian Ove Korsgaard 
describes this break with the tradition as a way of defending it in these terms: 
Recent years’ tightening of the control represents a break with a tradition that goes way back 
in time. But the reason is that we now have a number of schools which do not place themselves 
in the classic free school tradition. Earlier some schools built on a different cultural or 
pedagogical foundation, but there were not a lot of schools whose support for the democracy 
we live in could be questioned (Ove Korsgaard, Kristeligt Dagblad, 20.09.2005). 
 
Of course, opponents of the restricted school autonomy would say that this represents a lack of trust in 
the ability of parents and schools to use their freedom responsibly and hence a lack of respect for 
minorities as moral and political equals who are entitled to make their own decisions, even ‘wrong’ 
ones.  
Chapter 2 demonstrated that there are two types of intolerance in the Danish School debate: nationalist 
and liberal intolerance. Nationalist intolerance is based on the view that certain cultural and religious 
practices non-acceptable because they may undermine core national values and eventually the identity 
of Danish society. Liberal intolerance predicated on the civic turn in Denmark appears both in the 
public school case and in the free school case. The first modality is most easily traced in the free 
school case and regards the divisive and segregative effects of too many religious (Islamic) free 
schools. Too much diversity endangers the social basis for maintaining a liberal democratic society. 
The second modality of liberal intolerance is seen in the concern that central liberal norms are 
undermined (in casu gender equality, democracy and fundamental rights). The third modality regards 
the creation of ‘liberal people’ and/or ‘active citizens.’ Again this modality is most obvious in the free 
school case where Islamic free schools are criticised for not preparing students to become competent 
individuals and citizens in a modern society ‘with freedom and democracy’. Of course, it can be 
debated how ‘liberal perfectionist’ this criticism really is. Some non-perfectionist strands of liberalism 
would also be concerned about the potential harm done to the fundamental interests/rights of children 
by not providing them with the preconditions for a life independent of others and/or of the pursuit of 
collective political goals of different groups, minorities as well as majorities (Gutman 1995; Brighouse 
1998). 
In the Danish school debate it is difficult to disentangle nationalist and liberal intolerance since 
nationalists often endorse very liberal values which they claim are special Danish values (or a special 
Danish interpretation of these values) rooted in a (Christian) national cultural tradition.  
Conceptions of tolerance are in the Danish debate on schools are based on both pragmatic and 
principled reasons. The pragmatic defence of tolerance is in the public school case found, first, in the 
defence of school autonomy by the ministers. It is seen as suboptimal and epistemologically 
challenging to make rules on the (non) accommodation of cultural and religious differences which 
should apply uniformly to all schools in Denmark. Secondly, tolerance is defended pragmatically at 
the school level with reference to the goal at hand: accommodations have to be made to ensure the 
well-being and education of the children. In the free school case, the pragmatic argument for tolerance 
is less prevalent and atypical in a country with a strong concern about integration: free schools allow 
the peaceful co-existence of two religions/cultures which are fundamentally incompatible.  
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In the public school case the argument for toleration on pragmatic grounds in the ‘integration through 
inclusion’ strategy shades into arguments which mirror more principled liberal arguments for 
toleration, namely that immigrant parents need to be regarded as moral and political equals who are 
entitled to make their own (even wrong) choices and that their views (as parents) have to be taken 
seriously as those of equals. In the free school case we find the same kind of argument with regard to 
the schools’ and the parents’ use of their freedom of choice. At times, this argument is based on the 
Danish free school tradition rather than on general liberal principles. This is the part of the ‘free 
mindedness’ or liberality tradition that underscores the guaranteed equal civil rights (legal tolerance). 
The other part of liberality promotes a frank and confrontational ethos combined with the development 
of ‘think skin’ is not very salient here. Underlying these arguments are ‘respect conceptions’ of 
tolerance. 
 
4.2.3.2. Toleration in Politics  
The study of toleration boundary-drawing in public debates in Denmark, presented in chapter 3, found, 
firstly, that despite the proximity in time and resemblances of the illiberal and undemocratic views 
aired at the two meetings, the public debate regarding the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting was skewed towards 
tolerance while the debate regarding Bilal Philips’ visit was skewed toward intolerance. In explaining 
this difference the chapter pointed to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad of the 
two meetings. The significance of intolerance arguments in connection with Philips’ visit is connected 
to the fact that 1) Philips is a foreign citizen, 2) his views on homosexuality and gender equality 
resonated purely with audiences in Denmark (as compared to the criticism of Danish engagement in 
Afghanistan aired by Hizb ut-tahrir), and 3) that the audience at Philips’ lecture was perceived to be 
much wider than the audience at the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting, due to Philips’ international status as an 
Islamic authority, and because of the perceived ‘mainstream’ status of the Islamic Faith Community, 
who invited him to Denmark. Thus, it can be concluded that toleration boundary drawing is shaped 
significantly by the citizenship status and the perceived impact of the object of toleration.  
Secondly, the comparison between the two debates showed a number of recurrent positions of 
tolerance/intolerance across the two cases and involved actors. In both cases the two most prominent 
positions of tolerance are what has been called ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ and ‘tolerance-but-protest’. 
The prominence of the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ positions, it has been argued, is linked to the 
importance of free speech considerations in Danish political culture, which connects toleration 
boundary drawing narrowly with legal limitations on free speech. However, in the debates this 
position is often criticised as a way of avoiding making moral judgement and of taking a stand. The 
criticism connects to the tradition of liberality in Denmark, which sees this kind of tolerance and 
behaviour as naive and a sort of value relativism. Put another way, tolerance is seen as a form of moral 
failure: It implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right and wrong. Likewise, the 
discursive strategy of leading politicians in the two debates to make boundary drawing a matter of 
legality rather than politics - something for courts and lawyers to decide on – was criticised, not least 
the Danish People’s Party. Representatives of the party on several occasions called upon the involved 
ministers to ‘step up’, ‘take responsibility’, ‘be more proactive’ and if necessary change the legal 
framework to make it possible to intervene. In line with the Danish tradition of free-mindedness or 
liberality this criticism of tolerance calls for more active engagement with and confrontation of what is 
found to be wrong. Such a stand was inherent to the position of ‘toleration-but-protest’. Echoing the 
Danish tradition of liberality many actors of this positioned argued that we must tolerate, but we must 
also publicly challenge what we find to be outrageous and wrong. One version of this argument stated 
that the meetings of Hizb ut-tahrir and Bilal Philips should be tolerated, views discussed and counter-
arguments displayed. Not so much because marking disagreement is important in itself, but because 
we by airing disagreement and debating views we disapprove of are forced to reconfirm, reconsider 
and refresh our commitment to our own basic values and beliefs. 
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Regarding the most dominant positions of intolerance these are in both cases found to be ‘intolerance-
due-to-perceived-threat-and harm’ and modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’. In both cases radicalization 
scenarios of the meetings are constructed and linked to a discursive strategy of securitization, which 
attempts to push toleration boundary drawing out of the political arena and into the realm of the extra-
political. The meetings hereby become, it is argued, not a matter of political or moral boundary 
drawing, but of security concerns, and toleration is therefore not an option. The prominence of the 
modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’ has to do, as argued in chapter 3, with the interconnectedness 
between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering. These arguments of intolerance are 
exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the 
meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in 
opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary 
drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must 
be shared. The prominence of these liberal conceptions of intolerance testifies to the fact that 
alongside a continued tradition of Danish liberality Denmark has also seen a ‘civic turn’ in the last ten 
years, underlining the need to ensure commitment among the populace to key liberal democratic 
principles and values.  
 
4.3. Moving beyond Toleration in Denmark – ‘Positive Recognition’ and Inclusion to the 
Realm of ‘the Normal’?  
In the debate on toleration, some have argued that toleration, or at least toleration in its most classic 
guises, is deficient as principle of inclusion. The reason for this is that toleration involves a negative 
attitude towards that to which one objects and that the liberal doctrine on toleration does not take into 
consideration that not all differences are the same and all therefore cannot be relegated to the private 
realm as presupposed by liberalism’s divide between the public and the private (Modood & 
Dobbernack 2011). Therefore arguments have been made to move beyond toleration, either by 
recognising them instrumentally so as to include them in the realm of ‘the normal’ or by positively 
recognising their intrinsic value. For Galeotti, who argues for conceiving of ‘toleration as recognition’, 
the notion of toleration should hence be expanded to include a form of recognition, understood 
modestly as ‘the acceptance and hence the inclusion of a different trait, practice or identity in the range 
of the legitimate, viable, “normal” options of an open society’ (Galeotti 2006: 574). Others have 
demanded that we move even further and apply ‘positive recognition’ as a civic principle in all our 
relations (Modood 2007: 57). This implies working actively to turn the negative and stigmatic status of 
some (typically non-European) identities ‘into a positive feature of the societies of which they are now 
a part of’ (Modood 2007: 43). Such positive recognition, especially of the latter kind, is demanding 
and something rather different than the negative ‘objection’ entailed in the concept of toleration (Jones 
2006; Lægaard 2011; Forst 2008).  
The question is now whether there are tendencies to move beyond toleration in Denmark? As 
demonstrated in chapter 2, it is not clear that the debates on education and concepts elaborated school 
practices of dialogue contain explicit moves to go beyond toleration in this manner. In the public 
school case, the theoretical framework underlying the idea of the ‘appreciative dialogue’ requires 
respect for the status of immigrant parents as moral and ‘political’ equals, but stops short of 
demanding positive recognition of the identities and values of immigrant parents. The recognition 
of/respect for the parents concerns them as people who hold values, not their values. The central idea 
in the appreciative dialogue comes close to the notion of civility and perhaps even goes beyond, since 
it demands a principled curiosity towards that to which one objects and even towards that which one 
rejects. This arguably implies expanding the range of what is ‘normal’ and part of the ‘public space’ of 
the local school community (cf. Galeotti 2006). In the free school case there were hardly any traces of 
attempts to move beyond toleration, although one commentator noted that it was strange that nobody 
could recognise the positive value of immigrants acquiring Danish traditions for collective self-
organisation in associations and free schools.  
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Chapter 3 likewise hardly showed any instances of arguments going beyond toleration of the two 
investigated public meetings. Thus, the debates, regarded the boundary drawing between intolerable 
and tolerable norms, attitudes and values. Nobody in the debates argued for the recognition, respect as 
equal or admission to the realm of normal for the views raised at the meetings. Arguments were either 
for intolerance of the views, however for quite different reasons, or for some kind of ‘teeth-grinding’ 
tolerance. This is not very surprising considering the nature and content of the meetings - having 
focused on meetings arranged by or including controversial Muslim actors with views, which are by 
many perceived as ‘radical’. To argue for positive recognition of e.g. Bilal Philips views on 
homosexuals or Hizb ut-tahrir’s views on gender equality would be political suicide in the Danish 
context. Nevertheless, at least one example in that direction can be found in the material. Among 
individual Muslims interviewed in connection with the Bilal Philips meeting it is interesting to see 
how a few argue that Philips views on homosexuality is ‘normal’ and widely shared within Muslim 
communities. However, rather than leading to positive recognition of Philips’ views such statements 
led to counter-statements arguing that this only shows how different the boundaries for what is normal 
and what is not is within Muslim minorities and the majority population, and that Bilal Philips in this 
way is a symptom rather than the cause of the problem.  
In general the absence of moves beyond toleration in the cases that we studied in Denmark is partly 
predicated on the rather restrictive ‘civic turn’ that Denmark has witnessed in the last 10 to 15 years 
and which was very heavily pushed by the centre-right government (2001 – 2011) who was kept in 
power by the right wing Danish People’s Party– and of course partly based on the fact the public 
meetings studied in chapter 3 were indeed rather controversial in terms of their content. As mentioned 
the centre-left government in power since September 2011 has introduced a new emphasis in the 
immigration and immigration policy with more respect for differences and rights. However, this does 
not entail any immediate move ‘beyond toleration’:  
 
The Government’s policy is based on respect and reasonable demands. Those who want to be 
a part of Denmark should not constantly be met with new unreasonable demands, which 
exclude rather that integrate. The Government want a Denmark, where all regardless of their 
background feel welcome and participate actively in our community. A Denmark, where all 
can speak the Danish language. A Denmark, where all get an education that they can use. A 
Denmark, where both women and men participate in the labour market. And a Denmark, 
where people with different social and ethnic backgrounds live side by side. That is what 
Denmark needs (Danish Government 2011: 51).  
 
So even though the centre-left government also underline that diversity is a strength for Denmark in a 
globalised world etc, it should be clear from the above that the form of recognition that it is possible to 
obtain is the recognition as an active citizen who participates in education, in the labour market and in 
society in general and who do not separate themselves out or distance themselves from the rest. It is 
therefore unlikely that we will many attempts to move ‘beyond toleration’ in Denmark in the near 
future if by this we understand something akin to the positive recognition advocated by some 
multiculturalists (Mouritsen 2012).  
 
4.4. Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance across different Spheres/Situations: 
Educational vs. Political life – Praxis vs. Principle? 
Looking across the analyses of debates on toleration in education and in politics we tend to find that 
people who are involved with the task of reaching practical solutions to problems in everyday 
situations are more tolerant and pragmatic than people who are not. Hence in the study of public 
schools we find that the more pragmatic stance on accommodation of cultural and religious diversity 
Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde 
100 
comes from the professional community who are concerned about ensuring the participation of 
students in educational activities, whilst politicians generally pursued a much more ideologically laden 
agenda with a focus on fundamental principles and questions of identity.  
This pattern tends to repeat itself when we look at toleration within the field of politics itself. Here we 
saw how the non-political actors engaged with the everyday practices of e.g. deciding who should be 
allowed to book and rent a particular venue are generally more tolerant and pragmatic in their 
argumentation. Following this logic we would expect both debates analysed vis-à-vis Hizb ut-tahrir’s 
meeting and Bilal Philips to be skewed towards intolerance as neither debate centred on finding 
practical solutions to everyday problem. The nature of these debates was much more symbolic, leaving 
politicians and commentators the room to argue in principled ways about the general question of 
tolerance/intolerance of the meetings. Nevertheless, as shown in chapter 3, the debate surrounding 
Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was in fact skewed towards tolerance, not intolerance. One reason for this, 
however, supports the argument that circumstances of practical decision-making have a moderating 
effect on intolerance. Thus, as argued in chapter 3, the fact that Hizb ut-tahrir’s members are Danish 
citizens in contrast to Philips, and that they and their views therefore are not just going to disappear, 
has made some actors more inclined to tolerate and seek more pragmatic positions.  
Taken together the studies carried out in chapters 2 and 3 suggest that engagement with concrete 
activities and working under the pressure to produce solutions that will get things working increases 
the inclination to tolerate. While there is no guarantee that contact with others will make one more 
tolerant in one’s attitude towards (or beliefs about) others, it does seem to indicate that a goal oriented 
activity is more likely to lead to toleration in practice than ideological debates about basic principles 
and identities. 
 
4.5. The Impact of Toleration Boundary-drawing on Affected minorities: Intended and 
Unintended Consequences 
The civic turn in Denmark has the ostensive goal of integrating people into Danish society, generally 
and in its various institutional spheres. In the literature there is no clear cut conclusion on which kind 
of policies lead to inclusion and exclusion or segregation respectively (cp. Koopmans et al 2005; 
Koopmans 2010; Joppke 2009). From our studies only suggestive results can be gathered as to 
whether the debates and the policies concerning integration requirements and the boundaries of 
toleration affect minorities in a positive or in a negative manner. Results which would require further 
more thoroughgoing research. In the following we will take a brief look at them.  
Chapter 2 gave us that in the case of public schools the dialogue-based integration through inclusion 
and the related practical measures seem to be effective in ensuring the welfare and education of the 
students. Conversely, the more principled and symbolically laden ‘integration through values’ 
discourse can be counterproductive for the involved parties’ motivation and mutual communication.  
In the free school case, it is unclear whether or not policies are necessary and/or should be regarded as 
a success. Undoubtedly they prevent schools from teaching openly divisive and fundamentalist 
doctrines and they are likely to have reduced the number of schools with low academic quality and 
deficient civic education strategies. However, the unintended consequence of state monitoring may be 
alienation rather than integration. The price to be paid may be that students, parents and teachers feel 
that they are under a general suspicion of not being full and trustworthy citizens; a suspicion they will 
never be able to remove. Moreover, the method for establishing whether or not a school lives up to the 
freedom and democracy clause is intransparent to the target group and gives them the feeling of not 
having secure rights. 
It is difficult to gauge the long term effects on toleration, feeling of community and reciprocal 
understanding of the general segregation that results from the existence of free primary schools and 
the free choice of public school. However, there is no doubt that segregation can have serious effects 
on the academic achievements of weak learners in particular. On the other hand, for some minority 
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students Islamic free schools may give a more secure learning environment where their identity is 
positively reinforced or just not ‘an issue.’ This may improve their academic achievements. In fact, 
measured on their teaching effect the top 20 schools in Denmark include four Arabic/Islamic free 
schools (undervisningseffekt.dk; see the general introduction to the report). It should also be added 
that there is no general evidence to support that students of private (religiously based) schools are less 
tolerant and less civic minded than students from public schools (Glenn & De Groof  2005). 
Chapter 3 gave us that although the controversies regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting and Bilal 
Philips’ visit did not generate any concrete policy implications, which directly altered Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
or the Islamic Faith Community’s (or other Muslim actors) possibilities of using public meetings as a 
platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, as 
argued in chapter 3, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and 
processes of othering (Schiffauer 2012: 2-3). Toleration boundary drawing implies othering, as it 
functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and 
intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same time constructing an in-group and 
an out-group. As the differences that generate public debate and activate toleration boundary drawing 
today primarily are differences of Muslim views and practices, the main out-group constructed is that 
of the ‘Muslim other’. Often it is Muslims in general who are designated as the ‘other’, covering up 
important differences within the Muslim community. This interdependence between toleration 
boundary drawing and processes of othering affects the Danish Muslim community in at least two 
different ways.  
One way is that the intense focus on toleration boundary drawing in regard to specific views/practices 
can lead to a lack of boundary drawing vis-à-vis internal differences in the Muslim community. The 
public drive to cast Hizb ut-Tahrir and its views and practices as intolerable, may implicitly lead to 
misrecognition of variation in views and practices within the Muslim community. This indirect 
othering of all Muslims as potentially problematic may serve to delimit the possibilities of being 
tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims.  
A second effect of the great outrage regarding the two meetings on Muslim actors’ possibilities for 
participation is that as a Muslim actor you are today expected proactively to endorse central liberal 
values (freedom of speech; gender equality; non-violence, secularism; rule of law etc.), and dismiss 
certain illiberal ideas and values (Sharia; support of violent jihad; gender segregation; homophobia 
etc.) as a prerequisite for participation in public debates and political life. If you fail to do this or 
dismiss it as irrelevant to the question at hand, Muslims risk being excommunicated and having their 
‘moderateness’ or ‘liberalness’ drawn into question. Thus, an un-intended effect of the intense public 
debate about the illiberal views and practices of Hizb ut-Tahrir or Bilal Philips is that more liberal 
Muslims are forced to spend time and resources distancing themselves from certain views and 
practices, and endorsing others, before they are certified as tolerable and legitimate public debaters. 
Put another way, Muslims are forced to discursively ‘perform safety’ and certify boundaries in order 
to be accepted as part of the in-group. In this way the boundary drawing regarding ‘radical’ Muslim 
actors in public debates generates special conditions for participation vis-à-vis also ‘moderate’ 
Muslims actors.  
In sum, our studies suggest that one should be cautious about making policies which inadvertently 
produce exclusion and alienation rather than inclusion and integration and which make almost 
impossible for minorities to be perceived and act in a differentiated manner. Policies which aim at 
security of rights, specifying more precisely what requirements should be met and how they should be 
met may be a way to avoid this. As concerns the effects of public political debate itself, these are 
harder to regulate and control since this would imply a regulation on the freedom of speech and 
openness of debate. Still, for participants in such debates it is worth considering the further effects of 
public interventions and the framing of problems and identities. We now briefly turn to this issue. 
 
Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde 
102 
4.6. What Could be Done? 
In relation to the public schools it is advisable to continue to spread the ideas of the appreciative 
dialogue between the schools, the parents and the students. This ought to be the task of the Ministry of 
Education as well as the municipal school administrations. One risk pertaining to the local school 
autonomy in Denmark is that it can be random whether schools adopt best practices. Or even make the 
effort to seek out information and learn about new methods. At the same time it should be remembered 
that the appreciative dialogue itself presupposes local autonomy since solutions found through 
appreciative dialogue require local decision makers to act in a flexible manner. It is procedural and not 
a one-size-fits-all approach. 
In the relation to the private schools, it is worth considering the extent to which a diverse free school 
sector is dependent on the fact that the costs of establishing and maintaining a free primary schools 
with an alternative philosophy and pedagogy is not too high in terms of having to document and 
monitor academic standards and the requirement to teach freedom and democracy. The apparent 
uncertainty that some schools feel about what it takes to live up to requirements and their reluctance to 
run the risk of not being found to live up to them may well lead them to not use the degree of freedom 
that the current law actually allow them. While there is a dilemma contained in forcing a limited 
definition on how schools ought to teach in line with the freedom and democracy clause because it 
invariably will reduce the flexibility in how the requirement can be met, a more simple and transparent 
evaluation model could increase the feeling of certainty. Moreover, it would be fairer to schools if the 
model was mainly oriented towards the kind of knowledge that should be transmitted through lessons 
since a requirement to create a specific democratic ethos among students arguably is much more 
difficult to measure. When does for example criticism of certain aspects of democracy as a form of 
government represent lack commitment to democratic values? After all criticism of democracy 
abound, even among people who carry no totalitarian convictions. The emphasis on knowledge rather 
than on ethos also seem to be in line with the experience of the Ministry of Education has had with 
monitoring, namely that is usually lack of knowledge transmitted through lessons that is the problem, 
not attitudes towards democracy and freedom. Moreover, increased certainty among schools may also 
lessen potential alienating effects of monitoring, resulting from the experience of being under general 
suspicion. 
At a different level of policy, chapter 3 shows that principled public debates about the limits of 
toleration are often intense and heated. However, as the material also shows such debates tend to fade 
rather quickly with media attention. This indicates that it would be unwise to change legislation in the 
area of free speech or public assembly on the grounds of individual, controversial cases. In many ways 
the two cases investigated in chapter 3 indicates that Denmark has the necessary regulation in place to 
deal with ‘radical’ statements in the public sphere. The room of tolerance is wide in Denmark due to 
lenient free speech regulation and the Danish tradition of free-mindedness or liberality. At the same 
time the room of tolerance could be substantially narrowed within existing legislation if a political 
majority wanted it, as shown in the case of Bilal Philips where nothing hindered that Philips had been 
denied entry to Denmark.  
In both the cases of education and politics, toleration comes in combination with security of rights. In 
the case of appreciate dialogue in public schools, the confrontational ethos strongly present in the 
Danish tradition of free-mindedness is replaced with a more gentle approach which seem to entail ‘gag 
rules’ as to ‘what’ and in particular ‘how’ certain issues are addressed (cf. Holmes 1988). This of 
course differs from the ‘rules of engagement’ known from and ultimately legitimate at the level of 
public political debate. However, here it should be remembered that the two approaches to debate and 
dialogue relate to different levels of politics and policy. At the level of schools there are not only 
informal differentiations in status and power, but also formal ones. In the political public debate 
equality necessarily must be assumed in relation to the freedom of speech. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
In this final chapter we have brought together the results of our studies of acceptance, toleration and 
intolerance in Danish society, education and politics. It is difficult to make very general conclusions as 
to whether the Danish tradition of free-mindedness has been broken. However, we find that the 
tradition could be said to be broken in three ways. First, the tradition’s firm insistence on equal and 
legally secured rights to say, think and do whatever you want as long as it does not harm others 
directly seem to have been narrowed down in some instances where ‘the liberal intolerance’ of ‘the 
civic turn’ has led to an increased emphasis on the need to incur ‘common liberal values’ in current 
and future citizens in order to preserve the social and institutional basis for the liberal democratic order 
and in order to promote the creation of liberal people with liberal ‘ways of life’. Secondly, calls to 
forbid certain interventions by controversial religious groups and individuals through the restriction of 
rights also borders on this tradition which emphasises the combination of secure rights with harsh 
criticism (when needed): ‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor.’ Finally and conversely,  the 
pragmatic response to the dominating discourse on ‘integration through values’ in the form of 
appreciative dialogue promoted by professional school community discontinue another part of the 
free-mindedness tradition in that it shies away from the confrontational ethos found in debate culture 
of this tradition. 
Our studies have found that despite these new developments, or perhaps because of them, moves to go 
beyond toleration are not very dominating and are not likely to develop in Denmark even with the 
2011 change in government from centre-right to centre-left. Our studies also indicate that having an 
action oriented or solution seeking element in the interaction between parties rather than a purely 
discursive exchange on principles and identities lead to more toleration in practice (if not necessarily 
in belief and attitude). This suggests that highly charged debates on the relative worth of different 
principles and identities is just as likely to lead to further intolerance as it is to move participants 
beyond toleration towards a notion of positive recognition. 
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